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ABSTRACT
In the wake of the political upheavals of the twentieth
century, political theorists have rediscovered the
unsentimental teachings of Thomas Hobbes.

Hobbes was a

philosopher of order during a period of disorder— the
English Civil War.

He taught that sovereignty ought to be

absolute and unchallengeable, so that order might be
preserved.

In particular, the sovereign ought to have the

power to approve or disapprove political and religious
teachings— in effect, to establish an unchallengeable "civil
theology."

Hobbesian sovereignty might preserve order, but

it would also cut off political discussion and debate in
summary fashion.

In the twentieth century, political

theorists have suspected that ideologies such as those of
free-market capitalism, secularism, or the liberaldemocratic welfare state might be among the components of a
contemporary "civil theology."

This dissertation will

examine the thought of Hobbes, but will focus special
attention on those political theorists for whom he has held
the most fascination in the twentieth century.

The

interpretations offered by Leo Strauss, Michael Oakeshott,
and C. B. Macpherson, all of whom have written extensively
on Hobbes, will be examined in detail.

The brief but

perceptive contributions offered by Hannah Arendt and Eric
Voegelin will be considered, as will the interpretation of
Thomas Spragens, a political theorist of the postwar
vii
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generation who has attempted to synthesize some of the main
currents in twentieth-century philosophical and political
thought.
To an extent, the thought of all six of the thinkers
considered here bears upon the question of which doctrine—
that of laissez-faire capitalism or of the liberaldemocratic welfare state— most closely resembles a sinister
"neo-Hobbesian" dogma which threatens to circumscribe
political debate.

This issue will be the subject of some

concluding remarks, which will draw upon the contributions
of the six twentieth-century thinkers while invoking the
contrast between Hobbes and Aristotle as a central theme.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The recent commemoration of the four hundredth
anniversary of Hobbes's birth provides an appropriate
occasion for an examination of the treatment of the author
of Leviathan in contemporary political thought.

Hobbes's

presence in twentieth-century political theory is
ubiquitous; almost every major thinker comments on him to
some extent.

He was a thinker who attempted to bring order

out of disorder; contemporary disorders, ranging from the
totalitarian disasters of our century to the anomie of urban
civilization, have led reflective people back to his
thought.
Hobbes's stark, unsentimental political thought has
attracted the attention of a number of commentators in the
post-World War II era; despite the ready availability of the
materials, neither the treatments of Hobbes offered by these
thinkers nor the broader implications of these treatments
have been treated systematically heretofore.

Hannah Arendt

critiqued Hobbes in a brief section of The Origins of
Totalitarianism, as did Eric Voegelin in The New Science of
Politics.

More extensive treatments are offered by Leo

Strauss (in Natural Right and Historv. The Political
Philosophv of Hobbes, and elsewhere), Michael Oakeshott
(including his introduction to Leviathan and the essay "The
Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes"), and C. B.
Macpherson (especially in The Political Theorv of Possessive
1
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Individualism).

More recently, Thomas Spragens has offered

a critique of "scientistic" or "technocratic" tendencies in
modern politics in works such as The Irony of Liberal
Reason; the culpability of Hobbes for such developments is
considered in Spragens's The Politics of Motion.
It seems plausible to suggest that twentieth-century
history has made Hobbes's political thought salient.

The

scenes of street fighting in prewar Germany between Nazi and
Communist partisans, precursors of much worse things to
come, bring to mind both the Hobbesian "war of all against
all" and the near-anarchical situation of the English Civil
War which eventually confronted Hobbes.

For severe

political upheavals, Hobbes prescribed a severe solution:
the institution of a sovereign power to which no opposition
would be allowed.

This new kind of sovereign would dictate

a "civil theology" for society; to allow dissent from this
"civil theology" would only introduce discord.

This feature

of Hobbes's theory— its attribution to the sovereign of
authority to judge of the admissibility of doctrines and
opinions, political, religious, or otherwise— represents the
central theme of this study.

Some contemporary observers

note the growth of the modern state and wonder whether it
has not taken on a Hobbesian character already.

Direct

political coercion is not necessary for a state to take on
such a Hobbesian character, according to several of the
thinkers to be considered; such a "neo-Hobbesianism" could
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be the result of the uncritical acceptance of a
"conventional wisdom" which becomes a background assumption
underlying all political discussion.

Which modern political

tendency represents such a new "civil theology"?

Is

capitalism the new dogma from which no dissent is tolerated?
Or, is the new dogma not capitalism but rather "secular
humanism" or the doctrines of welfare-state liberalism?
These are among the considerations that explain the
fascination Hobbes has held for interpreters of the modern
political predicament.
In addition to the intrinsic value of a consideration
of Hobbes's fascinating albeit sobering political thought,
his example provides a convenient connecting theme for the
study of a set of issues that have concerned the postwar
thinkers discussed herein.

Besides the aforementioned theme

of the Hobbesian sovereign as political censor, a subsidiary
theme for this work will be the contrast between Hobbes and
Aristotle.

The gap between these two thinkers provides a

convenient evaluative criterion.

This contrast is relevant

to the somewhat related questions of the legitimacy of the
range of activities of the contemporary state and of the
centrality of the political to human nature.
An initial concern will be a consideration of the life
and teachings of Hobbes himself.

His attraction to a

metaphysics patterned after a mechanical, Galilean physical
science, and the influence of this mechanistic tendency on
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his political thought (an issue that has been the subject of
lively debate among scholars) will be considered.

A

connecting thread can be detected, joining a mechanistic
metaphysics to a materialistic account of sensation,
implying the Hobbesian "state of nature" in which human
beings collide with each other like molecules in a test tube
unless they make a covenant with a sovereign protector.

The

technical minutiae of Hobbes's doctrine are not, however, as
central to this study as is the historical setting in which
Hobbes found himself. As his career developed
contemporaneously with a period of political upheaval in
England, Hobbes developed a low regard for popular
government, an aversion which was reinforced by the rantings
of the sectarian extremists which grew louder with the
approach of civil war.

His low opinion of democracy may

have resulted from his early translation of Thucydides'
histories, in which a decadent demos hastened the decline of
Athens.
Leo Strauss will be the first twentieth-century thinker
whose reflections on Hobbes will be considered.

Strauss

views Hobbes as something of a culprit; he sees Hobbes,
along with Machiavelli, as the originator of the modern
doctrine of natural right, which represents a retrogression
from classic natural right.

Modern natural right begins

with the individual and his passions, and proceeds to affirm
the rights of the individual against the state and against
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his fellows; classic natural right begins with the state and
the citizen's duty to it, along with the state's role in
inculcating virtuous habits in the citizenry.

Modern

natural right is reductionistic and egalitarian, while
classic natural right acknowledges the natural distinctions
to be found among men.

Strauss acknowledges that Hobbes's

thought tended to justify a bourgeois ethic of capitalistic
acquisition; nevertheless, he sees the Hobbesian theory as
of a piece with the socialist and welfare-state tendencies
of the twentieth century.

Hobbesian thought, together with

modern liberalism and socialism, is seen as leading to the
establishment of a "universal and homogeneous state,"
dedicated to the enlightenment and prosperity of all, which
affirms an ecmal entitlement as a matter of right (rather
than the right of the superior to rule the inferior), and
which takes on a Hobbesian character as it homogenizes away
all cultural distinctiveness and particularity.
Of all the twentieth-century thinkers, Michael
Oakeshott probably takes the most favorable view of Hobbes.
Oakeshott thinks that Hobbes has captured the problematical
character of man's existence as a social being.

The

Hobbesian solution to the political problem carries special
significance for Oakeshott as a thinker who argues that the
scope of political activity ought to be kept strictly
limited.

Central to Oakeshott's thought is the notion of

civitas or civil association as a political ideal.
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According to this conception, the state exists only to
stipulate conditions to be observed by individuals (as well
as groups below the level of the state) in their pursuit of
whatever ends they choose.

Opposed to the conception of

societas or civitas is that of universitas. in which the
state enlists all its subjects in the pursuit of a single
substantive purpose.

Oakeshott is attracted to the

Hobbesian doctrine of sovereignty because, whatever its
shortcomings, it would at least prevent political
"busybodies" from enrolling everyone in their favorite
projects; everyone minds his own business in the Hobbesian
state.

Hobbes therefore offers, if not a version of

"secular salvation," at least a "second-best deliverance"
from the human predicament with respect to politics.
C. B. Macpherson implicates Hobbes in his critique of
"possessive market society."

Macpherson sees the thought of

Hobbes, along with that of Locke, as a component in the
self-justificatory process of our "possessive individualist"
society.

Macpherson concedes a tentative validity to

Hobbes, but he emphasizes that some of Hobbes's assumptions
do not hold for man in general, but instead are appropriate
only within possessive market society.

For Hobbes's theory

to operate, social assumptions, not just metaphysical or
psychological ones, are required.

Consider, for instance,

Hobbes's conception of power as a "zero-sum game," in which
power is a matter of order or rank, and one man's power
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implies a reduction in the power of others.

This assumption

is valid for possessive market society, but it would not
hold for the traditional society that preceded it, argues
Macpherson.

Neither would it hold for the genuine

participatory democracy for which Macpherson holds out hope.
Such a participatory democracy would better reflect the
whole of man's natural capacities, he claims.

He sees hope

for the emergence of a more full-fledged democracy in the
ideologies of some of the "Third World" nations.
Concise but perceptive critiques of Hobbes have been
offered by both Arendt and Voegelin.

For Arendt, the crisis

of modernity consists in large part of the atrophy of the
political; the thought cf Hobbes is held to represent the
culmination of this development.

In the Hobbesian state,

acquiescence in the commands of the sovereign exhausts the
political realm; wide-ranging political discussion and
engagement throughout society would be superfluous or worse.
From Arendt's perspective, the extent to which a thinker
represents an antidote to the crisis of modernity depends on
his affirmation or denial of the Aristotelian dictum that
man is a political animal. For Voegelin, on the other hand,
civilizational crisis is not so much political as it is
spiritual.

A central concern for Voegelin is the relation

between religion and politics in the Hobbesian state.
Although Hobbes takes considerable pains to emphasize that
his doctrine is not inconsistent with the existence of a
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Christian commonwealth, he holds that the sovereign must be
the final arbiter of the admissibility of religious
teachings; the superiority of sources outside the political
realm, such as revelation, is denied.

Hobbes has tried to

obscure the fact that his political doctrine must claim a
validity superior to that of Christianity; this prompts
Voegelin to categorize the doctrine as yet another symptom
of "modern gnosticism."
The final twentieth-century thinker to be considered is
Thomas Spragens, who has attempted to interpret and
synthesize a wide range of intellectual developments in
fields ranging from political theory to philosophy of
science to the natural sciences themselves.

Spragens has

criticized a tendency toward a "scientistic" or
"technocratic" practice of politics, in which rulers or
their appointees view the citizenry as a collection of
experimental subjects to be manipulated.

The thinking of

Hobbes, whom Spragens has treated at length in his The
Politics of Motion, must be held culpable for contributing
to such "technocratic" tendencies, he argues.

Furthermore,

Spragens compares the "end-less," purposeless universe of
Hobbes unfavorably to an Aristotelian world-view which sees
all beings, including participants in politics, as directed
toward an end in their activities.
Are the activities of the contemporary state
legitimate, and is the realm of politics central to human

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

nature?

As was suggested above, such questions have been

highly contested by postwar political theorists.

The

Aristotelian purposiveness described by Spragens would seem
to suggest affirmative answers to these queries.

It would

seem to be a fair conclusion that Macpherson and Arendt
would give qualified affirmative answers as well, while
Strauss, Oakeshott, and Voegelin would each answer with a
qualified negative.

The point of view to be pursued here is

that insufficient attention has been given to the "neoHobbesian" character of the laissez-faire ideology, to which
Strauss would appear at least to give aid and comfort with
his critique of the "universal and homogeneous state."

For

example, some attention is devoted below to the affinity
felt for Hobbes (and even for the ancient Sophists) as well
as the hostility to both Plato and Aristotle professed by
some of those who have taken the lead in a movement to
revive the classical liberalism of the nineteenth century
(see chapter 8 below, especially 288-92).

Nevertheless, it

is to be conceded that the left-leaning "vanguard" politics
contemplated by Macpherson (and criticized trenchantly by
Spragens) may take on the character of the sinister drive to
build the "universal and homogeneous state" described by
Strauss.
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CHAPTER 2; ERECTING LEVIATHAN— THE THOUGHT
OF THOMAS HOBBES IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
With his proposal for an absolutist sovereign, Thomas
Hobbes presented a stark and unsentimental solution to the
problem of political upheaval and disorder.

The parallels

between the political divisions within seventeenth-century
England and the global ideological upheavals of more recent
times have fascinated twentieth-century political theorists;
several thinkers have taken Hobbes's views as a motif.

A

recurring tendency has been the identification of one
political doctrine or another as a pernicious "neoHobbesianism," an attempt to install certain crucial
background assumptions as a "conventional wisdom" that
effectively becomes removed from political debate.
Tendencies ranging from capitalism to secularism have been
treated as having attained the status of "neoHobbesianisms."
Leo Strauss identified Hobbes, along with his
predecessor Machiavelli, as the initiator of the modern
break with the classical political tradition; he argued that
Hobbes had lowered the sights of political philosophy by
placing right prior to law and passion prior to reason.
Strauss claimed that, by positing an equal natural right
prior to obligation, Hobbes had opened the way for the
building of a tyrannical "universal and homogeneous state"
that would be premised on the satisfaction of men's
10
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"passions," their physical wants and needs.

C. B.

Macpherson devotes about half of his The Political Theorv of
Possessive Individualism to Hobbes; he believes that
Hobbes's conception of power and his view of the individual
as the owner of his capacity to labor represent ideological
assumptions favorable to the development of modern
capitalism.

He holds that such Hobbesian conceptions have

contributed to the passive "consumer society" of modernity,
in which the capacities for activity required for genuine
participatory democracy have atrophied.
If the political disputes attendant to the English
Civil War represented a precursor to the ideological
upheavals of the twentieth century, then Hobbes's thought
can be taken to suggest a solution to current difficulties.
However, recent theorists often have taken Hobbes's
proposals more as a symptom of modernity than as a solution
to modern difficulties.

Eric Voegelin pointed out that

Hobbes's scheme would require a pervasive censorship; while
other peaceable civilizational pursuits would be allowed,
there would be no freedom of political debate, and public
discussion would be strictly regulated.^

For Hannah Arendt,

who emphasized the centrality of the capacity for speech and
discussion to the nature of man in works such as The Human
Condition, modern upheavals are analyzed as consequences of

^Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An Introduction
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 154-55.
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the atrophy of the political; the Hobbesian proposal amounts
to a proposal to aggravate this very atrophy.
Throughout his career, Hobbes's thought developed in a
context of intellectual and political upheaval.

Under such

influences, he developed a political philosophy which
included an insistence on the absolute nature of political
authority.

Since men are passionate creatures whose desires

for the objects of their passions overwhelm their desire for
peace, they must,

to avoid annihilating each other, make a

covenant to establish an absolute sovereign whose
determinations may not be resisted. The powers of this
sovereign are to include the power to regulate the
admissibility of political and religious doctrines.

It was

this absolutism which several twentieth-century political
theorists have seen as threatening the integrity of the
political.
Dissenting from this view of Hobbes's thought is
Michael Oakeshott, who has commented on Hobbes in several
books and essays, including an introduction to Leviathan.
Oakeshott's view is that politics ought to be a strictly
limited activity, concerned with enforcing the rule of law
among persons who prefer to choose their own pursuits rather
than having overarching purposes imposed from without.
According to Oakeshott, Hobbes is a salutary thinker because
he believes in keeping politics from getting out of control.
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Oakeshott identifies Hobbes as the philosopher of "Will
and Artifice"; he accepts Hobbes's account of politics as an
artificial construction, an exacting undertaking to be
pursued within the confines of carefully specified
constraints.

Thomas Spragens, the youngest of the political

theorists to be considered herein, objects to this Hobbesian
artificiality.

In his monograph on Hobbes, The Politics of

Motion, he compares an "end-less" Hobbesian metaphysics
unfavorably to an Aristotelian conception of purposeful
human striving (politics included) within a universe in
which beings naturally seek the fulfillment of their
purposes or ends.

He interprets the purposelessness of the

Hobbesian universe as part of a reductionistic tendency in
politics and philosophy which he has criticized in works
such as The Ironv of Liberal Reason.
Hobbes; His Life and Career
"Fear and I were born twins," Hobbes would say,
referring to the fact of his premature birth upon his
mother's hearing of the approach of the Spanish Armada.
Indeed, vestiges of his life experiences, including
political events and intellectual encounters, are infused
into Hobbes's thought.^

^The details of this account of Hobbes's career are taken in
large part from Richard S. Peters, Introduction to Bodv. Man. and
Citizen, selections from Thomas Hobbes, ed. Peters (New York:
Collier, 1962), 5-18.
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Born in Malmesbury, Wiltshire, in 1588, Hobbes entered
Magdalen Hall, Oxford, at age fourteen.

Peters notes that

he appears to have been bored by his Aristotelian tutors,
although he was a proficient student.

This is the first

indication of a persistent aversion to Aristotelian thought,
including scholasticism, which he saw as providing an
intellectual pretext for "seditious" doctrines that
threatened civil authority.

He came of age at a time when

the traditional philosophical, political, and religious
wisdom of the past, especially that of Aristotle, was coming
to be questioned.
William Cavendish, Earl of Devonshire, hired Hobbes as
tutor to his young son in 1608.

The position gave Hobbes

the opportunity to travel in cosmopolitan European circles;
it was the beginning of a lifetime of polemical,
philosophical, and literary activity.

Trips to continental

Europe would be crucial events in Hobbes's career.

Peters

notes that he had "encountered the growing dissatisfaction
with the Aristotelian system of thought when he visited the
continent in 1610."

Here he encountered reports of the work

of Kepler and Galileo, and his contempt for Aristotelianism
was confirmed.

Peters remarks further that Hobbes's anti-

Aristotelianism probably was reinforced by his acquaintance
with Francis Bacon, a pioneer in the inductive method of
modern science, from Bacon's retirement in 1621 until his
death in 1626.
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Hobbes's first scholarly endeavor was a translation of
Thucydides' history into English, published in 1628.

His

career as a philosopher did not begin until his second
Continental journey, which commenced the following year.

It

was during this trip that Hobbes became intrigued with
Euclidean geometry as a paradigm for all knowledge,
scientific as well as philosophical.

It was on his third

Continental trip (1634-1637) that Hobbes made a pilgrimage
to Italy to visit Galileo.

His encounter with Galileo

prompted the development of a complete conceptual scheme.
The idea of motion as first cause would provide the paradigm
under which both natural and moral philosophy could be
subsumed.

His philosophical interests always went beyond

the political.

His first philosophical work, the Little

Treatise, provided a mechanistic explanation of sensation.
Jones contends that Galilean natural philosophy and the
experience of the English Civil War are the two decisive
influences on Hobbes's thought.^
Upon his return to England, Hobbes found the country in
a state of political turmoil, prompting him to shift his
attention to political philosophy.

His first political

work. Elements of Law, was published in manuscript form in
1640.

Hobbes's political thought emphasized the absolute

authority of the sovereign; ironically, throughout his

^W. T. Jones, ed., Machiavelli to Bentham. vol. 2 of Masters
of Political Thought (Cambridge, Mass.; 1941), 87-91.
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career he had to consider whether his life was in danger
because his doctrines might be offensive to the regime.

In

1640, after the seating of the Long Parliament, he fled to
Paris in fear for his life.

There he completed several

philosophical works under the patronage of the Abbé
Mersenne, including the Latin version of De Cive, which
represented an expansion of the second part of Elements of
Law.
With an increasing number of Royalist émigrés present
in Paris, Hobbes soon found himself drawn into political
controversy again.

By 1651 he felt it safe to return to

England, having already prepared Leviathan, a forceful
statement of his political views, for publication.

Skinner

notes that all of Hobbes's major political works appeared in
English in rapid succession from 1650 to 1651: Elements of
Law was published for the first time, in two sections which
appeared three months apart, in 1650, followed the next year
by an English translation of De Cive (under the title
Philosophical Rudiments) and Leviathan.^
Hobbes lived out the remainder of his life in England,
remaining active as a scholar until his death in 1679 in
Hardwick, Derbyshire.

The final decades of his career were

not without controversy.

Warrender notes that the critical

^Quentin Skinner, "Conquest and Consent: Thomas Hobbes and
the Engagement Controversy," in G. E. Aylmer, ed., The
Interregnum: The Quest for Settlement. 1646-1660 (London:
Macmillan; Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, Archon Books, 1972),
94.
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reaction to Hobbes was ambivalent; there was a tendency to
condemn his theories while following them in practice, and
he was always hounded by an army of opponents.
and the Vatican prohibited his books.

Both Oxford

Hill notes that

Hobbes withheld publication of Behemoth. his account of the
history of the English Civil War, because he was afraid that
the bishops would have him burned.

A pirated edition

appeared upon the lifting of censorship in 1679; the
official version was published only posthumously, in 1682.
Hobbes's views potentially were as offensive to Anglican
divines as to Presbyterians or "Papists.
Hobbes and Thucvdides
It was noted above that Hobbes inaugurated his
scholarly career with a translation into English of
Thucydides' history.

It was his view that the purpose of

history was to instruct, as he observed in a brief note "To
the Readers," inserted at the outset of the translation:
"For the principal and proper work of history being to
instruct and enable men, by the knowledge of actions past,
to bear themselves prudently in the present and providently
towards the future: there is not extant any other (merely
human) that doth more naturally and fully perform it, than

% o w a r d Warrender, Introduction to Hobbes, De Cive: The
Latin Version, ed. Warrender (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
Clarendon Press, 1983), 17-20; Christopher Hill, The Century of
Revolution: 1603-1714. Norton Library History of England (New
York, 1982), 214.
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this of my author."

For Hobbes, Thucydides' account of the

turmoils of the Greek democracy represented a confirmation
of his own reservations about democratic government and a
warning of the upheaval which England was to experience
during the seventeenth century.

Schlatter argues that

Hobbes's encounter with Thucydides was responsible for the
crystallization of an attitude toward politics that would
manifest itself through all his political works.

"In his

autobiography Hobbes tells us that from his first encounter
with the classics Thucydides had been his favorite author
because Thucydides had taught him that democracy was absurd
and that one man is wiser than a multitude," he observes.
Thucydides disliked democracy; Hobbes, in Behemoth. cited
democratic theory as one of the causes of the English Civil
War. ®
Thucydides' history deals with the Great Peloponnesian
War (431-404 B. C.).

This war marked the temporary end of

Athenian democracy and the permanent end of Athenian
imperial preponderance.

The belligerent policy of the

demagogic ruler Alcibiades, in pursuit of imperial
domination over Sparta in the Peloponnese, contributed to
the downfall of Athens.

Under his leadership the Athenians

^Hobbes, English Works, ed. William Molesworth (London: John
Bohn, 1839), 8:vii; Richard Schlatter, Introduction to Hobbes's
Thucvdides. ed. Schlatter (New Brunswick, N. J . : Rutgers
University Press, 1975), xviii-xix; Hobbes, English Works 6:19293. See also Hobbes's comments about democracy in Rudiments
fEnglish Works 2:131-140), and in Leviathan (English Works 3:17375) .
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became notorious for atrocities such as the slaughter of the
city of Melos.

An overambitious expedition against Sicily

led to Athenian military humiliation.

Soon after the

expedition departed, Alcibiades defected to Sparta;
subsequently the Athenian fleet and army were nearly
destroyed, the city was reduced to near-starvation, and the
Spartan naval commander Lysander dictated humiliating terms.
"So that, though overcome by three the greatest things,
honour, fear, and profit [emphasis added], we have both
accepted the dominion delivered us and refuse again to
surrender it, we have therein done nothing to be wondered at
nor beside the manner of men."

So spoke the Athenian

ambassadors to the Lacedaemonians in Book I of Thucydides'
history, in just one of several passages of which echoes can
be heard within the political philosophy of Hobbes.

The

great theorist of absolutism appears to have borrowed many
of his notions about political man from this account of the
Great Peloponnesian War.

For instance, in a continuation of

the passage above, the Athenian ambassadors note that they,
the Athenians, had "been reputed contentious" by the
Corinthians.

In fact, however, such men as the Corinthians,

"if they lose anything which they think they should not,
either by sentence or by the power of our government, they
are not thankful for the much they retain but take in worse
part the little they forego, than if at first, laying law
aside, we had openly taken their goods by violence.

For in
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this kind also they themselves cannot deny, but the weaker
must give wav to the stronger [emphasis added].
As the above remark reveals, Hobbes took a starkly
unsentimental view of claims of natural right.

In his

thought, statements about good and evil had no objective
validity other than as statements of the preferences of the
speaker; natural right was simply the right of the
conqueror.

Thucydides presented a dramatization of such a

view in book 5 of the history, in the so-called Melian
Dialogue.

With Athenian forces bearing down on the city of

Melos, the Athenian commanders met with the Melian
magistrates in an attempt to obtain a surrender.

The

Melians pleaded that theirs was a neutral city that had no
quarrel with Athens, but the Athenians would have none of
it.

"But out of those things which we both of us really do

think, let us go through with that which is feasible; both
you and we knowing, that in human disputation justice is
then only agreed on when the necessity is equal; whereas
they that have odds of power exact as much as they can, and
the weak yield to such conditions as they can get."

The

Athenians' views on honor and justice were similar to those
that Hobbes would put forward in various works ; men "hold

^Hobbes, English Works 8:82-84. Compare, for instance.
Leviathan. ch. 13 [English Works 3:110-116).
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for honourable that which pleaseth, and for just that which
profiteth."®
As has been remarked, one of the strongest influences
of Thucydides upon Hobbes was his dismissive opinion of
democracy.

Thucydides provided a lively account of the

tendencies of the multitude in council in book 3 of the
history, in a speech which he attributed to Cleon, a
predecessor of Alcibiades as Athenian ruler, in an
appearance before the Athenian assembly.

The reversal of a

prior decision to destroy the conquered city of Mytilene
irritated Cleon, and he upbraided the gathering.
You are excellent men for one to deceive with a speech
of a new strain, but backward to follow any tried
advice; slaves to strange things, contemners of things
usual. You would every one chiefly give the best
advice, but if you cannot, then you will contradict
those that do. You would not be thought to come after
with your opinion; but rather if any thing be acutely
spoken, to applaud it first, and to appear ready
apprehenders of what is spoken, even before it be out;
but slow to preconceive the sequel of the same. You
would hear, as one may say, somewhat else than what our
life is conversant in; and yet you sufficiently
understand not that that is before your eyes. And to
speak plainly, overcome with the delight of the ear, you
are rather like unto spectators sitting to hear the
contentions of sophisters, than to men that deliberate
of the state of a commonwealth.

®Hobbes, English Works 9:99-104. See also Rudiments
fEnglish Works 4:32): "Every man, for his own part, calleth that
which pleaseth, and is delightful to himself, good; and that evil
which displeaseth him"; see also Leviathan fEnglish Works 3:41):
"But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire,
that is it which he for his part calleth good: and the object of
his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and
inconsiderable."
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These were points well taken by a theorist who would go on
to argue in Leviathan "that a monarch cannot disagree with
himself, out of envy, or interest; but an assembly may; and
that to such a height, as may produce a civil war.
Hobbes took the case of the Sicilian expedition as a
paradigmatic example of the dissolution into which a
democratic regime could fall easily.

Thucydides noted at

the outset of book 8 that when news of the defeat came, the
Athenians "were mightily offended with the orators that
furthered the voyage: as if they themselves had never
decreed it."

The demagogic rhetoric of the ambitious

Alcibiades had swayed them into approving the foolhardy
expedition.

Hobbes feared that this episode in ancient

Greek history might represent a precursor of the tumultuous
period that England appeared to be entering.

Fools and

demagogues were coming to the fore as the nation was
becoming divided over questions of religious orthodoxy and
constitutional legitimacy.
The Contemporarv Context: The English Civil War
The upheavals of seventeenth-century England would
prompt Hobbes to publish his reflections on politics.

The

^Hobbes, English Works 8:302-03, 3:175. See also Rudiments
fEnglish Works 2:133): "Wherefore some Nero or Caligula reigning,
no men can undeservedly suffer but such as are known to him,
namely, courtiers. . . . But in a popular dominion there may be
as many Neros as there are oratours who sooth the people."
l°Hobbes, English Works 9:322-23.
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religious and ideological divisions of the English Civil
War, while not pursued with the violence that would attend
more recent revolutions, may be seen as harbingers of the
catastrophes of the twentieth century's "Age of Ideology."
The period was one of fundamental change in English life.
If a total democratic revolution was not accomplished, there
was at least a revolution in thought that was a prerequisite
for subsequent democratization.

According to Hill, the

alteration amounted to a civilizational change, in which
England went from being a medieval to a modern state.

Over

the course of the period, claims of Divine Right lost their
power.

Politics became a rational pursuit, discussed in

terms of utility and common sense.

Astrology and alchemy,

held in high repute even by educated men at the beginning of
the century, had fallen into disrepute by the end.

A

scientific, atomistic world-view gained ground during the
period at the expense of a theistic, hierarchical view.

The

changes manifested themselves in all aspects of intellectual
life, including politics, economics, religion, literature,
and the arts.

According to Morrill, the role played by

religious divisions in the upheavals of the period prompted
a "depoliticized" attitude toward religion by the end of the
century.

The religious content of English civilization was

diluted, so that people were less eager to apply religious
claims directly to the political realm.

The result was a
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move in the direction of a secularized society in which
religion was "unthreatening.
In the controversies that divided seventeenth-century
England, religious, political, and economic matters were
intertwined.
'religious',

"This impossibility of shutting off
'constitutional', and 'economic' causes of the

Civil War corresponds to the complexity of life in
seventeenth-century England, and to the confusion in the
minds of men who lived in it," notes Hill.

The immediate

precipitant of the conflict was a dispute over the taxes
levied by Charles I in order to finance an expensive foreign
policy; some scholars interpret the dispute as a clash of
conflicting economic interests, in which a rising merchant
class objected to being compelled to finance the King's
ambitions.

However, questions of fiscal and military policy

were overlaid with a controversy over constitutional
legitimacy.

Were certain levies to be legitimated on the

basis of royal prerogative, or had Parliament the right of
approval over any proposed charges?

Furthermore, all these

matters took on a religious coloration.

The Crown's foreign

entanglements, along with certain activities at court,
raised suspicions that the King and his supporters and
courtiers were "closet Papists."

There developed a tendency

^%ill, Centurv of Revolution. 3-4; John Morrill, "The
Stuarts (1603-1688)," in Kenneth 0. Morgan, ed., The Oxford
Illustrated Historv of Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1984), 346-47.
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for divisions on political and constitutional matters to run
along religious

l i n e s . ^2

In religion, a tendency toward sectarian fragmentation
marked the period.

Unable to count on the support of all

economic and social classes, the Crown had to grant a
measure of religious toleration as a matter of political
necessity.

Toleration could be a matter of degree; members

of a sect or denomination might be allowed to practice their
religion openly while being denied the right to hold office
or participate in politics.

The matter of a religious

settlement, of exactly what

beliefs would be tolerated or

admitted into public life, became a central political issue.
Several sects had political claims to make.

Hobbes cited

Papists, Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists, and
members of "divers other sects" as being among the
"seducers" of the people.

The preaching of revolutionary

and democratic doctrines from the pulpits, in opposition to
strict obedience to sovereign authority, alarmed Hobbes.
Hill characterizes the religious atmosphere as one of a
"riot of competing sects" tending to anarchy.

Most extreme

were the Fifth Monarchists, "who sought in the sixteenfifties to bring about by military revolt the long predicted
reign of Christ. . . . The duty of the elect was to
eliminate hindrances to Christ's rule on earth.

This often,

in political terms, became 'overturn, overturn, overturn', a
^^Hill, Centurv of Revolution. 86.
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doctrine of anarchism.”

For all their extremism, the Fifth

Monarchists represented only a more radical version of a
more widely disseminated Puritan millenarian moral
compulsion.

To Hobbes, these developments represented

nothing less than the first stages of an anarchistic
political catastrophe.^^
Upon taking the throne in 1625, King Charles felt
compelled to convene a succession of Parliaments in order to
secure financing for the military (especially naval) buildup
that his foreign policies required.

The legislature was

thus given a pretext for claiming a more prominent
constitutional position; controversy over the exact nature
of this position finally led to civil war.

Complicating the

King's position was the suspiciously Anglo-Catholic
character of the "Laudian counterreformation" initiated by
Archbishop of Canterbury William Laud.

After King and

Parliament exchanged a series of ultimatums, the last coming
in 1642, the war was on.

Opposition to royal authority

coalesced under the leadership of the New Model Army,
commanded by Oliver Cromwell.

Charles was captured and

eventually executed on January 30, 1649.

There followed a

period of "Commonwealth” or republican government in which
Cromwell held effective executive power.

However, a

succession of Parliaments proved too radical for Cromwell,

^^Hobbes, English Works 6:167; Hill, Centurv of Revolution.
144-45.
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and he dismissed them; he finally proclaimed a
"Protectorate" government with himself holding the office of
lord protector.

Upon Cromwell's death in 1658 his son

Richard succeeded him, but the younger Cromwell resigned the
following year.

An alliance of royalists invited Charles

II, son of the executed king, to return to England; he
assumed the throne in 1660, completing the Restoration.
The "War between the Pens"
In Behemoth. Hobbes observes that "a kind of war
between the pens of the Parliament and those of the
secretaries, and other able men that were with the King"
attended the English Civil War.

The conflict often took on

the character not so much of a military engagement as of an
exchange of propagandistic salvoes between parties seeking
to establish the legitimacy of their stances with the
public.

The periodic issuance of "declarations" and

"remonstrances" may illustrate that partisan divisions had
not yet reached the extremes associated with twentiethcentury ideologies.

Opponents who attempted to engage each

other in debate must have felt that they still shared at
least some common ground.

In any case, a look at some of

the political manifestoes of the period should prove
illustrative of what was at issue during the period.^'*

^^Hobbes, English Works 6:265.
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Many of these manifestoes take the form of claims made
against the sovereign on behalf of Parliament or the people.
The earliest one of importance was the Petition of Right,
issued to the King by Parliament as constitutional conflict
over taxation was coming to a head.

The Petition was an

expression of several grievances that would be heard again
in the following century, during the American Revolution,
including taxation without consent, imprisonment without
cause, and billeting of soldiers in private homes;
protections against some of these abuses would be enacted
into the United States Constitution under the Bill of
Rights.

The King's acceptance of the Petition represented a

crack in the edifice of absolute sovereignty.
After 1640, as civil war loomed, the rate of issuance
of manifestoes accelerated.

The Grand Remonstrance of 1641

received only a slim majority in Parliament, reflecting a
cleavage between the incipient Presbyterian and Independent
parties; it addressed religious issues.

The Remonstrance

asserted a Parliamentary right of approval over government
advisors, and it called for an international synod (to
involve bishops from both England and Scotland) to address
the question of a religious settlement.

(If the Petition of

Right anticipates the United States Constitution, then the
Remonstrance, with its list of political and religious
grievances, may be taken as anticipating Jefferson's
Declaration of Independence.)

The following year, with war
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approaching. Parliament issued an ultimatum to the King in
the form of the Nineteen Propositions, which made demands
similar to those of the Remonstrance.

The King issued a

surprisingly moderate reply to the Nineteen Propositions,
invoking not absolutism but a "mixed" theory of government
that included King, Lords, and Commons.

Perhaps this was an

indication of how precarious his position had become.
By 1647, with the King in military custody, the New
Model Army proposed a new constitution for England.

The

document that the army drew up, the Agreement of the People,
anticipated the United States Constitution in some important
respects.

It called for popular sovereignty, with the

legislature to hold power as a public trust.

The people

held certain civil and religious rights in reserve from
government, the document declared.

The Agreement reflected

the influence of the radical Leveller party, some of whom
wanted to extend suffrage to the whole populace without
regard to property.
Hobbes must have been alarmed by the character of the
"war between the pens," since sovereign authority was on the
defensive throughout.

It is unlikely that Hobbes could ever

i^These and other manifestoes of the period are discussed in
Hill, Centurv of Revolution, and Samuel Rawson Gardiner, ed.,
Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution. 1625-1660. 3d
ed., rev. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press,
1906). For Charles I's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions, see
Corrine Comstock Weston, "Beginnings of the Classical Theory of
the English Constitution," Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Societv 100(April 1956): 133-144.
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have brought himself to support any claim of right of
revolution on the part of subjects against their sovereign.
While it has been suggested that Hobbes's views were
convenient to the interests of the wealthy, Thomas notes
that he viewed the middle classes' opposition to the Crown
as foolhardy; their own best interests should have dictated
support for sovereign authority.

However, as Skinner

observes, Hobbes had his political works published during
the Commonwealth period, after the King's execution.
Skinner characterizes Hobbes as a de facto theorist who
affirms the authority of the "powers that be," no matter
which party is in power.

Justification is to be based not

on providence but on the practical needs of the political
realm, which requires order rather than disorder.
Hobbes is a theorist of the status quo.

Thus,

The writers of the

"war between the pens" have no standing upon which to base
their claims as far as he is concerned.
preached against oppression.

He feared those who

Such people tended to make

their case before "the common people, who would easily
believe themselves oppressed, but never oppressors."^®
Hobbes's Science of Politics
The nature of the times prompted Hobbes to publish his
reflections on politics.

From 1640 to 1651 he presented

^®Keith Thomas, "The Social Origins of Hobbes's Political
Thought," in K. C. Brown, ed., Hobbes Studies (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1965), 214-16; Skinner, "Conquest and Consent,"
93-98; Hobbes, English Works 6:196.
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three political works which represented a continuing
elaboration of a single argument.

Elements of Law, first

circulated in 1640, contained the entire argument in
compressed form.

Scholars cite its first section in

particular as the best statement of Hobbes's psychology and
his view of human nature.
The political implications of the argument were not
stated explicitly until De Cive, which appeared in Latin in
1642 with an English translation (under the title
Philosophical RudimentsI in 1650.

De Cive was to have been

the third part of a trilogy on the subjects of "body, man,
and citizen," with the previous two parts to be entitled De
Corpore and De Homine.

The first two sections appeared

eventually, but political events compelled Hobbes to
complete De Cive first.

Hobbes hoped that De Cive would

prove sufficiently congruent with men's political
experiences that it could stand alone, without benefit of
the other two sections: "Therefore it happens, that what was
last in order, is yet come forth first in time.

And the

rather, because I saw that, grounded on its own principles
sufficiently known by experience, it would not stand in need
of the former s e c t i o n s . F i n a l l y , the whole argument was
elaborated in the forceful polemical statement of Leviathan
(1651).

^^Hobbes. English Works 2:xx.
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Metaphysics
Hobbes became convinced that the natural science of the
Enlightenment, especially Galilean mechanics, could provide
the conceptual framework for an encyclopedic account of
human knowledge.

In the ninth chapter of Leviathan he

presents a typology of the sciences which classified
physics, mathematics, geometry, and civil and moral
philosophy as providing "knowledge of consequences."

The

natural sciences provide knowledge of "consequences from the
accidents of bodies natural"; the moral sciences, "of
politic bodies."^®
Since mechanics is the study of matter, the choice of
mechanics as the paradigmatic form of scientific knowledge
has metaphysical implications.

Indeed, the core tenet of

Hobbes's metaphysics is that everything that exists is
matter, or body; or, at the very least, that no knowledge
can be had of that which is not body.

Scientific knowledge

consists of knowledge of bodies and their motions.
Scientific laws describe the behavior of bodies as they
collide with each other.

All knowledge is knowledge of

bodies in motion and of the causal relationships that obtain
among bodies as they impact upon each other.

Hobbes

maintained that even his psychological and social theories
were of this nature, although several observers have

^®Hobbes, English Works 3:71-73.
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questioned whether his account of man and society is
genuinely mechanical.
How could Hobbes maintain that men are just like
billiard balls?

He did it by employing a "resolutive-

compositional" method.

Complicated phenomena are to be

explained by resolving them into their simplest components
and then recomposing them.

One employs the resolutive

method to argue from effects to causes; to move from causes
to effects, simply employ the compositional method, which is
the converse of the resolutive.

In this way, complex

phenomena such as man and society can be broken down into
their simplest components for scientific purposes.
Ultimately, the most complicated phenomena are revealed to
be nothing more than aggregations of smaller bodies and
their motions.^0
Nominalism
Hobbes adhered to nominalism, the doctrine that names
are the ultimate reality, but that, at the same time, the
content of names is completely arbitrary.

Hobbes began his

version of nominalism with the suggestion that names serve
as signs, marks, or "notes of remembrance."

Apparently, he

believed that names have no meaning apart from that given to
Jones, Machiavelli to Bentham. 88-89; Hobbes, English
Works 1:10-11.
Jones, Machiavelli to Bentham. 88-89; Hobbes, English
Works 1:65-72.
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them by the community of speakers of a language.

He denied

that names can be thought of as derived from nature.

The

names of the animals were "taught by God himself," but even
they were "arbitrarily imposed."

Over time, names can be

found "growing everywhere out of use"; they are "invented
and received by men at pleasure."
of essences.

He denied the existence

Even the existence of universal names does not

indicate the presence of essences, "there being nothing in
the world universal but names; for the things named are
every one of them universal and singular."

Some names

indicate things "truly existent"; so-called "universal"
names point to that which is "only feigned."

Peters notes

that Hobbes could employ the nominalist doctrine most
conveniently in polemics.

"Negatively he used it to launch

polemics against the doctrines of the Schools whose
adherence to Aristotelian essences not only, in Hobbes's
view, fuddled men's minds with metaphysical vaporings, but
were also a positive threat to peace by their encouragement
of extra-mundane systems of beliefs and of the superstitions
by means of which the priests maintained such a stranglehold
on the population.
Since names have no meaning apart from that which men
give to them, the matter of definitions becomes crucial.
Men properly place definitions at the "beginning of their

2%obbes, English Works 3:19-21, 1:16-18; Peters,
Introduction to Bodv. Man. and Citizen. 15.
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reckoning."

Furthermore, scientific error can most often be

attributed to those who "begin not their ratiocination from
definitions; that is, from settled significations of their
words."

In the political realm, it will fall to the

sovereign to provide the crucial definitions of things
political.

"Moreover, if a controversy be raised of the

accurate and proper signification, that is,

the definition

of those names or appellations which are commonly used, . .
. the determination will belong to the city."

In Hobbes's

political scheme, the sovereign becomes the "Great
Definer."^2
Human Nature
Applying a mechanistic paradigm to human psychology,
Hobbes sought the causes of sensation.

He determined that

"the cause of sense, is the external body, or object, which
presseth the organ proper to each sense," either immediately
or mediately.

Whether the sensation is of pleasure or of

pain is determined by whether the pressure created by the
external body helps or hinders "that motion which is called
vital," that is, the circulation of the blood through the
body.

The passion of appetite is associated with pleasant

sensations; unpleasant sensations lead not to appetite but
to aversion.

These passions of appetite and aversion are

the determinants of human behavior, according to Hobbes.

22Hobbes, English Works 3:24, 33; 2:269.
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Thus, Hobbes held that man is essentially passionate. Man's
appetites may be identified with his self-interest, his
aversions with fear; self-interest and fear are held by
Hobbes to be the basic motivations of human behavior. ^3
Hobbes did not shrink from the conclusion that human
behavior is completely determined by the play of the
passions.

Freedom cannot mean freedom from passion; the

only relevant sense of freedom is freedom from external
constraint.

Freedom in this sense is consistent with

complete determinism.

It follows that there is no such

thing as an independent will; "will" is simply the last
appetite to manifest itself in deliberation.24
Political disputes are about good and evil in the
political realm; Hobbes derived his understanding of the
significance of claims about good and evil from his account
of sensation.

To call something good or evil amounts to

nothing more than an expression of human appetite or
aversion.

"Every man, for his own part, calleth that which

pleaseth. and is delightful to himself, good; and that evil
which displeaseth him."

Good is subjective, not objective;

it inheres in men and not in the things that men value, so
that the good will vary from person to person.

"Nor is

23Hobbes, English Works 3;1-2. 4:31.
24gee Hobbes, English Works 3:38-51.
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there any such thing as absolute goodness, considered
without relation.
Physically, human beings are roughly equal, argues
Hobbes.

Some are stronger than others, but with a weapon

the weakest could kill the strongest, "since there needeth
but little force to the taking away of a man's life."

It is

in their capacities for passion that men differ most
dramatically; the object of one's passion might be material
wealth, physical safety, or famous reputation.
Respectively, men are driven to seek these objects by
competition, diffidence, and glory, which Hobbes calls the
"three principal causes of quarrel."

While some people will

be relatively tranquil, others will be fanatical in the
passionate pursuit of the objects of their desires.

Self-

interest inclines to contentiousness in the pursuit of the
objects of our desires; fear inclines us to seek peace, but
the tendency to struggle outweighs the inclination to peace
unless the balance is manipulated artificially.
State of Nature and Right of Nature
Hobbes conceived of the state of nature as one in which
there is no sovereign authority to constrain the passionate
pursuit of desire.

He spoke of a "right of nature" which is

tantamount to a right to what one can get away with.

To

2%obbes, English Works 4:32; see also 3:38-42.
2%obbes, English Works 4:82 (see also 2:6-7); 3:110-112.
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have such a "right" means to be compelled, on account of
being unable to do otherwise; it is the capacity to do what
one cannot help doing.

This "right of nature" does not

appear to require that others recognize a moral obligation
to respect it, as in more conventional interpretations of
right; it is an "amoral" conception of right.
Since Hobbes at several points asserted that claims
about good and evil are mere expressions of subjective
preference, his amoralism has often been taken for granted.
However, in Rudiments he did appear to ground his political
doctrine on an appeal to experience rather than on his
psychological theory; on this basis, some scholars have
speculated that Hobbes's political theory is independent of
his reductionistic psychology, so that it is consistent with
a conventional understanding of moral obligation.

This is

the so-called "Taylor thesis" of Professor A. E. Taylor.
For a time, Hobbes scholarship was dominated by a discussion
of this "Taylor thesis," but it has not won universal
acceptance.

For instance, while Hobbes may have wished to

convey the impression that his was a genuinely moral theory,
Jones argues that he "never really appeals to anything but
utility."27
Hobbes's concept of "right of nature" or "natural
right" is not moralized or sentimentalized.

In other

27a . E. Taylor, "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes," in Brown,
ed., Hobbes Studies. J5-55 [first published in Philosophv 13
(1938): 406-24]; Jones, Machiavelli to Bentham. 113-14.
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theories, government and civilized society are to secure for
the individual what is his by right of nature.

For Hobbes,

on the other hand, the full exercise of men's right of
nature would bring not the fulfillment of a civilized
condition but its very opposite, a state of war.

To

overcome this state of war requires the supersession of the
right of nature.

The right of nature, understood as the

right to use absolutely any means to defend oneself in a
state of nature, is nothing but a description of that which
it would be prudent for one to do in such a state; it might
even be psychologically impossible for someone to renounce
self-defense in such a state of war.

As such, this

conception of the right of nature lacks any moral content,
although Hobbes's language may sometimes obscure this.
Hobbes's view of law may be contrasted with his view of
natural right.

While natural right can be seen as a

reflection of a compulsion, at least it is a compulsion
generated from within the individual, not imposed from
without; in this sense, "law is a fetter, right is freedom,
and they differ like contraries."

This doctrine of law was

expounded further in the Dialogue between a Philosopher and
a Student of the Common Laws of England, a work composed
late in Hobbes's career.

At issue is whether law partakes

essentially of command or of reason.

Hobbes's "Philosopher"

contends that if the latter is the case, then everyone will
be entitled to ratiocinate about law, and the law's ability
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to compel will be lost.

Thus, law consists essentially of

command, or "fetter.
"It is therefore a right of nature, that every man may
preserve his own life and limbs, with all the power he
hath."

Everyone would be entitled to judge for himself

what steps were necessary; the "right of nature" can be
reduced to a right of self-defense.

Only for the very

strongest would the passionate pursuit of desire be
unconstrained.

For everyone else, Hobbes's most famous

formulation would apply: life would be "solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish, and short."

Whatever other passions they

harbor, there is one that would become predominant for most
men— fear, particularly the fear of a violent death.
Hobbes thought that it would be irrational for men to
continue in this state of nature.

Even if all they care

about is the fulfillment of their desires, men ought to be
able to recognize that their desires usually will be
frustrated in these circumstances.

To observe the laws of

"civil society" would be rational.

The "catch" is that

while men still find themselves in a state of nature, anyone
who proclaimed his disinterested adherence to a set of rules
would be vulnerable to those willing to take advantage.

28Hobbes, English Works 2:186, 6:1-160.
29Hobbes, English Works 4:83 (see also 2:9 and 3:117); 3:113.
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Erecting Leviathan; The Covenant
The law of nature, which demands that men seek peace,
requires that the right of nature be set aside.

The

exercise of the right to self-protection by absolutely any
means leads to a state of unceasing war, a state in which no
rational man would want to remain.

However, left to their

own devices, men will remain slaves to their passions,
unable to attain the peace that their reason recommends to
them.

The situation must be weighted artificially to favor

For Hobbes, then, sovereignty was not to be established
by an appeal to the right of nature, but by the overcoming
of this selfsame right.

Once the free exercise of the right

of nature obtains, it issues in the warlike state of nature,
from which rational men must necessarily escape through the
institution of the office of the sovereign.

Hobbes was not

concerned with whether this state of nature ever really
existed.

The argument is hypothetical, and the state of

nature is a heuristic device.

Ultimately, the argument may

be seen as a logical exercise which is intended to
demonstrate the non-optional character of political
obligation.

Hobbes held that men ought to behave as though

they had had a "right of nature" and then agreed to give it
up.

It is as though men agreed to combine all their wills

into one will; they have agreed to give up their natural
right to their sovereign.

Men enter not into a contract but
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a covenant. a relationship of trust that extends into
perpetuity.

This arrangement is wholly a work of artifice;

men are not political by nature.

If men's natural

inclinations are given free play, they may kill each other
in the pursuit of their desires.
The Office of the Sovereign and Its Powers
Hobbes was unique in that he invoked a form of socialcontract theory not to protect people from absolute
political authority but to affirm absolutism itself.

The

sovereign is an "artificial person"; the covenant
establishes an office, which is not to be confused with the
"natural person" of those who hold the office.

Since the

office of sovereign does not exist prior to the covenant,
the sovereign is not bound by it; the subjects are obligated
to the sovereign, but the converse does not hold.

The

subjection of the subjects to the sovereign is absolute,
hence sovereign authority is absolute.

There is no right to

rebel, at least none that sovereign authority can affirm; a
successful rebellion may be described as such only ex post
facto.

Furthermore, for the subjects to grant anything less

than absolute authority to the sovereign would be
irrational, since absolute power is required to enforce the
social covenant by means of which a state of war was

^^Hobbes, English Works 3:116-130, 4:86-94. See Hobbes's
Introduction to Leviathan (English Works 3:ix-xii) for a
disquisition on the state as an "artificial man."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

43

escaped; it is irrational to will an end without willing the
means to that end.

Since the sovereign represents the

multitude, it is as though all the subjects are the authors
of all the acts of the sovereign; for the subjects to resist
sovereign authority in any way would be self-contradictory,
as though they were resisting themselves.

The subjects

cannot complain of the injustice of sovereign authority,
because justice and injustice have no meaning apart from the
establishment of sovereign authority and the exercise of
sovereign command.

Nevertheless, Jones notes that it

appears that, at least when sovereign authority is
established by institution or agreement rather than
acquisition or conquest, men can establish that authority
while placing limits on it at the same time.
The Nature of Power
In the first instance, Hobbes's notion of power
signifies nothing more than possession of the means to
attain an end.

However, with respect to relations among

men, power takes on a coercive aspect; it consists in the
ability to compel a subject to act according to the will of
the one who compels him, rather than the subject's own will.
As such, power is something that is exercised upon other
men; the MiIlian conception of power as one's own capacity
for self-development, or the Aristotelian notion of power as

Jones, Machiavelli to Bentham, 117-128.
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the actualization of one's undeveloped but potential
talents, is lost.

A relationship involving power is a

"zero-sum game"; the exercise of one person's power is
always at someone else's expense.

Consider, for instance,

Hobbes's statement in Leviathan, chapter 10, that "the
Value, or WORTH of a man, as is of all other things, his
price; . . . honour consisteth only in the opinion of
power."

In estimating each other's power, men are like

competitors in a open marketplace.

Their estimates of each

other's power are constantly fluctuating; they must consider
not only everyone's actual power, but everyone's estimate of
everyone else's power.

Genuine power consists in the margin

of one's power over that held by other men; effectively, one
is powerless unless one's power is superior to that of
others.

As long as others seek ever greater power, one must

play the "power game" just to preserve one's own position.
It is a conception of power that would seem to dictate a
ruthlessly competitive society, and it has made Hobbes the
target of critiques from the modern political left.
Sheldon Wolin, for instance, has criticized Hobbes for
holding an oversimplified, excessively negative conception
of power.

In Hobbes's account of the institution of

sovereignty, the subjects agree not to act; they refrain
from acting in order to clear a "right of way" for the
sovereign.

Subjects renounce their natural right and leave

^^Hobbes, English Works 3:74-84.
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the field of action open to the sovereign.

Wolin argues

that this conception of political power will turn out to be
hollow.

"The power to act required only the elimination of

hindrances rather than the active enlistment of the private
power and support of the citizens.
to stand aside and not interfere.

The citizens had simply
If sovereign power were

effective because it induced withdrawal, how could the
sovereign ever hope to join his subjects' wills to his in
the pursuit of a common endeavor?"

Actually, the removal of

hindrance was incomplete as long as there remained
consolidations of private power in the form of privately
held property.

Hobbes's sovereign, once established, would

still require the active support of private power; to expect
the sovereign "to overawe the wealthy by waving the sword"
would be unrealistic.
The Special Problem of Religion:
The Battle against the Ministers
Power considerations governed Hobbes's assessment of
the political situation of contemporary England, but the
source of "private" power with which Hobbes was most
concerned was not the economic power identified by Wolin but
rather ecclesiastical power.

England was riven by

challenges to sovereign authority in the name of religion.
Sovereign power had to be asserted to preserve the peace.
33gheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision; Continuitv and
Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston; Little, Brown
and Co., 1960), 281-285.
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The situation dramatized the general need for absolute
sovereign authority.

Whether a single person or an

assembly, the sovereign ought to have absolute legislative
and judicial power, power to make war and to punish.

There

may be no appeal from the decisions of the sovereign
representative; that would be tantamount to anarchy.
One important power of the unchallengeable sovereign
representative is the power to judge what doctrines will be
admissible in the commonwealth.

Disagreement over doctrines

is one of the most frequent occasions for impassioned
conflict; to allow it would be to countenance a lapse into
something like Hobbes's warlike state of nature.

The

subjects of the Hobbesian commonwealth cannot be allowed to
endanger the public safety by indulging in political debate.
"For doctrine repugnant to peace, can no more be true, than
peace and concord can be against the law of nature.
"Doctrines repugnant to peace," religious in
derivation, were rampant in the England of the Civil War, in
Hobbes's view.

He found himself in an awkward and

ambiguous position with respect to religion.

The English

state as understood by most Englishmen was bound up with the
established church; the ruler was also the "defender of the
faith."
unity.

Religious faith could be a component of political
The seventeenth century showed that faith could

contribute to political disruption as well.

At the outset

^^Hobbes, English Works 3:163-65; see also 2:78-79.
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of Behemoth. Hobbes presents a bill of indictments against
those responsible for the corruption of the English people;
Christian ministers, including "Papists," Presbyterians,
Independents, Anabaptists, "Fifth-monarchy men," and
ministers of "divers other sects," were at the head of the
list.35
Hobbes sought to legitimate the union of temporal and
ecclesiastical power in the civil sovereign, so that the
declarations of the sovereign would be taken as
authoritative on all doctrinal matters.

In the seventeenth-

century environment he saw that, on the contrary, religious
claims were being put forward as competitors for
authoritativeness against the civil sovereign.

"Our rebels

were publicly taught rebellion in the pulpits," cried
Hobbes, whereas they should have been taught "the grounds of
their duty" instead.35
Chapter 12 of Rudiments and the corresponding chapter
29 of Leviathan include a listing of "seditious opinions"
that "tend to the dissolution of a commonwealth."

Prominent

among these are "that the judgement of good and evil belongs
to private Persons," and "that the Supreme Power may be
divided."

The spread of these seditions corresponded with

the proliferation of new religious sects.

Puritans and

Dissenters were bold enough to go about claiming that they
35Hobbes, English Works 6:166-67.
35lbid., 343.
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had been moved by the spirit of God; it seemed as though
everyone felt himself authorized to claim that God was
speaking through him.

In a climate of religious anarchy,

everyone was claiming to be a religious authority, or so it
seemed.

In secularized language, it seemed that everyone

was claiming an absolute right of conscience, such right
having priority even over the commands of the civil
sovereign.

To Hobbes, it looked like a return to the "war

of all against all" of his state of nature.

Everyone was

claiming the authority that properly belonged to the
sovereign; if everyone acts like a sovereign, it will be as
though no one is sovereign.

"Papists" would place the

ecclesiastical authority in a Pope who resided outside the
realm, creating the potential for a conflict with the
temporal authority.

Protestant sectaries went beyond this,

authorizing everyone to act as a Pope unto himself.
Ultimately, the source of the sedition was to be found
in the theories of the ministers.

Unsound, subversive

theology could undermine the polity; civil order required
control over the pulpits.
created ex nihilo.
the universities.

Of course, theologies were not

They originated in the seminaries and
Here we find an interesting parallel with

contemporary political events.

"The Universities have been

to this nation, as the wooden horse was to the Trojans."
Intellectual pretexts for the subversion of civil authority
^^Hobbes, English Works 2:150; 3:308; 2:150, 155.
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had found a home in academia; most dangerous were the
doctrines of scholasticism.

Rebellious men were being

"furnished with arguments for liberty out of the works of
Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Seneca, and out of the histories
of Rome and Greece, for their disputation against the
necessary power of their sovereigns."

Hobbes's advice to a

new ruler would be to make the universities the first
targets of reform.
The core of rebellion, as you have seen by this, and
read of other rebellions, are the Universities; which
nevertheless are not to be cast away, but to be better
disciplined: that is to say, that the politics there
taught be made to be, as true politics should be, such
as are fit to make men know, that it is their duty to
obey all laws whatsoever that shall by the authority of
the King be enacted, till by the same authority they
shall be repealed . . . that the King owes his crown to
God only, and to no man, ecclesiastic or other; and that
the religion they teach there, be a quiet waiting for
the coming again of our blessed Savior, and in the mean
time a resolution to obey the King's laws, which also
are God's laws; to injure no man, to be in charity with
all men, to cherish the poor and sick, and to live
soberly and free of scandal; without mingling our
religion with points of na irai philosophy, as freedom
of will, incorporeal substance, everlasting nows,
ubiquities, hypostases, which the people understand not,
nor ever care for. When the Universities shall be thus
disciplined, there will come out of them, from time to
time, well-principled preachers, and they that are now
ill-principled, from time to time fall away.
Thus, Hobbes had not given up all hope for the universities ;
they could not be dispensed with, no matter what their
recent shortcomings.^8

^^Hobbes, English Works 6:213, 233, 236-37.
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Against the "Papists"
In the absence of the necessary censorship of higher
education, Hobbes set out on his own to do the work of an
intellectual policeman.

He saw the Presbyterians and the

"Papists" as the major threats; both gave legitimacy to an
authority that could challenge that of the sovereign.

The

Presbyterians abetted anyone who claimed to be moved by the
"spirit of God"; once it is granted that the spiritual
inspiration is genuine, any claims made are beyond normal
means of evaluation.

Pocock remarks: "Hobbes, then, set out

to destroy 'enthusiasm,* . . .

a doctrine that must place

the authority of prophetic utterance at the disposal of any
man who might claim it on grounds that could not be
evaluated by his fellows."

"Papism" might be a more direct

threat; it places the ecclesiastical authority outside the
realm, in the person of the Pope.
countenance this.

Hobbes could not

"Which being thus, most manifest it is,

that those subjects who believe themselves bound to
acquiesce to a foreign authority in those doctrines which
are necessary to salvation, do not per se constitute a city,
but are the subjects of that foreign power."-®

3®J. G. A. Pocock, "Time, History, and Eschatology in the
Thought of Thomas Hobbes," in Pocock, Politics, Language, and
Time: Essavs on Political Thought and History (New York:
Atheneum, 1971), 182 (originally published in The Diversity of
History: Essavs in Honour of Sir Herbert Butterfield. J. H.
Elliot and H. G. Koenigsberger [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul;
Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970]); Hobbes, English
Works 2:294.
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The heart of Hobbes's challenge to "Papism" is found in
chapter 42 of Leviathan. "Of Power Ecclesiastical."

Here he

controverted the views of the Italian Cardinal Bellarmine,
author of a tract defending the temporal power of the Pope.
Hobbes argued that Bellarmine had improperly derived a
coercive power from the power to teach.

Properly

understood, excommunication should carry no civil sanction;
it is a simple refusal to associate.

Similarly, kings may

receive recommendations from Christian divines, but they are
not to be commanded by them.

Preachers, therefore, "are our

schoolmasters, not our commanders, and their precepts not
laws, but wholesome counsels."^®
Hobbes found several of the doctrines of the Roman
church to be conducive to the subversion of the civil
authority; "they had many fine points in their
ecclesiastical policy, conducing to the same end," he
remarks.

The doctrine of excommunication represents a

significant challenge, since temporal authority "can only
kill the body [not the soul]."

Another abuse is the

doctrine of transubstantiation, which amounts to "the
turning of consecration into conjuration, or enchantment."
It attributes a kind of magical power to the clergy, beside
which kingly authority pales.

Most threatening of all are

priestly celibacy and the claim of authority to judge the
authenticity of marriages.

From these it follows, first.

4°Hobbes, English Works 3:485-584, esp. 490.
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that civil and ecclesiastical authority can never be united,
and, second, that the clerics will have the authority to
judge the legitimacy of the royal succession.

"Do you not

see, that by this the King must of necessity either want the
priesthood, and therewith a great part of the reverence due
to him from the most religious part of his subjects, or else
want lawful heirs to succeed him: by which means, being not
taken for the head of the Church, he was sure, in any
controversy between him and the Pope, that his subjects
would be against him?
Against the Presbvterians: "Mortalism"
Yet another opinion "tending to the dissolution of a
commonwealth" is "that faith and sanctity, are not to be
attained by study and reason, but by supernatural
inspiration, or infusion."

Hobbes had to take this stance

in order to defeat the Presbyterians.

"Which granted, I see

not why any man should render a reason of his faith; or why
every Christian should not be also a prophet; or why any man
should take the law of his country, rather than his own
inspiration, for the rule of his action.
By denying the reality of spiritual inspiration, Hobbes
could defeat not just Presbyterianism but any form of
Puritan religious extremism.

To make this a coherent

^^Hobbes, English Works 6:183, 173; 3:610, 692; 6:180.
^^Hobbes, English Works 3:311.
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position, Hobbes must adopt what Pocock describes as a novel
form of religious heterodoxy called "mortalism."

Mortalism

denies the existence of spirit in the conventional
understanding of the term.

God cannot be experienced by an

infusion of spirit; God is only experienced when he speaks
to us, directly or indirectly.
his words.

God is to be known only by

Spirit, or soul, exists only alongside body; it

dies when the body dies, and is revived only when the body
is resurrected; it is to be understood as a subtle form of
corporeal body.

This mortalist doctrine is applied to such

doctrinal matters as eschatology and the existence of angels
in part 3 of Leviathan. especially chapters 34 and 38.^^
The "Foundation of Faith"
Hobbes was determined to resist the "seditious"
tendencies of both "Papism" and Presbyterianism.

At the

same time, he was aware that a component of the legitimacy
of the English state was its religious character.

While he

sought to place a limit on the application of religious
claims in the political sphere, Hobbes insisted that his
views were compatible with orthodox Christianity.

Although

Hobbes's views were heterodox, Pocock argues that it would
be a mistake to classify him as an atheist.

43Pocockr "Time, History, and Eschatology," 182-93; Hobbes,
English Works 3:380-396, 437-461.
44pocock, "Time, History, and Eschatology," 160-62.
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According to Hobbes, our obligation to God is to
acknowledge his power.

It is not part of our compact with

the sovereign to refrain from doing this; the sovereign may
not prevent us from making this acknowledgement.

However,

we have abandoned our right to judgement about right and
wrong in the temporal sphere to the sovereign; this includes
the right to make judgements about what forms of
acknowledgement of God's power are appropriate.

As far as

we are to be concerned, that which gives honor to God is
simply whatever is taken for such in the civil society in
which we live.

In the past, it had fallen to Adam, Abraham,

and Moses to make such judgements; now, when whole civil
societies are Christian commonwealths, this function is to
be performed by the sovereign.

The "one essential" of

salvation is to acknowledge "that Jesus is the Christ," in
whatever form is accepted in the civil society in which we
live.

Beyond this, individuals may not ratiocinate about

such matters.'*®
Hobbes had another argument for his view of the
relationship between civil and ecclesiastical authority
based on the definition of a church.

A church is a group of

people who are united in their adherence to a single
religious dispensation.

As such, a church must have an

authoritative interpreter of scripture and doctrine at its

4®Hobbes, English Works 3:584-602; see also 322-343, 461475, and 2:203-319.
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head.

Each Christian commonwealth thus constitutes a

church, with the civil sovereign of each commonwealth at the
head of each church.

As long as nations are sovereign and

there is no international civil authority, there will be as
many churches as there are nations; hence, there can be no
universal

Church.^6

"Officially," at least, Hobbes's doctrines remained
consistent with Christian belief.
was an uneasy coexistence.

At best, however, this

Pocock's view that Hobbes was

not an atheist is a minority persuasion.

More common is the

view that his writings conveyed a high degree of skepticism
or irony regarding religion.

The fundamental intention

appeared to be to subordinate religion so that it would not
present a threat to civil order.
Such was the interpretation of Leo Strauss, who saw a
parallel between the stance of Hobbes and that of the modern
liberal state.

Like the Hobbesian sovereign, the modern

state has its own purposes, and if objections to these
purposes are raised from a religious standpoint, then the
state must subordinate religion.

The modern state could

even be interpreted as putting forward a justificatory
doctrine that represents a "secular religion."

Unobstructed

progress, including widespread economic prosperity and the
abolition of war, are the promises of universalistic
^^Hobbes, English Works 3:458-61; see also 2:277-283.
47jones, Machiavelli to Bentham. 140-142.
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ideologies that tend to sweep aside all vestiges of the more
modest, particularistic world-views that they encounter.

To

satisfy these expectations, the modern ruler must endear
himself to his subjects, even if this requires the sacrifice
of constitutional legitimacy.

Strauss thus argues that the

modern "universal and homogeneous state" represents a
latter-day Hobbesianism that is as intolerant of opposition
as is Hobbesian absolutism.
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CHAPTER 3: LEO STRAUSS— CLASSIC NATURAL
RIGHT AND THE MODERN HOBBESIAN STATE
The contribution of Hobbes was of central importance to
the thought of Leo Strauss, who has become a leading figure
in contemporary political theory.

Strauss directed his

critical attention first to Spinoza, then to Hobbes, next to
the ancient Greek writer Xenophon, and finally to
Machiavelli as he sought to ascertain the nature of the
breakdown of political order that European civilization had
experienced, and, especially in the study of Xenophon, to
recover an alternative to the tendency which had led Europe
to initiate a disastrous political experiment,

strauss

presented his basic teaching in Natural Right and Historv.
in which he upholds classic, inegalitarian natural right
against the modern, egalitarian version.

In classic natural

right, virtue takes precedence over freedom, obligation is
upheld in preference to claim, and reason predominates over
passion.

Strauss attributed contemporary political

disorders to the supplanting of the classic natural right
teaching by the modern version.

Spinoza, Machiavelli, and

especially Hobbes prepared the groundwork for this reversal,
which manifests itself in the efforts of the modern liberal
regime to build a "universal and homogeneous state" for the
purpose of universal prosperity and enlightenment.
Strauss joined the exodus of German-speaking
intellectuals to the United States before the onset of World
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War II.

Before that, as a young Jewish student in Germany

during the Weimar Republic period, a pressing concern became
what he frankly called "the German-Jewish problem" (which
was but a symptom of a more general predicament).^

He

scrutinized the contribution of Spinoza, who as a Jew in the
Netherlands during the seventeenth century confronted a
similar period of political and religious upheaval (similar
to the upheaval faced by Hobbes, Spinoza's English
contemporary, as well).

Ultimately, Strauss found Spinoza's

solution unsatisfactory; furthermore, he viewed Spinoza's
position as derivative from the thought of Hobbes.

His

confrontation with Hobbes led Strauss to understand the
contemporary crisis as a manifestation of the conflict
between the classic and modern natural right teachings.
Strauss finally traced the origins of this conflict all the
way back to the thought of Machiavelli, but he continued to
regard Hobbes as the most systematic exponent of the modern
version of natural right.
In Hobbes's presentation, the sovereign dictates the
interpretation of holy scripture and the details of
religious observance.

In the modern world, religion has

become a private matter, but Strauss nevertheless perceives

^Strauss provided an intellectual biography of sorts in the
Preface to the English version of his study of Spinoza, entitled
Spinoza's Critique of Religion, trans. E. M. Sinclair (New York:
Schocken Books, 1965), 1-31 (originally published in German as
Die Reliaionskritik Spinozas als Grundlage seiner
Bibelwissenschaft [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1930]).
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a tendency for the modern state to impose an insidious view
of man's place in the world.

Instead of a religious

orthodoxy, the state insists on loyalty to the goal of
universal enlightenment and affluence for all.

Modern

science is to seek mastery of nature for the relief of man's
estate.

The state debases education by taking control of

the educational apparatus for the purpose of the
unrestricted development of technology; the university
becomes a technical training center rather than the seat of
civilization and culture.
Strauss suggested that the modern state's promotion of
unlimited technical progress represented a kind of "necHobbesianism," an unacknowledged and yet unchallengeable new
doctrine.

He detected the potential for a uniquely modern

form of tyranny in this new doctrine of progress.

He became

convinced that the classical Greek writer Xenophon had
anticipated the possibility of a tyranny based on applied
science in a work entitled Hiero or Tvrannicus; Strauss
sought to recover an appreciation of this ancient
interpretation of tyranny.

Upon the publication of his

interpretation of the Hiero. Strauss became embroiled in an
exchange with Alexandre Kojéve.

Kojéve contended that

historical trends pointed to the attainment of a "universal
and homogeneous state" which would solve the problem of the
good regime.

Strauss found Kojéve's terminology apt, but he

discerned that the notion of a "universal and homogeneous
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State” captured the essence of a new form of tyranny.
Strauss thought its attainment unlikely; furthermore, if
attained, it might well be destructive of man's humanity.
Strauss's criticism of the modern state corresponds to
the anti-government tendency of contemporary American
conservatism; although Strauss surely might not approve of
popularized versions of his thought, many right-leaning
politicians and intellectuals have cited his influence.
Dinesh D'Souza, of the Heritage Foundation publication
Policv Review, provides a thumbnail sketch of Straussian
influence in American politics.
Yet this unassuming bespectacled man left an
indelible mark on students who would go on to
distinguish themselves in the American academy— such men
as Harvey Mansfield at Harvard, [Allan] Bloom and Joseph
Cropsey at the University of Chicago, Werner Dannhauser
at Cornell, Harry Jaffa at Claremont McKenna College,
and Walter Herns at Georgetown University. . . .
Prominent Straussians include: Paul Wolfowitz, former
assistant secretary of state, now a U. S. ambassador;
Gary McDowell, associate director of the Department of
Justice ; William Kristol, chief of staff for Education
Secretary William Bennett; and Carnes Lord, director of
security at the National Center for Public Policy.
Speechwriters for Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
Defense Secretary Weinberger identify themselves as
Straussians. Jack Kemp and Lewis Lehrman are
politicians of the right who derive their Straussian
perspective from Strauss protege Harry Jaffa.
D'Souza concludes that the followers of Strauss constitute
"the most rigorous conservative force in political theory,
with increasing influence on public policy.

^Dinesh D'Souza, "The Legacy of Leo Strauss,” Policv Review,
no. 40 (1987), 36.
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The Core of Strauss's Teaching
The heart of Strauss's doctrine was put forward in
Natural Right and Historv in a few pages within chapter 4,
entitled "Classic Natural Right."
According to Strauss, the classic natural right
teaching took for its starting point a critique of hedonism.
"The thesis of the classics is that the good is essentially
different from the pleasant, that the good is more
fundamental than the pleasant."

Since pleasure is

associated with the satisfaction of wants, the wants must be
prior to the pleasures.

Wants and the striving for their

satisfaction are the primary facts.

Furthermore, there is a

natural order of the wants, reflective of the natural
constitution of the being in question.

In human beings we

encounter the common-sense distinction between body and
soul; everyone admits that the capacities connected with
soul are higher than those associated with body.

The

capacity for speech, reason, or understanding distinguishes
man from the other animals and permits us to speak of man's
having a soul.

According to nature, a truly human existence

will consist of the highest possible development of these
uniquely human capacities.

"Therefore, the proper work of

man consists in living thoughtfully, in understanding, and
in thoughtful action.
^Leo Strauss, Natural Right and Historv (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1953), 126-27. Among other references, Strauss
refers here to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.7.1098a8-17.
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Strauss allowed that the thesis that the most excellent
life for human beings is the thoughtful life could be
defended on hedonistic grounds, but he contended that the
classics would object to this.

Hedonism would make reason

the handmaiden of pleasure, and would detract from the
intrinsic value of the excellent human life.

"We know that

it is a vulgar error to identify the man of excellence with
one's benefactor.

We admire, for example, a strategic

genius at the head of the victorious army of our enemies.
There are things which are admirable, or noble, by nature,
intrinsically.
The contention that human nature is social is derived
from the distinctive human capacity for reason.

Reason

manifests itself in speech, and speech is essentially
communicative.

Spoken communication, the essentially human

act, necessarily implies reference to others; "fellowfeeling" is implied in the communicative act.

Communication

through speech therefore provides the natural basis for
justice in the sense of consideration of others.

"Man

refers himself to others, or rather he is referred to
others, in every human act, . . . His sociality does not
proceed, then, from a calculation of the pleasures which he
expects from association, but he derives pleasure from
association because he is by nature social."

The necessity

to take into account the other's point of view in spoken
'^Strauss, Natural Right and Historv. 128.
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communication so that agreement may be secured means that
freedom is necessarily limited.

There is a sense that,

concerning one's fellows, all things are not permitted.

The

power of speech conveys a great freedom, but this freedom is
accompanied by a sense of restraint.

"Restraint is

therefore as natural or primeval as freedom," argues
Strauss.^
The derivation of the human essence from the capacity
for reason, speech, and communication suggests the model of
the city, or civil society, as the ideal form of human
association; "Man cannot reach his perfection except in
society or, more precisely, in civil society."

Not just any

city will suffice; the ideal city necessarily will be small.
along the lines of the ancient Greek polis.

This society is

to be kept together by mutual trust, which requires
acquaintance; while it may not be necessary for everyone to
be acquainted with everyone in the city, everyone should at
least know an acquaintance of everyone else.

The pursuit of

human excellence requires the supervision of manners ; if the
society can be kept small enough to permit intimate
acquaintance, this supervision can be maintained without
resort to despotism.

In any case, the modern metropolis

falls far short of this classic ideal of civil society; "In

^Ibid., 129-30. Strauss refers here to Aristotle, Politics
1.2.1253a7-18 and 3.6.1278bl8-25; Nicomachean Ethics 8.11.1161bl8 and 9.9.1170bl0-14; and Rhetoric 1.13.1373b6-9.
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a very large city, in 'Babylon,' everyone can live more or
less as he lists."®
An essential point is that this ideal civil society
would be a closed society.

Strauss holds that the

attainment of human excellence is a matter of chance; it is
unlikely that all societies could attain it at once.

"The

probability that all human societies should be capable of
genuine freedom at the same time is exceedingly small."
This is a decidedly inégalitarian principle; societies will
differ in the degree to which they approximate excellence.
The chances of realizing human excellence are best if a
multiplicity of independent societies, each maintaining a
particular way of life, is permitted.

To attempt to

incorporate all societies into a universal or allcomprehensive state would likely result in a civilization of
the least common denominator which could not sustain the
achievements of the higher societies.

"An open or all-

comprehensive society will exist on a lower level of
humanity than a closed society, which, through generations,
has made a supreme effort toward human perfection,"
concludes Strauss.

"If the society in which man can reach

the perfection of his nature is necessarily a closed

®Strauss, Natural Right and History. 130-31. Strauss refers
to Nicomachean Ethics 8.6.1158al0-18 and 9.9.1170b209.1Q.1171a20, and Politics 3.3.1276a27-34.
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society, the distinction of the human race into a number of
independent groups is according to nature."^
The best chance for the attainment of human excellence
is provided by the maintenance of a multitude of independent
societies.

Within each of these societies, the pursuit of

excellence will involve the exercise of constraint, since
excellence involves freedom exercised within limits.

Self-

restraint, or self-discipline, is best, but it cannot always
be relied upon.

Therefore, the promotion of excellence

within each society will require the exercise of rulership,
which will include a modicum of force and coercion.
"Justice and coercion are not mutually exclusive; in fact,
it is not altogether wrong to describe justice as a kind of
benevolent coercion."

The standpoint of classic natural

right cannot affirm anarchy, the absence of rule, as a
political ideal.

The good ruler will exercise power in

moderation, but the application of political authority will
sometimes be necessary.

Political excellence consists in

finding a mean between power and restraint; virtuous rule is
distinguishable from despotism because it is directed toward
excellence, not the interest of the ruler.

The political

art consists in the moderate exercise of power over men who
vary widely in their capacity for excellence.

Natural right

is necessarily inegalitarian; those who are entitled to
exercise political power are superior in right to those who
^Strauss, Natural Right and History. 131-32.
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are subject to that power.

"While all men, i.e., all normal

men, have the capacity for virtue, some need guidance by
others, whereas others do not at all or to a much lesser
degree. . . . Since men are then unequal in regard to human
perfection, i.e., in the decisive respect, equal rights for
all appeared to the classics as most unjust."®
From the perspective of classic natural right,
political power is to be exercised on behalf of a particular
way of life.

Each civil society seeks to establish and

maintain a politeia. a term often translated as
"constitution."

However, "constitution" or politeia in this

sense refers not just to a document prescribing abstract
legal principles, but to the particular way of life of a
society, not limited to the legal or political.

Politeia

might better be translated by "regime," understood in a
broad sense.

A constitution or regime in the classic sense

does not require the ruler to respect the right of the
citizens to live in just any way they wish; the ruler is
entitled to promote a certain way of life, to command and
forbid particular things.

This constitution or regime is a

substantive arrangement, not just a legal document.

It

permits the ruler to act in such a way as to influence the
tone or character of the society, the habits or attitudes

®Ibid., 132-35. Strauss refers to Nicomachean Ethics
5.1.1129b25-1130a8 and 10.9.1179b7-1180al0, and Politics
1.5.1254a29-31, 1.6.1255a3-22, and 7.3.1325b7 ff., among other
passages.
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that the society considers most respectable.

It might even

be conjectured that a society cannot avoid exercising such
influence; if it were to attempt to maintain a strict
neutrality concerning ways of life, it might find that it
had erected the standard of the "common man" or "mass man"
as authoritative by default.

"When the authoritative type

is the common man, everything has to justify itself before
the tribunal of the common man; everything which cannot be
justified before that tribunal becomes, at best, merely
tolerated, if not despised or suspect.
Strauss emphasizes that, according to the teachings of
the classics, the best regime will be attainable only under
the best conditions, and the existence of these conditions
will be a matter of chance.

When these conditions do not

obtain, we shall have to settle for the best feasible regime
rather than the simply best regime.

To attempt to actualize

the best regime when the requisite conditions are not
present might require the politician to resort to unjust or
ignoble measures; the abolition of human imperfection,
requiring a miraculous change in human nature, is not
feasible and should not be sought.

The best feasible

regime, which will be the best that can be done in most
circumstances, is equivalent to the legitimate regime;
whereas only one regime can be simply best, there might be a
^Strauss, Natural Right and Historv. 135-37. Strauss refers
to Nicomachean Ethics 10.9.1181bl2-23, and Politics 3.6.1278bll13, 3.17.1288a23-24, and 4,1.1289al2-20, among other passages.
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variety of legitimate regimes, depending on circumstances.
The legitimate regime will be imperfect; it will be just,
but not noble.

"Noble actions require, as Aristotle says, a

certain equipment; without such equipment they are not
possible.
The simply best regime would consist of the absolute
rule of the wise; however, formidable obstacles to its
attainment compel us to separate the question of the best
regime into its theoretical and practical aspects.

"The few

wise cannot rule the many unwise by force," notes Strauss.
"The unwise multitude must recognize the wise as wise and
obey them freely because of their wisdom."

However, the

wise may be unable to persuade the unwise.

"What is more

likely to happen is that an unwise man, appealing to the
natural right of wisdom and catering to the lowest desires
of the many, will persuade the multitude of his right; the
prospects for tyranny are brighter than those for rule of
the wise."

Since we can apprehend that to try to realize

the simply best regime directly may result in tyranny, we
must, as a practical matter, temper the absolute right of
the wise to rule with a requirement for consent.
^^Strauss, Natural Right and Historv. 138-40. Strauss
refers here to Nicomachean Ethics 5.7.1135a5, and to several
passages from Politics, including 2.6.1265al8-19, 4.1.1288bl0
ff., 4.11.1295a25-30, and 7.12.1331bl8-23.
^^Strauss, Natural Right and Historv. 140-41. Strauss
refers to Politics 2.2.1261a38-b3 and 2.9.1270b8-27, among other
passages.
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As a practical matter, the solution to the problem of
the best regime is the establishment of a mixed regime.

A

wise legislator would draft a legal code to which the
citizenry would consent freely.

The code should be altered

as little as possible; its implementation should be
entrusted to wise legislators who will administer it in the
spirit in which it was drafted.

The classics held that such

a government could best be entrusted to a landed
aristocracy, made up of "gentlemen."

The gentleman, while

not a wise man or a philosopher, partakes of nobility and
detachment from the vulgar to a sufficient extent that he
can be trusted to be a wise administrator.

One form of such

a government would be a mixed regime consisting of
democratic, aristocratic, and democratic components, with
the aristocratic part in the central position.

"The mixed

regime is, in fact— and it is meant to be— an aristocracy
which is strengthened and protected by the admixture of
monarchic and democratic institutions.
Aristotelian Natural Right
Strauss next distinguishes three versions of natural
right: the Socratic-Platonic, the Aristotelian, and the
Thomistic.^3

According to Strauss, Aristotelian natural

right is distinguished by its respect for the particular as
^^strauss. Natural Right and Historv. 141-42. Strauss
refers to Politics 2.6.1265b33-1266a6, among other passages.
^^Strauss, Natural Right and Historv. 146.
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opposed to the general or the universal.

This distinction

is relevant to Strauss's attitude toward Spinoza, toward
Hobbes, and toward the contemporary state.
Aristotelian natural right lacks the emphasis on the
divergence between the requirements of philosophy and
politics found in the Platonic-Socratic version.

According

to Strauss, Aristotle in his treatment of justice never
diverts his attention from the concrete manifestations of
the just and the unjust as they occur in public life.
A right which necessarily transcends political society,
he [Aristotle] gives us to understand, cannot be the
right natural to man, who is by nature a political
animal. . . . Plato eventually defines natural right
with direct reference to the fact that the only life
which is simply just is the life of the philosopher.
Aristotle, on the other hand, treats each of the various
levels of beings, and hence especially every level of
human life, on its own terms. When he discusses
justice, he discusses justice as everyone knows it and
as it is understood in political life, and he refuses to
be drawn into the dialectical whirlpool that carries us
far beyond justice in the ordinary sense of the term
toward the philosophic life.
Justice as it is understood in political life is not
equivalent to fully developed philosophy, but it retains its
validity nonetheless.

In an important sense, natural right

is not the exclusive property of philosophy, but is part of
political right, in that political life represents the full
development or completion of natural right.

While we may

speak of relations of justice between complete strangers,
"only among fellow-citizens do the relations which are the
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subject matter of right or justice reach their greatest
density and, indeed, their full growth.
A second aspect of the "particularism" of Aristotelian
natural right, which distinguishes the Platonic-Socratic as
well as the Aristotelian doctrine from the Thomistic, is its
insistence on the mutability of natural right.

Strauss

interprets this to mean that for Aristotle natural right
manifests itself in concrete decisions in which the faculty
of phronesis is exhibited, not in abstract principles.
General principles may be derived from all such concrete
decisions, but for Aristotle all such general principles are
corrigible.

Another way of putting it would be that general

principles are valid only ceteris paribus.

Principles such

as those of commutative and distributive justice are
posterior to the pursuit of the common good, the nature of
which is such that it cannot be expressed in terms of a
priori principles.

According to Strauss, Plato and

Aristotle both hold that "there is a universally valid
hierarchy of ends, but there are no universally valid rules
of action.
Strauss on Spinoza
Natural Right and Historv represents a concise
statement of a political teaching whose origin may be traced
l^ibid., 156-57.
ISibid., 157-63.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

72

back to Strauss's first scholarly undertaking, a study of
Spinoza which he completed before he left Germany.

Strauss

understood Spinoza's thought within the context of the
recurring "Jewish problem" which had plagued European
politics through the centuries.

The problem of finding a

religious and political settlement that would provide a
secure existence for European Jewry manifested itself in
Spinoza's day, just as it would almost three centuries
later, when the young Strauss would confront the political
upheavals of Germany during the nineteen-twenties.

Strauss

detected an "Epicurean motive" in Spinoza's thinking, an
effort directed toward establishing social calm and
political comity.

An important element of such an

accommodation would be an understanding of some kind between
Christians and Jews.
In his philosophy, Spinoza conceives of God simply as
the totality of everything that exists in the universe.

He

presented this doctrine as part of a posture in which he
feigned a sympathetic attitude toward Christianity, urging
Christians to purge their faith of outmoded Jewish relics.
Strauss argued that Spinoza was simply accommodating the
prejudices of predominantly Christian Dutch society;
actually, he was a thoroughgoing skeptic with respect to

^®See Gerhard KrUger, review of Die Reliaionskritik Spinozas
als Grundlage seiner Bibelwissenschaft (German title of Spinoza's
Critique of Religion), by Leo Strauss, in Deutsche
Literaturzeitunq 51 (20 December 1931): 2408.
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religion, and his doctrines could be turned against anv
orthodoxy.

Spinoza was trying to reconcile both

Christianity and Judaism to the modern project, providing a
doctrine to which both Christians and Jews could assimilate
themselves.

However, in doing so he had sacrificed

everything essential to both faiths, argued Strauss.

In

practice, the criticism of religious orthodoxy was
demoralizing and inimical to societal excellence.

Strauss

viewed Spinoza's philosophy as another instance of the
modern reductionistic tendency directed against those
particularistic beliefs and practices by which individuals
and societies orient themselves.
Spinoza's doctrines did not hold Strauss's attention
for long.

Despite differences between the two, he regarded

Spinoza's efforts essentially as derivative from those of
Hobbes.

In the history of the break between classic and

modern natural right, the thought of the English philosopher
was the "main event."
Strauss on Hobbes
Originally, Strauss identified Hobbes as the initiator
of the break between the classic and modern conceptions of
natural right.

Later, he came to view Machiavelli as the

founder of the modern, but the example of Hobbes remained

^^Strauss, Preface to Spinoza's Critique of Religion. 15-21;
see also W. T. Jones, Hobbes to Hume, vol. 3 of A Historv of
Western Philosophv. 2d ed. (New York; 1969), 196-202.
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central to his thought. Strauss's most extensive statement
on Hobbes is found in the monograph The Political Philosophv
of Hobbes.
For Strauss, the crucial feature of Hobbes's political
philosophy, that which distinguished it from classic natural
right, was its inversion of the proper relationship between
right and law.

"For Hobbes obviously starts, not, as the

great tradition did, from natural 'law', i.e. from an
objective order, but from natural 'right', i.e. from an
absolutely justified subjective claim which, far from being
dependent on any previous law, order, or obligation, is
itself the origin of all law, order, or obligation. . . .
For, by starting from 'right' and thus denying the primacy
of 'law' (or, what amounts fundamentally to the same, of
'virtue'), Hobbes makes a stand against the idealistic
tradition."

Hobbes's "natural right" occupies an

intermediate position between the classic understanding of
right and a purely natural principle; it lacks the character

^®Strauss, The Political Philosophv of Hobbes, trans. Elsa
M. Sinclair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press,
1936; reprinted, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952).
Strauss updated and corrected his account of Hobbes in a section
of chapter 5 of Natural Right and Historv (166-202), and in a
review of Politique et philosophie chez Thomas Hobbes by M.
Raymond Polin which appeared in the French journal Critique (10
[1954]: 338-62); the English version (trans. Mme. Simone Midan)
appeared in Strauss's volume What Is Political Philosophv? and
Other Studies (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1959) under the
title "On the Basis of Hobbes's Political Philosophy" (170-196).
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of a natural "law," but at least it remains a "juridical
conception.
In Strauss's presentation, Hobbes begins his political
philosophy with two "postulates of human nature”: natural
appetite on the one hand, and reason on the other.

Appetite

is rooted in man's animal nature; insofar as he is an
appetitive creature, man does not differ from the beasts.
Hobbes distinguishes man from the other animals with his
second postulate, that of reason; reason confers upon man
powers that the other creatures lack.

However, unlike the

classics, Hobbes places reason in a position subordinate to
appetite.

"Human appetite is thus not in itself different

from animal appetite, but only by the fact that in the case
of man appetite has reason at its service. "^0
Acting in the service of appetite, reason suggests that
self-preservation, the preservation of life, is a primary
good.

It does not represent a summum bonum in the sense

that it provides satisfaction or repose to the spirit, but
it is at least the prerequisite for the satisfaction of all
other wants.

Hobbes speaks more often of "avoiding death"

than of "preserving life"; the goodness of self-preservation
occurs to the reasoning capacity only, but the aversion to
death receives reinforcement from the passions.
death more passionately than they desire life.

Men fear
Furthermore,

-'Strauss, The Political Philosophv of Hobbes, viii-ix.
20ibid., 8-9.
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it is not the mere fact of death that constitutes the summum
malum, but an agonizing death, especially a violent death at
the hands of other men, that men find truly fearsome.

The

fear of violent death is irrational and emotional by nature,
but at least it is rational in its effects. Hobbes suggests.
In fact, he proposes to make this fear the basis of the
political.

He goes so far as to deny the moral value of any

political impulse that does not spring from the fear of
violent death.
Man requires companions to ward off those who would put
him to death violently.

Such companions could be obtained

by force or by agreement.

The former approach constitutes

despotism, and in a sense it is the more natural of the two;
the superior man seizes his opponents and places them in his
service rather than killing them.

Hobbes holds non-despotic

rule to be unnatural. It occurs only when two or more men
reach an agreement to perform a mutual abnegation; they
recognize the threat of death, rather than each other, as
the true enemy.
The fear of violent death thus provides the impetus for
the remainder of Hobbes's political philosophy.

It enables

him to distinguish between justice and injustice, preventing
his philosophy from becoming wholly naturalistic.

To act

out of fear of violent death is just; to act from other
21ibid.,

15-18.

22ibid., 21-22.
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motives, such as fear of punishment or fear of loss of
reputation, is unjust.

These latter motives constitute

"vanity," while the motivation provided by fear of death is
true "modesty."

This contrast of vanity and modesty may be

seen as a secularized version of the contrast of pride and
humility in Christian thought.

Without the distinction

between vanity and modesty, Hobbes would be left with no
conception of justice.
For Strauss, Hobbes's political philosophy represents a
lowering of the sights with respect to the classic
conception of natural right.

Not reason but impassioned

fear of violent death is the basis of the political.
Wariness of one's fellows, not sociability, is natural for
humans.

The non-despotic state is not natural but

artificial.

A many-faceted reductionistic tendency

manifests itself.

Bourgeois morals drive out aristocratic

virtue; religion is to be subordinated to the state; history
threatens the primacy of philosophy; the study of politics
becomes a naturalistic science of the passions.
A Political Science of the Passions
Strauss has gained a reputation for emphasizing the
timeless significance of a philosopher's thought, to the
neglect of considerations of social and historical context.
In The Political Philosophv of Hobbes he deviated from this

23jbid., 23-28.
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tendency; his intent was historical and biographical.

He

sought to downplay the influence of Galilean natural science
on Hobbes's political philosophy.

He identified two

tendencies in Hobbes's thinking, the first the development
of a new moral attitude which is present from the beginning
of his career, and the second a growing attraction to the
new physics and mathematics accompanied by an explicit
rejection of the philosophical tradition.

However, the two

tendencies were independent of each other, and they
overlapped; the break with tradition was incomplete even
when Hobbes first encountered Euclidean geometry at about
age forty.

"But the new moral attitude is one thing, and

the consciousness of its novelty and the rebellion against
tradition, which is the concomitant of that consciousness,
is another."24
Once Hobbes's career as a political philosopher and
controversialist was underway, his break with Aristotle was
nearly complete, but nevertheless he held back from
condemning Aristotle's Rhetoric.

Strauss detects the

influence of the Rhetoric in Hobbes's anthropology as
expressed in such passages as chapter 10 of Leviathan.
Whatever the differences between Aristotle and Hobbes might
be (concerning the priority of reason as opposed to passion,
or law as opposed to right, for instance), the account of
human passions in the Rhetoric corresponds to Hobbes's
24 Ibid., xi-xii, 136.
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reductionistic tendency to some extent, since Aristotle
seems to account for all the passions in terms of pain and
pleasure.

Anger, for instance, is described by Aristotle as

a pain caused by a slight to an individual or his friends;
pity is a pain attending the suffering of an evil by someone
who does not deserve it.

"It would be difficult to find

another classical work whose importance for Hobbes's
political philosophy can be compared with that of the
Rhetoric." claimed Strauss; "the use and appreciation of
Aristotle's Rhetoric which may be traced in Hobbes's mature
period are the last remnants of the Aristotelianism of his
youth."25
Hobbes's political science consists of the
classification and criticism of the passions, especially
that of vanity, and of the opinions that these passions
generate.

One thing that Hobbes does have in common with

the classics is that he draws a clear distinction between
reality and appearance, or between knowledge and opinion;
fear is the foundation of political reality, vanity of
misguided opinion ("For vanity is the force which makes men
blind, fear is the force which makes men see").

Hobbes

seeks to criticize the prevalent but incorrect political
opinions that spring from vain passion; Strauss describes
his theory as an "exact and paradoxical political

25%bid., 30-43. See also Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. Lane
Cooper (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1932), esp. 2.2-11.
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philosophy" which aims at purging the polity of all vestiges
of pre-scientific morality.

However, to the extent that

this exact, scientific philosophy partakes of reason, its
source is fear, and not the reasoned speech that Strauss
cites as the source of the political in the

tradition of

classic natural right. For Hobbes, the attempt to ground the
political in the capacity for speech partakes of vanity.
Hobbes's political science differs from the classics in
its insistence on applicabilitv.

He rejects the classical

insight that the realization of the best regime is a matter
of chance.

Strauss

remove all vestiges

remarks that while Hobbes may seek to
of vain passion, in the end he insists

that the standard arrived at by reason be in accord with the
passions.

Hobbes insists on applicability in all cases,

even when the circumstances for the realization of political
excellence are most unfavorable.

To be applicable in such

extreme cases, political science must come to imitate a
technical procedure.

The polity is to be understood as an

artificial body, and the political scientist's function is
akin to that of a mechanic who attends to keeping a machine
running.

If the machine is kept in proper working order, it

should not run out of control, no matter how much friction
is generated by the violent passions actualized within it.
Hobbesian political science can have no higher goal than

2®Strauss, Political Philosophv of Hobbes. 130, 136-39, 14245; see also Natural Right and Historv, 129-30.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

keeping the political mechanism under control.

"The aim of

the state is for him as a matter of course peace, i.e.,
peace at any price."

Political science understood as such a

technical undertaking cannot, of course, have anything to
say about virtue and vice, rightness and

w r o n g n e s s . 27

Strauss concluded that Hobbes's contribution amounted
to a lowering of the standards of political philosophy to
such an extent that its application could only bring
political disintegration.

By placing right prior to law and

reward prior to obligation, modern natural right threatens
to submerge political order in a cacophony of competing
claims.

If all differences in reasonableness among men are

denied, it becomes impossible to solve the problem of
sovereignty by proposing that the rational ought to rule the
irrational.

The renunciation of the possibility that human

nature might provide a rational standard implies the
abolition of the distinction between the good and the
necessary; the necessary becomes the only standard.28
Historv versus Philosophy
The renunciation of a rational standard in political
science suggests a reduced role for philosophy relative to
history in the study of politics.

Hobbes's attitude, as

Strauss interprets it, is that "philosophy lays down
27gtrauss, The Political Philosophv of Hobbes. 150-55.
28%bid., 157-61, 165-70.
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precepts for the right behavior of men.
not nearly so effective as examples."

But precepts are
Hobbes, for instance,

preferred to teach political prudence and the dangers of
democracy by means of a translation of Thucydides' history
rather than a philosophical tract.

Such a preference

reveals that Hobbes took his bearings from how man actuallv
lives rather than how he ought to live.

Strauss held that

the preference for history implied a disparagement of
reason.

"As Hobbes doubts the effectiveness of precept

altogether— does he not assert the impotence of reason with
reference to all men, that is, as a principle?— must we not
conclude that the impotence of reason was established for
him even before he engaged in natural science?"^^
Strauss invoked Aristotle's authority to argue that the
shift from philosophy to history, or at least from
metaphysics to politics, reflected a denial of the existence
of an order transcending man, suggesting instead that man is
the highest being in the universe.
order became the central theme.

Man and not an eternal

The philosophical ideal of

a life devoted to contemplation and understanding was to be
replaced by what Strauss called "a more popular ideal.
Hobbes's thinking eventually led him back from history
to philosophy, but he returned not to the philosophical
tradition but to his own political philosophy, which he held
29jbid.,

79-81.

30jbid.,

90-91.
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to be both more valid and in particular more applicable than
that of Aristotle.

Strauss describes Hobbes's procedure as

the replacement of a morality of obedience with a morality
of prudence— which, of course, raises the question whether
it has any truly moral content.

Hobbes's teaching is

strictly instrumentalist; it is concerned with finding an
effective means to a desired end.

Whether there ought to be

any constraints on the utilization of just any means to a
desired end is a neglected question.

"Hobbes lets us see

that even if there were an eternal order, he would take into
consideration only the actual behavior of men, and that his
whole interest is centered on man, on application, on the
'use of means
Strauss contends that the subiect of Hobbes's political
philosophy is history.
instructive.

A comparison with Aristotle is

For Aristotle the development of a polity has

a rational end; the study of the political has the notion of
a stable, perfect order as its connective thread.

The

perfect order provides an objective standard for judging the
political.

For Hobbes, on the other hand, "the subject of

at least the fundamental part, and precisely of that
fundamental part, of his political philosophy, is an
history, a genesis, and not an order which is static and
perfect."

The state of nature, or that which develops from

it, is not to be understood by a standard found outside of
31lbid., 98-102.
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it; all we need do is understand fully the state of nature
itself.

History provides its own standard, instead of being

judged by a standard set up beforehand.

Since history

"tests itself," the philosopher is relieved of the task of
judging it.^^
Religion Subordinated to the State
Strauss concluded that Hobbes's preference for history
over philosophy would commit him to a disparagement of the
idea of an eternal order; this disparagement was made
manifest by the subordination of religion implied by the
Hobbesian doctrine of sovereignty.

The prominence given to

the matter of sovereignty places civil authority on a
collision course with religious commitment in Hobbes's
thought.

One of the best-known features of his theory is

his insistence on the absolute nature of sovereign
authority.

Out of mutual fear, men are persuaded to

substitute a limited, avoidable danger— that of state
authority— for an immeasurable, unknowable danger.

A high

price is paid for this concession to absolutism, however;
the possibility of any external standard by which to judge
the legitimacy of authority is removed.

Strauss contended

that this feature made it impossible for Hobbes's political
science to distinguish between despotism or tyranny and
virtuous rule (an incapacity shared by contemporary

32ibid., 104-06.
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behavioristic political science, Strauss would add).
Strauss drew the fateful conclusion that Hobbes's "final
theory is that every effective rule is eo ipso
legitimate.
In order that sovereign authority might be effective,
Hobbes's theory stresses that no division of authority can
be tolerated; otherwise, civil disobedience and disorder
would be legitimated.

As has been shown from the discussion

of the English Civil War above, Hobbes regarded the
religious sphere, especially the Christian tendency to
distinguish between temporal and ecclesiastical power, as
harboring the potential for political division and sedition.
In a brief section on Hobbes within his study of Spinoza,
Strauss emphasized the tension between religion and the
Hobbesian conception of the state; "Obedience to the
established power is never sin.
established authority is sin."

Rather, rebellion against
To Hobbes, Christianity

inverted the proper relation between religion and the state.
To Strauss, this meant that all devotion or commitment
without a specifically political origin, especially the
religious impulse, would tend to be subordinated in a
Hobbesian regime.

"Hobbes's is the first doctrine that

necessarily and unmistakably peints to a thoroughly

33ibid., 67-68.
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•enlightened,' i.e., a-religious or atheistic society as the
solution of the social or political problem.
Hobbes's doctrine requires political supervision of the
religious; the sovereign dictates the interpretation of holy
scripture and religious dogma.

Political authority must

keep religion under control; otherwise, the fear and promise
of the eternal might subvert the effectiveness of the fear
of the violent death.

"Hobbes's personal attitude to

positive religion was at all times the same; religion must
serve the State and is to be esteemed or despised according
to the services or disservices rendered to the state,"
Strauss remarked.

He detected reflections of this Hobbesian

attitude in the modern state's treatment of

r e l i g i o n . ^5

Bourgeois over Aristocratic Morals
The disparagement of religion had its counterpart in
the vulgarization of manners and morals in the Hobbesian
polity.

Keith Thomas has argued that over the course of his

career Hobbes displayed an attraction for an aristocratic
ideal, in his personal life if not in his political theory;
he lived a detached, solitary existence devoted to
contemplation.^®

Whether or not this was the case, Strauss

argues that at the level of political philosophy we see in
^^strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion. 95-96; Natural
Right and Historv. 198.
^®Strauss, The Political Philosophv of Hobbes. 74.
3®Thomas, "The Social Origins of Hobbes's Political Thought."
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Hobbes a movement from an aristocratic to a bourgeois ethic.
He came to realize that his most fundamental premises could
not provide a foundation for an aristocratic politics; the
polity was to be based on fear, not honor or virtue.
"Hobbes's criticism of aristocratic virtue thus does not
mean the replacement of honour by prudence.

It is rather

justice and charity which take the place occupied before by
honour.

These virtues, which in Hobbes's view, are the only

moral virtues, have, however, their ultimate foundation in
fear of violent death."

It would seem that to so

distinguish between justice or charity and prudence might be
to draw a distinction without a difference.

As has been

noted above, Hobbes's theory does not rise above the level
of utilitarianism or instrumentalism, raising the guestion
whether it has any authentic moral content.

Whether

Hobbes's politics is a moral theory or a mere counsel of
prudence, its motive force comes from the fear of violent
death.

"Precisely, this attempt to give a foundation to

utilitarian morals by having recourse to a force which
imperatively compels prudence, is the peculiarity of
Hobbes's political philosophy.
The description of England as a "nation of shopkeepers"
is recalled by Strauss's account of the character of the
society that Hobbes's philosophy would dictate.

Strauss

refers to Rudiments in attributing to Hobbes the opinion
^^Strauss, The Political Philosophv of Hobbes. 116.
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that material goods and the means to their acquisition are
the only real goods; "Along with peace at home and abroad,
freedom for individual enrichment is the most important aim
of corporate life.”

Strauss anticipates Thomas's judgement

about Hobbes's stance on the English Civil War; he was not
an opponent of the English middle classes, but he argues
that they were acting against their own best interests by
opposing sovereign authority.
Strauss's description of Hobbes's account of man's
place in the universe anticipates his judgement that the
impulse to dominate nature is characteristic of modernity.
In contrast to Aristotle's thesis of the benevolence of
nature, Hobbes appears to posit something resembling the
scarcity hypothesis of modern economics.

Man "experiences

only force, and not kindness" from nature.
Constantly aware of the desperate seriousness of his
situation, it will not occur to him to be proud of his
freedom, and, therefore, he will, above all, be on his
guard against taking that freedom as the object of his
speculations, against contemplating himself in his
freedom and taking pleasure in it. . . . Not grateful
contemplation of nature, and still less vain
contemplation of man, is fitting to man's situation, but
the utilization and cultivation of nature. For man can
assert himself only by increasing and improving nature's
deceptive and niggardly gifts by his labour and
exertions; . . . Because Hobbes's point of departure is
that man is at the mercy of nature, he distrusts good
fortune and the fortunate, distrusts their gratitude and
their gaiety, distrusts, in particular, in spite of all
personal affection, the aristocracy, whose virtues are
only 'virtues of nature'.

3®Strauss, Political Philosophv of Hobbes. 118-19.
also Chapter 2, 29-30 above.

See
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Thus Hobbes is not merely the partisan of the new money
making classes; he expresses the spirit of a society in
which enrichment would be the motivation not of just a
single class but of everyone.

Aristocratic virtue cannot

provide the foundation for a polity; the true foundation
will not be revealed until political philosophy lowers its
sights.

Furthermore, the affluence that a bourgeois society

may achieve should not deceive us; the society may appear to
be flourishing on the material level, but the society of
which this great economic machine is a part is based on
fear.

"In the movement from the principle of honour to the

principle of fear, Hobbes's political philosophy comes into
being.
Strauss on Machiavelli
Strauss turned his attention from Spinoza to Hobbes and
later to Machiavelli; by the time of the appearance of the
American edition of The Political Philosophy of Hobbes.
Strauss had changed his opinion about the origin of the
break between classic and modern natural right.

"Hobbes

appeared to me as the originator of modern political
philosophy.

This was an error; not Hobbes, but Machiavelli,

deserves this honor."

He concluded that Machiavelli's

^^Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. 125-28.
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reserve, in contrast to the audacity of Hobbes, had led him
to underestimate the radicalism of the Florentine thinker.^0
Strauss condemned Machiavelli on the same grounds that
he denounced Hobbes.

Both suggested that a desirable end

justifies any means; neither distinguished between how men
actuallv live and how they ought to live.

In the Prince.

Machiavelli deliberately adopted a posture of indifference
to the distinction between king and tyrant.

"If it is true

that only an evil man will stoop to teach maxims of public
and private gangsterism, then we are forced to say that
Machiavelli was an evil man," declared Strauss in his
Thoughts on Machiavelli.^^
The parallels that Strauss detected between the
theories of Machiavelli and Hobbes led him to view the
thought of the former as an intimation of the latter.

Both

thinkers maintained an unsentimental view of man as a
creature of the passions; a ruthless political authority was
required to keep men's passions from getting the better of
them.

Machiavelli did not even resort to the device of a

putative social covenant among men to justify the state; he
asserted simply that political morality was built on a
^^Strauss, The Political Philosophv of Hobbes. Preface to
the American Edition, xv-xvi.
4igtrauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glencoe, 111.: Free
Press, 1958), 9; see also On Tvranny. revised and enlarged ed.
(Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, Agora Editions, 1963; reprint,
Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, Cornell Paperbacks,
Agora Paperback Editions, 1968), 22-23.
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foundation of immorality or at least amorality.

Strauss's

presentation of this justification of political authority
sounds distinctly Hobbesian.
Necessity makes men not only virtuous but good as
well. Men in general have no natural inclination toward
goodness. Therefore they can be made good and kept good
only by necessity. Such necessity is brought upon men
originally by non-human nature, by the original terror.
But the quasi-original goodness is inseparable from
defenselessness and want. Men are therefore compelled
to form societies in order to live in peace and
security. The security afforded by society would remove
the necessity to be good if the primary necessity to be
good were not replaced by a necessity to be good which
stems from laws, i.e., from punishment or threat of
punishment— by a necessity originating in men.
We might note the intimation of a Hobbesian, "positivist"
conception of law in the equation of law with punishment.
Order is to be kept through the exercise of a civil
authority who exercises a kind of "virtue" unrestricted by
considerations of law or morality.

"Immoral modes" would be

resorted to only in "extraordinary cases"; Strauss remarks
that "Machiavelli's view of the relation between moral
virtue and the common good . . . abolishes the essential
difference between civil societies and bands of robbers,
since robbers too use ordinary modes among themselves
whenever

possible.

Machiavelli insinuated that Christianity left men with
too much of a guilty conscience to exercise the necessary
political ruthlessness.

Strauss contended that in this

respect his intention was identical to that of Hobbes;
^Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli. 249, 259.
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religion had to be subordinated to the political realm.

"We

no longer understand that in spite of great disagreements
among those thinkers, they were united by the fact that they
all fought one and the same power— the kingdom of darkness,
as Hobbes called it; that fight was more important to them
than any merely political issue."

Both thinkers had to be

circumspect, since they were confronted with pious Christian
opinion.

Machiavelli appealed to a prejudice in favor of

classical antiquity to gain a hearing.

He claimed to favor

a revival of classical virtue, thereby disparaging
Christianity indirectly.

His explicit statements on

Christianity were inconsistent, so that his teaching can be
interpreted plausibly as consistent with the established
religion.

Hobbes took a different approach in the second

half of Leviathan, offering an explicit apology for the
consistency of his doctrine with religious orthodoxy.
Strauss contended that because of the politically awkward
situation in which each thinker found himself, neither could
state his true views explicitly.

He argued, for instance,

that Machiavelli often contradicted himself intentionally,
so that complicated interpretive rules are needed to
ascertain his genuine views; furthermore, he would indicate
his dismissal of a widely held view by refusing to mention
it.

Strauss held that both Hobbes and Machiavelli were

opponents of religion, but that theirs were esoteric
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teachings whose true meanings could be ascertained only by
"reading between the lines.
Although he finally felt compelled to attribute the
origin of modern political philosophy to Machiavelli rather
than to Hobbes, Strauss continued to view the British
philosopher as the paradigmatic example of the break with
classic natural right.

Machiavelli had only initiated that

which Hobbes would bring to systematic fruition.

"It was

Machiavelli, that greater Columbus, who had discovered the
continent on which Hobbes could erect his structure.
Strauss on Xenophon
After completing his study of Hobbes, Strauss directed
his attention away from modernity and toward an ancient
Greek text.

He undertook a critical explication of Hiero or

Tvrannicus by Xenophon, who is best known for having
supplemented Plato's account of the life of Socrates.
Strauss believed that in the Hiero he had found a clue to
the nature of the type of tyranny that threatened to engulf
modernity.

Xenophon provides an intimation of a beneficent

form of tyranny which struck Strauss as capturing perfectly
a kind of "neo-Hobbesianism" into which contemporary
political practice threatened to lapse.

He published his

43ibid., 231. Strauss's fullest statement on the necessity
of esoteric interpretations is to be found in the title essay of
Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press,
1952), 22-37.
44gtrauss, Natural Right and History. 177.
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reflections on the Hiero in an essay entitled "On Tyranny"
which appeared in a volume bearing the same title, along
with a new translation of the Hiero commissioned for the
occasion.

The revised and enlarged edition of this volume

contained Alexandre Kojéve's response to Strauss's original
reflections in an essay entitled "Tyranny and Wisdom," along
with a rejoinder by Strauss entitled "Restatement on
Xenophon's Hiero."
The Hiero takes the form of a dialogue between the
title character, a tyrant of antiquity, and Simonides, a
poet reputed to be a wise man, who has come to visit him.
Strauss remarks that "the intention of the Hiero is nowhere
stated by the author."

The dialogue contains little

narration other than the phrases "Simonides said" or "Hiero
said" at the appropriate places; we do not know whether
either of the characters speaks for the author.

Strauss

believes that this ambiguity is a deliberate tactic on the
part of Xenophon; "The dialogue that deserves the name
communicates the thought of the author in an indirect or
oblique way," he remarks.

"Society will always try to

tyrannize thought."^*5
Commenting on the dramatic action of the dialogue,
Strauss states that the conversation "is likely to take
place in an atmosphere of limited straightforwardness."

The

tyrant is especially likely to have an opinion of the wise
45gtrauss, On Tvrannv. 26-29.
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man that partakes of the vulgar.

He fears that the wise man

seeks to subvert his tyrannical rule; he confuses wisdom
with the ability to become a tyrant.

Although Simonides

would not appear to be able to threaten Hiero's rule, he
faces the problem of gaining the tyrant's confidence.

He

must adopt the "hardboiled" posture of the "real man" in
order to convince Hiero that he is unscrupulous enough to be
competent to advise a tyrant.

He appears to win Hiero's

trust gradually over the course of the dialogue.
At first glance, the action of the dialogue appears
simple enough; it can be divided roughly into two parts.

In

the first part (chapters 1-7) Hiero holds forth on the
unhappiness of the tyrant's life.

In the second part

(chapters 8-11) Simonides suggests measures that can be
taken so that the tyrant can be the happiest of men.

Thus

the dialogue would appear to be a relatively straightforward
endorsement of beneficent tyranny.

We should not hasten to

make a summary judgement on this matter, however.
In chapter 1, Simonides induces Hiero to admit some
unpleasant facts about his life as a tyrant.

The poet

suggests that the tyrant is, in a sense, wiser than he is,
since the tyrant is in a position to evaluate the merits and
demerits of the tyrannical life compared with that of the
private man.

Hiero protests that tyrants have fewer

46lbid., 40-42, 53-57.
47ibid., 28-9.
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pleasures and more pains than private men.

They go on to

discuss several species of physical pleasure, including
visual spectacles, food, the pleasures of marriage, and
finally homosexual pleasure.

Hiero contends that the tyrant

is in an inferior position to the private man with respect
to all these, especially the last.

"To the private man it

is immediately a sign that the beloved grants favors from
love when he renders some service, because the private man
knows his beloved serves under no compulsion.

But it is

never possible for the tyrant to trust that he is loved."
Hiero has won only a rhetorical victory here; he defeats
Simonides' suggestion that the tyrant's life is superior in
pleasures, but at the price of being forced to reveal his
own

d e s p a i r . ^8

At the outset of chapter 2, Simonides adopts an
unsentimental pose in response to Hiero's remarks.
Inferiority in the enjoyment of physical pleasures would
seem to him to be a trivial matter, since the tyrant's life
is superior in the decisive sense that he is "most capable
of harming your private enemies and benefiting your
friends."

Hiero responds that this is an appearance that

may seem obvious to the multitude.

"Now tyranny displays

openly, evident for all to see, the possessions which are
held to be of much value.

But it keeps what is harsh hidden

Xenophon, Hiero or Tvrannicus. trans. Marvin Kendrick, in
Strauss, On Tvrannv. 1-6.
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in the tyrants' souls, where human happiness and unhappiness
lie concealed."

From this point until the end of chapter 6,

Simonides remains almost completely silent while Hiero
describes the unhappiness of the tyrant's life in matters
transcending physical pleasure.
For the tyrant, all the lands he surveys are hostile
territory, even his own city, Hiero declaims; even at home,
the tyrant is surrounded by jealous rivals.

The tyrant

cannot even brag about his nation's martial conquests as the
private man can; he must try to minimize these, lest they
seem unjust.

Furthermore, the tyrant is hated by those who

ought to be inclined by nature to love him, including
children, wives, brothers, and comrades.

Everyone knows

that tyrants have themselves killed these, and that tyrants
have also perished at the hands of same.®°
The tyrant cannot even trust his own food and drink,
since rivals may attempt to tamper with them; the tyrant
requires a servant to sample his food and drink before he
himself does.

Cities have been known to honor those who

kill the tyrant.

The tyrant's needs and desires are much

harder to satisfy than those of the private man, since they
are of such a large scale; the tyrant's greatest expense of

49ibid., 6.
SOibid., 6-9.
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all is that of guarding his own life, which forces him to
resort to plunder.
The tyrant must fear the brave, the wise, and the just,
who may seek to overthrow tyrannical rule; he can trust only
the unjust, the incontinent, and the slavish.

One of his

few pleasures is found in the arming of mercenaries, who are
to terrorize the citizens of the tyrant's own city.

The

tyrant has slaves instead of friends; he is deprived of
pleasant intimacy.

The tyrant cannot even allow himself a

pleasant night's sleep, lest his enemies set upon him in the
night.

Fear spoils all the tyrant's pleasures; he cannot

even trust his own guards.
Simonides takes the conversational lead at the outset
of chapter 7.

He suggests that the tyrant bears all the

burdens that he does for the sake of honor.

"Accordingly,

it seems to me that you probably endure all these things you
bear in the tyranny because you are honored beyond all other
human beings."

Hiero objects that honor, like erotic love,

is not genuine unless given freely.
tyranny, then?

Why not give up

But merely to give up tyranny would not

suffice to make amends for all the crimes committed by the
tyrant.

"Rather, if it profits any other man, Simonides, to

Sljbid., 9-10.
52ibid., 11-13.
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hang himself, know . . . that I myself find this most
profits the tyrant."53
Strauss contends that the transition from chapter 7 to
chapter 8 is the turning point of the dialogue.

In a sense,

Simonides has the tyrant in his power; conceivably, he could
induce Hiero to commit suicide by agreeing with his
despairing assessment at this point.

However, he does not

do so; he thereby shows that he has no ulterior motive, and
this effects a change in Hiero's attitude.

The remainder of

the dialogue is taken up with Simonides's suggestions for
measures that the tyrant could take to win the affection of
his subjects.

He should leave punishment to others, and

should reserve the giving of rewards to himself.
Honorariums could be offered to the best farmer or merchant
in the city, for example.

"To sum it up, if it should

become clear with respect to all matters that the man who
introduces something beneficial will not go unrewarded, he
would stimulate many to engage in reflecting on something
good."

Additionally, the tyrant could instruct the

mercenaries to act as protectors of all the citizens, rather
than terrorizing them.

Finally, the tyrant should spend a

portion of his private fortune on public works for the
common good.

"Augment the city, for you will attach power

to yourself.

Acquire allies for it.

Consider the

fatherland to be your estate, the citizens your comrades.
53jbid., 13-14.
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friends your own children, your sons the same as your life,
and try to win victory by benefiting all these.
According to Strauss, the position of Xenophon cannot
be identified with either Simonides or Hiero.

Xenophon's

Simonides presents suggestions for the improvement of a
radically faulty order; that order remains faulty even after
it is improved.

Simonides discusses the pleasant effects of

the tyrant's kind actions; in order to avoid giving offense,
he pays no regard to how the tyrant came to power, or to his
previous misdeeds.

A mitigated tyranny is still a tyranny.

Strauss notes that Simonides never refers to Hiero as a
king.

Hiero thus lacks a valid title; tyrannical rule, in

opposition to kingship, lacks legitimacy.^5
Strauss interprets Xenophon as being in agreement with
his own position regarding the philosophical justification
for constitutional government.

In theory, the absolute rule

of the wise would be best; Xenophon acknowledges the weight
of objections to the "blindness" of "merely" legal justice
that places the letter of the law over its spirit.

In

practice, however, the establishment of the absolute rule of
the wise is likely to partake of tyranny; as a practical
matter, constitutional government, or "kingship," is best.
54gtrauss, On Tvrannv. 59-60; Xenophon, Hiero or Tvrannicus.
in Strauss, On Tvrannv. 14-20.
^^Strauss, On Tvrannv. 60-65.
56ibid., 74-77.
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"Tyranny is defined in contradistinction to kingship:
kingship is such rule as is exercised over willing subjects
and is in accordance with the laws of the cities; tyranny is
such rule as is exercised over unwilling subjects and
accords, not with laws, but with the will of the ruler.”
Tyranny could be improved so that the subjects willingly
acquiesce in it, but it would still partake of tyranny in
that it would remain lawless rule; the subjects might be
treated like comrades instead of children, but they are not
free.57
The Koiéve-Strauss Exchange
Alexandre Kojéve, a philosopher of Russian origin who
spent most of his career in France, responded to Strauss's
interpretation of the Hiero in his essay "Tyranny and
Wisdom"; the ensuing exchange gave Strauss the opportunity
to expound further on the relation between modern
totalitarianism and the tyranny intimated by Xenophon.
Kojéve is best known for his interpretation of Hegel's
Phenomenoloav of Spirit, especially with regard to chapter
4, section A of that work, which deals with the so-called
"master-slave dialectic."

This interpretation revolves

around the central concept of recognition; Kojéve contends
that it is man's nature to seek recognition.

Furthermore,

Kojéve would argue that it is only through a dialectical

57ibid., 69-72.
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procedure in which representatives of different viewpoints
seek recognition from each other, rather than an "Epicurean"
intellectual isolation and detachment, that any degree of
objectivity can be attained in either philosophy or
statesmanship.

This dialectical procedure often takes the

form of a struggle in which a superior overcomes an inferior
in a process akin to a master's subjugation of a slave; in
the Hiero. Kojéve would interpret Simonides as the "master"
and Hiero as the "slave."

The concept of recognition

provides the perspective from which Kojéve criticizes
Strauss's interpretation of the

H i e r o . ^8

Kojéve remarks that the measures comprising the
"beneficent tyranny" proposed by Simonides in the last three
chapters of the Hiero have become an "almost banal reality"
in the modern world; modern tyrants have already constructed
this "utopia."

However, Kojéve believes that a tyranny

confined to one country could never fulfill completely the
tyrant's lust for recognition.

Total satisfaction could

consist only in the construction of the "universal and
homogeneous state," a worldwide regime of universal
enlightenment and equality.

"The fact is that the political

man acting at the prompting of his desire for 'recognition'

5®Kojéve, "Tyranny and Wisdom," in Strauss, On Tvrannv. 148,
162-73. Kojéve's full discussion of Hegel's Phenomenoloav of
Spirit is to be found in Kojéve, Introduction to the Reading of
Hegel: Lectures on the "Phenomenoloav of Spirit", assembled by
Raymond Queneau, ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr.
(Ithaca, N. Y.; Cornell University Press, 1969).
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(or for 'glory') will be fully 'satisfied' only when he is
at the head of a State, not only universal but politically
and socially homogeneous as well (taking account of
irreducible physiological differences); of a State, that is,
which is the end and the end product of the common labor of
all and of each."

Such a state, Kojéve claims, would

represent "the realization of the supreme political ideal of
mankind.
In Kojéve's view, it is not at all problematical for
the philosopher to attempt to advise the tyrant.

In fact,

history reveals that philosophical ideals are often
realized, "sooner or later" if not directly and immediately.
For instance, Alexander the Great realized the ideal of
universality in an empire; St. Paul realized it with the
establishment of a church.

Hegel would cite these as

examples of "historical verification" of a philosophical
impulse.

The "universal and homogeneous state" would

provide "historical verification" of the Christian ethic,
albeit in secularized form.

Kojéve appears satisfied that

the establishment of such a state would represent the
solution to the problem of the good regime.®®
In his response to Kojéve, Strauss upholds the ideal of
wisdom or virtue, in opposition to recognition, as man's
5®Kojéve, "Tyranny and Wisdom," in Strauss, On Tvrannv. 14655.
®®Ibid., 180-88.
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natural end.

In claiming to have synthesized classical and

Biblical morality, Hegel and Kojéve actually have
constructed a lax morality out of two moral codes which made
very stringent demands.

They would justify the doing of

that which the self-respecting man would not do— the
establishment of a tyranny.

Strauss found it unsurprising

that the Hegelian synthesis would have this result,
because— and this is a crucial point— he regarded the
Hegelian master-slave dialectic as nothing more than a
sophisticated version of the reductionistic Hobbesian stateof-nature theory; instead of providing an external standard,
it justifies whatever history produces.

"Kojéve knows as

well as anyone that Hegel's fundamental teaching regarding
master and slave is based on Hobbes' doctrine of the state
of nature.
Strauss concedes the need for intersubjective
verification in philosophy in order to avoid sectarianism.
However, he prefers the sect to a relativistic Republic of
Letters in which all opinions are treated as equal, none are
taken too seriously, and there is no conception of virtue or
excellence other than a "middle-of-the-road" consensus.
Such a stance may have political as well as philosophical
significance; the relativistic Republic of Letters may be
identified with contemporary liberalism, while the
Glstrauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero," in On Tvrannv.
203-05. See also The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. 57-58 and
104-06, on the relation between Hobbes and Hegel.
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independence of mind associated with the outspoken sectarian
may correspond to the self-image of contemporary
conservatism.

The lackluster consensus of the "least common

denominator" is likely to be the result if the philosopher
goes to the marketplace with the idea of participating too
directly in efforts toward the best regime.

"Indispensible

philosophical politics" consists of persuading the city to
tolerate philosophy, not in building the best regime
directly; philosophy has been relatively successful at
achieving the former task.

The philosopher, however, "does

not expect salvation or satisfaction from the establishment
of the simply best social order.
Strauss believed that the attempt to actualize the
universal and homogeneous state would be "possible only on
the basis of unlimited technological progress with all its
terrible hazards"; if technology should not progress
sufficiently, the result would be permanent revolution and
political chaos.

Furthermore, he felt the Kojéve had "an

unfounded belief in the eventually rational effect of
movements instigated by the passions."

In any case, he held

that "men will have very good reasons for being dissatisfied
with the universal and homogeneous state."

On Kojéve's own

principles, if man's humanity can be fulfilled only by
striving for recognition, then in such a state onlv the
chief of state would find it.

The only truly humanizing

^^strauss, "Restatement," in On Tvrannv. 207-14.
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thing left for men to do would be to attempt a political
assassination or coup d'etat.

If we assume that the

unlimited development of technology represents the end of
History, then in the universal and homogeneous state all
striving is superfluous and man's humanity is lost.

If, on

the other hand, dissatisfaction remains, the only remedy for
it would be political violence.

Either way, the

actualization of the universal and homogeneous state would
be tragic.®3
Strauss on the Character of Modern Liberalism
Strauss believed that the contemporary liberal regime
partakes of the tyrannical "universal and homogeneous state"
to some extent.

The Hobbesian nature of this "universal and

homogeneous state" is established by the observation that
its Universal and Final Tyrant would "be forced to suppress
every activity which might lead people into doubt of the
essential soundness of the universal and homogeneous state:
...

In particular he must in the interest of the

homogeneity of his universal state forbid every teaching,
every suggestion, that there are politically relevant
natural differences among men which cannot be abolished or
neutralized by progressing scientific technology."

This

mention of the necessity for the tyrant to suppress certain
teachings recalls the powers attributed to the absolute

®3ibid., 207, 222-26.
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sovereign by Hobbes, especially in light of the contemporary
religious upheavals associated with the English Civil War
which concerned Hobbes.
Any doubt about the Hobbesian character of Strauss's
"universal and homogeneous state" may be set aside by a
consideration of Strauss's brief discussion of Hobbes in his
essay on the Nazi ideologist Carl Schmitt.

Here Strauss

interpreted Hobbes's understanding of the salus populi as
nothing more than defense against internal and external
enemies, "the enjoyment of innocuous freedom," and "the just
and modest acquisition of wealth by the individuals . . .
which is promoted in particular by the cultivation of the
sciences of mechanics and physics."

According to Strauss,

[T]hese principles cannot but lead to the ideal of
civilization, i. e., to the demand for the rational and
universal society as a single "union of consumers and
producers." Hobbes is to a much higher degree than,
say. Bacon the originator of the ideal of civilization.
By this very fact he is the founder of liberalism. The
right to the securing of bare life, i. e., the only
natural right that Hobbes recognizes, has the character
of an inalienable right of man, i. e . , of a claim of the
individual which precedes the State and determines the
purpose and the limits of the State. The manner in
which Hobbes lays the foundation for the natural right
to the securing of bare life suggests the whole system
of the rights of man in the liberal sense, even assuming
that it does not make these indispensible.
Strauss held that Hobbes differs from "full grown
liberalism" only by virtue of positing "man's natural
malice," rather than "corrupt institutions or the ill will

®^Ibid., 226.

See also chapter 2 above, 45-56.
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of a ruling stratum," as the obstacle to the attainment of
the liberal ideal.^5
Strauss believed that modern liberalism seeks to
harness the apparatus of the state for the sake of the
promotion of unlimited technological progress, and that it
tends to suppress in Hobbesian fashion any opinion that
"might lead people into doubt of the essential soundness" of
this activity.

According to Strauss's understanding of

classic natural right, the state ought not to give its
unqualified endorsement to just any innovation in
technology.

"The classics were for almost all practical

purposes what now are called conservatives.

In

contradistinction to many present day cciiscr^;atives however,
they knew that one cannot be distrustful of political or
social change without being distrustful of technological
change. . . . They demanded the strict moral-political
supervision of inventions; the good and wise city will
determine which inventions are to be made use of and which
are to be suppressed."®®

®5gtrauss, "Comments on Per Beariff des Politischen by Carl
Schmitt," in Spinoza's Critique of Religion. 337-38. The
original version (in German) of Strauss's essay appeared in
Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 67 (no. 6,
August-September 1932): 732-49. A reprint appeared in an English
translation of Per Beariff des Politischen (Schmitt, The Concept
of the Political, trans. George Schwab [New Brunswick, N. J . :
Rutgers University Press, 1976]), 81-105.
®®Strauss, "Restatement," in On Tvrannv. 226; Thoughts on
Machiavelli. 298.
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A "Hobbesian" (or "neo-Hobbesian") political tendency
would have the effect of cutting off political debate in
summary fashion, either by force or by persuasion; in the
latter case, what happens is that everyone takes the
veracity of the "neo-Hobbesian" doctrine for granted.
Strauss believed that the modern liberal state takes on a
"neo-Hobbesian" character when it shunts aside
"particularist" objections to the universalist state and its
promotion of technology.
Conservatives look with greater sympathy than liberals
on the particular or particularist and the
heterogeneous; at least they are more willing than
liberals to respect and perpetuate a more fundamental
diversity than the one ordinarily respected or taken for
granted by liberals and even by Communists, that is, the
diversity regarding language, folk songs, pottery, and
the like. Inasmuch as the universalism in politics is
founded on the universalism proceeding from reason,
conservatism is frequently characterized by distrust in
reason or by trust in tradition which as such is this or
that tradition and hence particular.
Despite his disagreements with Kojéve, Strauss would
probably not dissent from the definition of tyranny which he
proposes: "In fact, it is tyranny (in the morally neutral
sense of the word) when a fraction of the citizens (it
matters little whether it be a majority or a minority)
imposes its ideas and acts on all the other citizens, which
are determined by an authority which it recognizes
spontaneously but which it has not succeeded in making the
others recognize; and where it does so without 'coming to
terms' with these others, without seeking any 'compromises'
with them, and without taking into account their ideas and
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desires (determined by another authority recognized by these
others)."^7
Kojéve goes on to suggest that such a tyranny could be
established "only through force or terror."

Strauss would

probably dispute this; he would incline to the view that a
kind of tyranny could come about "by default," as it were,
as a result of the phenomenon of "taking for granted"
described above on the part of the majority.

(Undoubtedly,

Strauss would also dispute whether there can be a "morally
neutral sense" of the word "tyranny"!)

Strauss suggests

that the modern liberal state partakes of tyranny when it
places its institutional weight behind a "universalist" or
"cosmopolitan" perspective without taking into account or
"coming to terms" with the ideas and desires of the
"particularist" or "parochial" fraction of the citizens.
Thomas Spragens attributes to "technocratic" liberalism an
"analytical division of society into two 'classes' of people
who are radically distinguishable in their relationship to
the mode of production of knowledge (to put it in quasiMarxist form) and who are therefore conceived as radically
distinguishable in their mode of being— the 'knowers' being
depicted as free, rational actors, the 'nonknowers' as
causally determined functions of their environment."
Spragens also speaks of the distinction between the
®^Strauss, Preface to Liberalism Ancient and Modern (New
York: Basic Books, 1968), vi; Kojéve, "Tyranny and Wisdom," in
Strauss, On Tvrannv. 153.
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"enlightened” and the "unenlightened" as being functionally
equivalent to that between the "knowers" and the
"nonknowers."

There can be no question that in Strauss's

view contemporary liberalism partakes of a kind of tyranny
of "enlightened," "universalist," "cosmopolitan" opinion
over an "unenlightened," "particularist," "parochial" world
view.®®
In contemporary American politics, this division
between the particularist and the universalist manifests
itself in those sociocultural issues associated with
"single-issue politics," especially those which involve a
collision between secularist and religious world-views.
Dinesh D'Souza gives voice to the frustration felt by
conservatives over their inability to get a hearing for the
questioning of "enlightened" opinion (note particularly the
reference to sex education):
Liberalism, Strauss argues, adopts the values of
positivism and historicism, not consciously, but at the
level of cliche. This is best seen in slogans and
formulations that have become commonplace in our time;
"You can't legislate morality." "You're trying to turn
back the clock." "How can you believe that? This is
1987?" The way liberals typically apply historicism is
as follows: first, they decide what political program
they favor; second, they identify inevitable historical
movement toward that program; third, they maintain that
since things are headed in that direction anyway we
might as well make the transition as painless as
possible; fourth and finally, they label anyone who
opposes their preferences— which are, by now, historical
laws— regressive, dogmatic, and worthy of derision and
®®Kojéve, "Tyranny and Wisdom," in Strauss, On Tvrannv. 153;
Thomas A. Spragens, Jr., The Ironv of Liberal Reason (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1981), 128.
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contempt. This pattern of reasoning is very familiar
with respect to liberal views on sex education, welfare
programs, arms control, and a host of other items.
Without doubt, the conservatives would cite the rhetorical
approach described above as an instance of liberal "neoHobbesianism. "

On matters such as sex education (now

including the question whether to promote the use of condoms
to prevent the spread of AIDS) the liberal state interposes
itself between religiously devout parents, who seek to teach
the chaste morals sanctioned by orthodoxy, and their
children.

Typically, debate sinks to a low level, owing to

the sensitivity of these matters; liberals often put
themselves in the position of portraying the parents' views
as "worthy of derision and contempt."

On these and related

matters, it would not be hard to find examples of
contemporary polemic portraying the conservative position
simply as being "behind the times.
It is not clear whether Strauss regarded the
"secularist" or the "technocratic" aspect of modern
liberalism as more fundamental.

Undoubtedly, an important

feature of the modern "corporate state" is its utilization
of educational institutions for the development of
technology.

Concomitantly, education comes to be thought of

as nothing more than technical training.

Strauss believed

that such a conception of education depended on the
assumption that all men are equally capable of attaining
69d 'Souza, "The Legacy of Leo Strauss," 40.
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wisdom.

The result, however, is not universal wisdom, but

the degradation of education and culture (of which
secularization may also be a component).

Concern about the

subordination of liberal education to technical training is
reflected in contemporary polemic about the state of
education (including one work by a student of Strauss, Allan
Bloom).

Strauss feared that the modern liberal state would

drive out the ideal of liberal education.

"Last but not

least, liberal education is concerned with the souls of men
and therefore has little or no use for machines.

If it

becomes a machine or an industry, it becomes
undistinguishable from the entertainment industry unless in
respect to income and publicity, to tinsel and glamour."^®
Strauss! Philosopher or Ideologue?
Strauss's description of the dangerous tendencies
within the contemporary liberal state added up to such a
rhetorically powerful indictment of liberalism that
political partisans have been tempted to try to appropriate
it.

As was noted above, several prominent American

conservatives either exhibit Straussian influence or
describe themselves explicitly as followers of Strauss.

A

typical tactic in conservative polemic has been the
identification of the "universal and homogeneous state" with

^°Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1987); Strauss, "Liberal Education and
Responsibility," in Liberalism Ancient and Modern. 25.
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the welfare state.

Ironically, such a tactic has the effect

of cutting off political debate in a summary fashion, more
severely even than the "cosmopolitan" liberal disparagement
of "parochial" views, since no one would want to be
identified with a regime which is totalitarian or protototalitarian in tendency.
Such an identification, if tenable, would place
philosophy squarely on one side of the contemporary leftright or liberal-conservative political division.

Those who

are not prepared to concede that such an abrupt end to
political and philosophical debate is appropriate will
wonder whether such an identification is not based on a
tendentious leap of interpretation.

For instance, a

Straussian may adopt the posture that we ought to be able to
apprehend immediately, perhaps by means of intuition, that
certain proposals would be put forward by the minions of a
sinister "universal and homogeneous state."

A less

indiscriminate interpretation might reveal that such a
conclusion does not follow so immediately.

Consider, for

instance, Strauss's own remarks to the effect that, given
the impossibility of the "universal and homogeneous state,"
political society must maintain the character of a
"particular society . . . whose highest task is its selfimprovement," or his acknowledgment that modern democracy
affirms not absolute equality but "equality of opportunity,
which implies that differently gifted people are supposed to
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do very different things with the opportunity offered."

Is

the welfare state really an intimation of the sinister
"universal and homogeneous state," or is it justifiable on
legitimate grounds of "self-improvement" or "equality of
opportunity"?

Is it legitimate to argue that all measures

touching on the economy serve the ends of the "universal and
homogeneous state"?

Indeed, if it is true that, as Strauss

suggests, modernity has erred in leaving technology free
from moral and political supervision, we might well ask
whether the unregulated economy is not a form of technology,
and whether the welfare state is not a proper instance of
moral and political supervision of the economy.
Furthermore, it represents something of an extrapolation
from the thought of Hobbes to say that the welfare state
represents a form of "neo-Hobbesianism," since Hobbes's
absolute sovereign is intended in the first instance to
perform the functions of the "night-watchman state," along
the lines of a minimalist, Nozickian "dominant protective
association" rather than a "universal and homogeneous
state.
Yet another instance of tendentiousness might be
Strauss's esoteric interpretation of a thinker such as

^^Strauss, "Political Philosophy and the Crisis of Our
Time," in George J. Graham, Jr., and George W. Carey, eds., The
Post-Behavioral Era: Perspectives on Political Science (New York;
David McKay Co., 1972), 221, 232; reprinted from George Spaeth,
ed., The Predicament of Modern Politics (Detroit: University of
Detroit Press, 1964).
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Xenophon.

Such an interpretation requires an intricate

succession of claims and arguments, each of which could be
considered plausible in isolation; however, such a long
chain of steps is required that one is given to wonder
whether there are no weak links.

Dallmayr suggests that the

whole procedure is inimical to political and philosophical
debate; he argues that "once esoteric and exoteric meaning
become infinitely exchangeable, we enter into a terrain of
quasi-Derridean playfulness— a terrain momentarily
entertaining but tedious in the end."

If it is assumed that

the greatest minds have deliberately obscured their true
teachings, then debate in political philosophy will be
closed to all except those who have privileged insight into
the correct esoteric interpretations.

As Dallmayr argues,

"By endorsing esotericism, Strauss's approach (in my view)
jeopardizes political philosophy— by ultimately pitting
philosophy against politics, and politics against
philosophy.

Immunized against worldly politics, philosophy

becomes a self-contained enterprise, while politics is
emptied of intrinsic meaning.
Strauss may have deemed it legitimate to deploy such an
esoteric argument against the contemporary state in the face
of the "neo-Hobbesianism" of a "vanguard" politics such as
that discussed by C. B. Macpherson (see chapters 4 and 8

^^Fred Dallmayr, "Politics against Philosophy: Strauss and
Drury," Political Theorv 15(August 1987): 328, 332.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

117

below).

Nevertheless, the confusion attending Strauss's

stance toward liberal democracy provides an illustration of
the pitfalls of his esotericism.

His followers take umbrage

at the suggestion that he was anything but a staunch
defender of liberal democracy against totalitarianism.
Nevertheless, he drops hints to the effect that a political
philosopher may not be able to make his true teaching
explicit.

Is liberal democracy just one step below the

simply best regime, or is it only one step above political
bestiality?

Although he professes to admire the practical

wisdom of the American founders, he maintains that liberal
democracy seeks to establish the "universal and homogeneous
state" no less than does communism.

Was he merely

flattering vulgar American opinion when he offered remarks
in defense of liberal democracy?

He and his followers

railed against such an interpretation.

Their protests may

be sincere, but Strauss left himself open to such a
treatment through his insistence on esotericism.^^

^^See, for instance, the exchange between S. B. Drury, "Leo
Strauss's Natural Right Teaching," and Harry V. Jaffa, "Dear
Professor Drury," Political Theorv 15 (August 1987); 299-315, 316325.
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CHAPTER 4: C. B. MACPHERSON— THE HOBBES IAN
PREMISE OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM
Whereas Leo Strauss identified the phenomenon of the
"universal and homogeneous state" as the contemporary
manifestation of Hobbesianism, for C. B. Macpherson it is
the assumption of "possessive individualism" that played
this role.

The two concepts differ in status; while Strauss

thought that, at least in some cases, the "universal and
homogeneous state" was being built by tyrants who knew
exactly what they were doing, for Macpherson "possessive
individualism" takes on the character of a hidden or
implicit premise, held not by conscious advocates but by
those who absorb it unconsciously as a part of the
"conventional wisdom."
A central component of Macpherson's possessive
individualism is the notion of self-ownership or "property
in oneself."

The individual is the proprietor of his

capacities, including those which might be held to be
essential to his humanity.

Since these capacities are

understood as property, they are all thought of as
alienable; they may be bought, sold, or traded in the same
way as one might dispose of a piece of material property.
Macpherson holds the assumptions of possessive
individualism to be culpable for a condition in which
contemporary man has come to think of himself as essentially
an acquirer and consumer of material goods.

The conception

118
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of man as active. which he finds in both Aristotle and Marx,
has been shunted aside.

The capacity to be an actor is not

seen by contemporary man as being particularly important;
furthermore, it is alienable, just like anything else.
Macpherson suspects that those of us who work in the employ
of other people have alienated our active capacity.

A

conception of man as essentially consumptive rather than
active has come to prevail.
Hobbes is the first of a succession of English-speaking
political thinkers whom Macpherson identifies as
incorporating possessive-individualist assumptions.

In his

The Political Theorv of Possessive Individualism he examines
several such thinkers who appeared during the seventeenth
century, with most attention devoted to Hobbes and Locke;
Harrington and the "Levellers" of the English Civil War
period are also treated.

In The Life and Times of Liberal

Democracv this examination is extended into the eighteenth,
nineteenth, and twentieth centuries.

Macpherson finds that

the assumptions of possessive individualism prevail to a
greater or lesser extent in the thought of Jeremy Bentham,
John Stuart Mill, and the "equilibrium theorists" of
twentieth-century political science, such as Robert Dahl and
Joseph Schumpeter.
In these works and elsewhere, Macpherson dissects
possessive individualism and presents what he takes to be
its deleterious effects.

One such effect has been the
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development of a version of democracy which he believes does
not generate sufficient participation, at least not from the
perspective of the teachings that provided the foundations
of democracy before the rise of the liberal state.

In works

such as Democratic Theorv; Essavs in Retrieval and The Rise
and Fall of Economic Justice he argues that the ethical
demands of the Western political tradition require a form of
democracy that provides for more extensive participation
than exists presently, and he explores the implications of
such a participatory democracy for politics in the
industrialized world.

In The Real World of Democracv he

puts forward the view that the nations of the "Third World"
have developed a notion of democracy that draws upon the
concept's pre-liberal roots; a renewal of democracy may
result from a confrontation between the "First World" and
the "Third World."
Macpherson's Critique of Modernitv
Macpherson does not object to being categorized as a
"social democrat."

This category would include the

political parties of the European Left, which favor
modifications of the market economy that go beyond those
upheld by the Democratic Party in the United States.
Macpherson includes himself among "the bulk of contemporary
social democrats and those socialists who do not accept the
whole of the Marxian theory," who "accept the humanistic
values read into liberal democracy by Mill and the
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idealists, but who reject present liberal democracy as
having failed to realize those values."

These socialists

and social democrats, while not accepting Marxian theory in
all its particulars, draw upon what they see as the ethical
core of Marxism, with its echoes of an Aristotelian notion
of human potentiality to be actualized.

They affirm "that

the human essence is to be realized fully only in free,
conscious,

creative activity," and they hold that a

capitalist economic system threatens to frustrate the
realization of this human essence.

Such a critique places

the matter of society's economic organization at the center
of politics, extending the political realm to an extent not
allowed for by a theorist such as Hobbes.

"The death of the

concept of

economic justice may be said to have been

proclaimed

by Thomas Hobbes in 1651 . .. Hobbes set the

tone of all subsequent liberal theories.
According to Macpherson, "The driving force of Marx's
whole thought was the belief that man had it in him to be a
freely creative being."

Macpherson's critique of modernity

is that this free creativity has been driven out by an
economic organization that incorporates a "vision of
inertia."
It is almost incredible, until you come to think of it,
that a society whose keyword is enterprise, which
^C. B. Macpherson, "Do We Need a Theory of the State?",
chapter 5, The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice and Other Papers
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 55-65; "The Rise and
Fall of Economic Justice," chapter 1, The Rise and Fall. 9.
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certainly sounds active, is in fact based on the
assumption that human beings are so inert, so averse to
activity, that is, to expenditure of energy, that every
expenditure of energy is considered to be painful, to
be, in the economist's term, a disutility. . . . To see
the hollowness of this vision, one need only ask what we
shall all do when automation, cybernation, and new
sources of non-human energy, have made the system of
working for material rewards quite out-of-date and
useless. What then shall we do except expend our energy
in truly human activities— laughing, playing, loving,
learning, creating, arranging our lives in ways that
give us aesthetic and emotional satisfaction?
The problem is that the "truly human activities" have
atrophied in the face of the necessity to "make a living."
The work that people do to provide for their material
subsistence has become so exhausting and time-consuming that
people are either unwilling or unable to expend much energy
outside of the workplace.

Leisure activities consist of

little more than passive consumption, including escapist
entertainment.2
For Macpherson, man is a being who has latent powers
and capacities that ought to be actualized rather than left
undeveloped.

He opposes this ideal to the utilitarian

notion of man as maximizer of utilities, a reductionistic
view that admits only differences in the quantities of
utility that each man accumulates without admitting
qualitative distinctions between ways of life that may or
may not be fit for a human being.

Macpherson argues that

the rise of market society has allowed an older conception

^Macpherson, The Real World of Democracv (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, Clarendon Press, 1966), 13, 38.
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of man as an active developer of his capacities to be driven
out by a utilitarian view of man as passive consumer.
From Aristotle until the seventeenth century it was more
usual to see the essence of man as purposeful activity,
as exercise of one's energies in accordance with some
rational purpose, than as the consumption of
satisfactions. It was only with the emergence of the
modern market society, which we may put as early as the
seventeenth century in England, that this concept of man
was narrowed and turned into almost its opposite. Man
was still held to be essentially a purposive, rational
creature, but the essence of rational behaviour was
increasingly held to lie in unlimited individual
appropriation, as a means of satisfying unlimited desire
for utilities. Man became an infinite appropriâtor and
an infinite consumer; an infinite appropriator because
an infinite desirer.
The political philosophy of Hobbes reflected a tendency to
view man as a consumer of utilities.

"A man's powers, in

this view, were not of his essence but were merely
instrumental; they were, in Hobbes's classic phrase, 'his
present means to obtain some future apparent good'."

Modern

liberal democracies are torn between the utilitarian and the
Aristotelian conceptions of man.

In Macpherson's view, John

Stuart Mill attempted to restore an emphasis on the
development of human capacities to liberal-democratic
theory, but his efforts were insufficient; the democratic
franchise did not alter the essential features of market
society, which reinforce the tendency for men to see
themselves as consumers of an ever-increasing volume of
utilities.^
^Macpherson, "The Maximization of Democracy," essay 1,
Democratic Theorv; Essavs in Retrieval (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, Clarendon Press, 1973), 5-6.
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Undoubtedly, the thought of Marx exercises a strong
influence on Macpherson's view of man and of the kind of
activity appropriate to a human being.

For instance, in

volume 1, part 3 of Capital we find a discussion of what
constitutes "exclusively human" labor.

"A spider conducts

operations that resemble those of weaver, and a bee puts to
shame many an architect in the construction of her cells.
But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of
bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in
imagination before he erects it in reality.

At the end of

every labour-process, we get a result that already existed
in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement."
This element of conscious control over the labor process
constitutes the essence of truly human activity for Marx and
Macpherson.

Under conditions in which so many of us work as

employees of others, the element of conscious control and
intelligent initiative is exercised primarily by the
employers, not the employees.

Marx discusses the

consequences of such an organization of work in a passage
from one of his 1844 manuscripts which foreshadows
Macpherson's critique of the predominance of the consumptive
over the active view of man

.n contemporary liberal

democracies.
The worker therefore only feels himself outside his
work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is at
home when he is not working, and when he is working he
is not at home. His labour therefore is not voluntary,
but coerced; it is forced labour. It is therefore not
the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to
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satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character
emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical
or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the
plague.4
The Nature of Possessive Individualism
In chapter 2 of The Political Theorv of Possessive
Individualism. Macpherson lists the postulates that he
contends constitute the fundamental assumptions of
"possessive market society":
(a) There is no authoritative allocation of work.
(b) Thereis no authoritative provision of rewards for
(c) There is authoritative definition and enforcement
of
contracts.
(d) All individuals seek rationally to maximize their
utilities.
(e) Each individual's capacity to labour is his own
property and is alienable.
(f) Land and resources are owned by individuals and are
alienable.
(g) Some individuals want a higher level of utilities
or
power than they have.
(h) Some individuals have more energy, skill, or
possessions, than others.
These features are all implicit in the crucial assumption of
"possessive individualism," to which Macpherson attributes
many of the deleterious tendencies of modern liberal
democracy.

Such tendencies were no doubt foreshadowed by

the changes involved in the continuing rationalization of
the English economy, which preceded Hobbes's career at least
by several decades; nevertheless, in political philosophy.

^Marx, Capital, vol. 1, part 3, in The Marx-Engels Reader.
2d ed., ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York; Norton, 1978), 344-45;
Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. in The
Marx-Enqels Reader. 74.
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Macpherson first detects the explicit assumptions in the
thought of Hobbes.

He then traces the history of

"possessive individualism" throughout the subsequent history
of English-speaking political thought, up to and including
the modern political science of the twentieth century.
Possessive individualism consists essentially of the
assumption of "self-ownership," the notion of the individual
as proprietor of his own capacities.

Under possessive

individualist assumptions, freedom comes to be looked upon
as a function of possession, an absence of dependence on the
wills of others.

The capacities most central to the human

essence are treated as commodities, in the same way that we
might treat material objects that we own; they can be
bought, sold, or traded on the marketplace.

People come to

think of society as consisting of exchange relations, and of
political society as a device for the maintenance of orderly
exchange.

Perpetual exchange produces an unequal

distribution of wealth in which land and capital become
concentrated in a few hands; most people find themselves in
the position of having to work for other people in order to
earn a living.

Macpherson's view is that this situation

amounts to a net transfer of power to the capitalists; most
people have lost access to the means of making their labor
productive.

Almost all are compelled to sell their energies

in the labor market; they have been drawn into the universal
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Hobbesian competition for power, from which none can opt
out. 5
Macpherson implicates the assumptions of possessive
individualism in his critique of modern liberal democracy,
in which we find a "curiously limited . . . vision of human
excellence that has got built into our society and that we
have made do with up to now.

It is a vision that is

inextricably linked with the market society."

The notion of

human nature as essentially active, which he would attribute
to both Marx and Aristotle, has atrophied under a set of
assumptions in which man comes to think of his capacity for
action as just one among many alienable possessions.

The

Hobbesian approach to power reflects this "vision of
inertia" as opposed to activity.

"A man's powers, in this

view, were not of his essence but were merely instrumental:
they were, in Hobbes's classic phrase, 'his present means to
obtain some future apparent good.'"

We find no trace of the

Aristotelian conception of human powers as talents or
potentials to be actualized, such that the increase of one
man's powers would be a benefit to all.

The Aristotelian

concept of developmental power is replaced by a view of
power as extractive; each man finds himself in a struggle to
extract from his fellows the best bargain that he can in the
marketplace.

As a result, we find workers who see work as

^Macpherson, The Political Theorv of Possessive
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
Clarendon Press, 1962), 1-4, 53-61.
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drudgery rather than as an opportunity for development, and
who rush into escapist activities as soon as the working day

A man whose productive labour is out of his own control,
whose work is in that sense mindless, may be expected to
be somewhat mindless in the rest of his activities. He
cannot even be said to retain automatically the control
of whatever energies he has left over from his working
time, if his control centre, so to speak, is impaired by
the use that it made of him during his working time.
Any such diminution of a man's control over his extraproductive activities is clearly a diminution of his
power over and above the amount of the transfer.
The critique of possessive individualism clearly recalls the
Marxian concept of alienation.

To alienate means to place

something in the power of another.

An extreme version of

alienation would be found in a society that allowed people
to sell themselves into slavery, as is contemplated by
Robert Nozick in his libertarian political tract, Anarchv.
State, and Utopia.

Such an arrangement would strike many

people as a violation of a deeply held moral intuition.

It

might be argued that there is a right to freedom of the
person that is an inalienable right, that is, a right so
fundamental to what it means to be a human being that people
should be forbidden to forfeit it voluntarily.

Macpherson

would contend that an arrangement such as Nozick
contemplates is only a more extreme version of what is
allowed already under capitalism, in which most people are
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employees of others, so that their control over their
creative powers is compromised.®
Hobbes's Possessive Individualist Assumptions
Hobbes is the first of a succession of English-speaking
thinkers in which Macpherson detects the assumptions of
possessive individualism.

According to Macpherson, Hobbes's

theory is an account of the relations necessary to a
particular kind of society; strictly speaking, the
conclusions it draws should not be generalized beyond this
particular society.

Nevertheless, the portrait of society

drawn by Hobbes is similar enough to our own that the theory
remains relevant.^
Macpherson begins with a discussion of Hobbes's view of
human nature and its relation to the account of the state of
nature.

He contends that Hobbes's statements about that

which is innate in man, about man "as such," do not contain
all that is necessary to argue the case for universal
obligation to an irresistible sovereign.

Hobbes's state of

nature is not inhabited by men "as such," but by civilized
men, as they would be within civilized society, except with
sovereign power removed; such men have not been completelv
®Macpherson, The Real World of Democracv. 38; "Problems of a
Non-Market Theory of Democracy," essay 3, Essavs in Retrieval. 67
(see also "The Maximization of Democracy," essay 1, Essavs in
Retrieval. 4-6); Robert Nozick, Anarchv. State, and Utopia (New
York: Basic Books, 1974), 331.
^Macpherson, Possessive Individualism. 9-17.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

130

abstracted from society.

For instance, it was necessarily

true of men in civilized society that they would seek everincreasing power over others, Hobbes assumed; Macpherson
inclines to the view that this holds only for a certain kind
of civilization, but he allows that some such assumptions
had to be made.®
It might be more appropriate to speak of a "natural
condition of mankind," which clearly refers to something to
be found within men, rather than a "state of nature."
Behavior in the state of nature is not that of primitive
man, but of social, civilized man; the term refers to what
is natural to men as thev are now.

In discussing chapter 13

of Leviathan. Macpherson remarks that "the matter about
which competition and diffidence would lead to a war of each
with all, is the civilized matter of cultivated land and
'convenient seats.'"

The warlike state of nature is arrived

at by taking men as they are and removing their fear of
sovereign authority.

"Take men as they now are, remove the

fear of unpleasant or fatal consequences of their actions to
themselves, and their present natural proclivities would
lead directly to the state of war."®
To deduce the characteristics of the state of nature in
this manner dictates that the state arrived at will contain
many features of the civilized society from which sovereign
®Ibid., 17-19.
®Ibid., 24-27.
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authority is removed in imagination.

Macpherson argues that

Hobbesian man, even in the state of nature, behaves as
though he were an inhabitant of a competitive market
society; he cites chapters 10 and 11 of Leviathan (in which,
he asserts, Hobbes presents just about all he has to say
about men in society) in support of his argument.

In these

chapters, Hobbes sets forth his definition of power.
is of two types: natural and acquired.

Power

Natural power

consists not of mere ability, but of eminence of ability; it
is a comparative quality, consisting of an excess of one's
capacities over those of others.

Practically speaking,

acquired power consists of one's ability to utilize natural
power to command the services of other men.

Wealth and

reputation constitute power because they give strength
against others.

This definition takes it for granted that

every man's power is opposed by every other man's.

For

instance, in Leviathan. chapter 10, Hobbes observes, "Nor
does it alter the case of honour, whether an action, so it
be great and difficult, and consequently a signe of much
power, be just or unjust; for honour consisteth only in the
opinion of power."

Macpherson remarks that this passage

presents "the essential characteristics of the competitive
market."

That honor consists of an opinion of power,

independent of any standard of justice or injustice other
than men's opinions of same, can be taken as a summary of
the way in which the market assigns value.

Market value
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determines, and is determined by, everyone's estimate or
opinion of everyone else's power.

Everyone is subject to

this market for power; furthermore, every man's power is
opposed by the power of every other man.^®
The conclusion that the state of nature would be
characterized by savage competitiveness was derived, in
Macpherson's view, from two postulates: first, that some men
seek ever-increasing levels of power and delight, while
others seek only to continue their present level; and,
second, that society is so fluid that the behavior of the
immoderate compels everyone else to enter the contest for
power.

He contests Strauss's interpretation, according to

which Hobbes held that all men innatelv seek ever-increasing
power; he cites passages from

Elements of Law and Rudiments

which contrast "vainglorious" and "temperate" men in support
of his contention.

"The evidence for Hobbes's position that

only some men innately desire ever more power is clear," he
concludes.
The related questions of the extent to which men seek
power over others and the extent to which this desire for
domination is innate in man is crucial to the controversy
over Hobbes between Macpherson and his opponents.

Strauss,

for instance, appears to believe that Macpherson attributes
^®Ibid., 34-40.

See Hobbes, English Works 3:80.

^%acpherson. Possessive Individualism. 40-44.
English Works 2:7, 4:82.

See Hobbes,
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too much to market society.

"Yet according to Hobbes, man

is distinguished from the brutes by the faculty of
considering phenomena as causes of possible effects, and
therefore by awareness of potentiality and power.
Macpherson does not even attempt to show that the natural
antagonism of all men does not follow from the peculiarity
of man thus understood," remarks Strauss.

"Nor is Hobbes'

view of men's natural competitiveness a reflex of the
emerging market society; Hobbes found or would have found
clear signs of that competitiveness not only in the market
but in the courts of kings, in the most backward villages,
among scholars, in convents, in drawing rooms, and in slave
pens, in modern as well as in ancient times."^2
Strauss thus attributes to Hobbes the view that the
desire for ever-increasing power is innate in man.
According to Macpherson, Hobbes's view is that the desire is
natural to some men, but only an acquired behavior in
others.

Macpherson's own view is that such a desire is

common to all men only within a possessive market society.
Both Strauss and Macpherson can cite several passages from
Hobbes in support of their interpretation of him.
Macpherson claims that the most decisive passage cited by
Strauss comes from a late and somewhat insignificant
^^Leo Strauss, review of Macpherson, The Political Theorv of
Possessive Individualism; Hobbes to Locke, in Strauss, Studies in
Platonic Political Philosophy (Chicago; University of Chicago
Press, 1983), 230; originally published in Southwestern Social
Science Ouarterlv 45, no. 1 (June 1964): 69-70.
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polemical work of Hobbes directed at his scholastic
opponents.

Macpherson himself refers to a passage from

Elements of Law in which Hobbes speaks of "those men who are
moderate, and look for no more but equality of nature," as
opposed to "others, that will attempt to subdue them."

He

takes this passage from one of Hobbes's major political
tracts to be decisive.

"In view of the evidence it seems to

me closer to Hobbes's intention to treat the striving for
power and precedence which he finds to be characteristic of
all men in society (and in the state of nature) as an innate
striving in some men and an acquired behavior in others."
Furthermore, if the striving is an acquired behavior in some
men, it will be open to Macpherson to argue that market
features of society have something to do with the
acquisition.
It would appear that the universal obligation to obey
an irresistible sovereign cannot be derived solelv from the
proposition that some men seek greater and greater power
while others are more temperate.

If this is the case, then

it could be that in the state of nature the vainglorious
would grab for power while the temperate would acquiesce,
and no war of all against all would follow.

A second

postulate is required in order to establish that in
civilized society it is necessarily the case that everyone's

^^Macpherson, Possessive Individualism. 42-45.
English Works 4:82.

See Hobbes,
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powers are constantly invaded by everyone else's.

A model

of societv is required in which everyone is drawn into a
competition for power.

Macpherson holds that it has been

much overlooked that Hobbes does put forward just such a
social model, besides his model of the state of nature.

The

presence of this social model may have been obscured because
it was not explicit.

According to Macpherson, we can

conceive at least four such possible social models.

The

first would be "customary or status society," in which power
is allocated authoritatively instead of by the market.
Three other models represent various stages in the
penetration of society by the market; they include "simple
market society," "more fully developed market society," and
finally the aforementioned "possessive market society,"
which, according to Macpherson, is Hobbes's actual model.
This final model contains the important feature that all
goods, including land and capital, are allocated by the
market.

It follows that evervone is forced to compete in

the marketplace in order to sustain life, meeting the
requirement, crucial to Hobbes's theory, that everyone's
power be opposed to everyone else's.
If we assume that Hobbes derived many of his
conclusions about human nature from observation of his
contemporaries, it is not difficult to comprehend how he
came to draw the conclusions he did about the necessarv
^^Macpherson, Possessive Individualism. 46-61.
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features of contemporary society.

The seventeenth-century

England of Hobbes's time was rapidly developing into a fullfledged market society.

It was not a perfect laissez-faire

regime; mercantilist policies aimed at enhancing national
power were pursued.

However, land was being brought onto

the competitive market, and more and more people were making
a living as wage-earners.

Hobbes's treatment of

distributive and commutative justice suggests that he
dismissed the standards of customary or status society in
favor of those of the market; in chapter 15 of Leviathan he
wrote dismissively, "As if it were injustice to sell dearer
than we buy; or to give more to a man than he merits.
Hobbes was not totally sanguine about the prospects of
a middle-class market society; in Behemoth he would suggest
that bourgeois morality was responsible for the English
Civil War.

On balance, however, Macpherson concludes that

Hobbes accepted the assumption common to educated people of
his day that civilized society was to be equated with market
society.

"We may conjecture that the ease with which Hobbes

attributed essentially market relations to all societies was
due to his having shared the view, common to men of the
Renaissance, that civilized society was limited to classical
Greece and Rome and post-medieval western Europe.

Since the

classical societies were to some extent market societies
they could easily be taken to fit a model drawn primarily
l^ibid., 61-67.

See Hobbes, English Works 3:137.
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from the more completely market society of his own time.”
Plato and Aristotle lived in a partially commercialized
society, Macpherson argues; Aristotle, embracing a
traditional standard, attempted to dissuade his
contemporaries from embracing the market.

Medieval

civilization exhibited even less market penetration, but as
the term "Dark Ages" suggests, this can be associated with a
civilizational breakdown.

Europe did not become

"recommercialized" until the early modern period, coinciding
with the career of Hobbes.

"Hobbes saw (and regretted) that

market man and market society were here to stay, but he fell
short of recognizing that this was a recent change.

Now he

saw it, now he didn't.
Hobbes's account of a ruthless competition for power in
the state of nature, whatever its relation to a market
system of economic organization, was essential to his
derivation of a universal obligation to an irresistible
sovereign.

He believed that he had deduced obligation

directly from facts about human nature and civilized
society.

The deduction represented what Macpherson calls a

"Galilean shift" in political theory.

Previous theorists

had purported to deduce obligation from fact, but they had
actually "smuggled in" additional premises about natural

^^Macpherson, Possessive Individualism. 67; "The Economic
Penetration of Political Theory," chapter 9, Rise and Fall. 105107 (see also "The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice," chapter 1,
Rise and Fall. 5-7).
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purpose or the will of God.

Hobbes, influenced by the laws

of Galilean mechanics, was convinced that obligation could
be derived directly from laws of "political mechanics,"
without resort to "fanciful" or "imported" notions of
purpose.

Political mechanics presents a further advantage

in that it establishes an equal rather than a hierarchical
natural right; by ruling out a system of values external to
man, Hobbes had eliminated the possibility of a hierarchy of
rights or obligations.

(In this interpretation, Macpherson

diverges from the view of Strauss by emphasizing the
influence of the new natural science on Hobbes's political
philosophy.)
Macpherson holds that in order to so deduce obligation
from fact, Hobbes needed to be able to postulate an
effective human equality.

Part of the work had been done by

the elimination of teleological considerations; Hobbes goes
on to establish both equality of fear and equality of
insecurity.

Equality of fear follows from the observation

that the weakest person is capable of killing the strongest.
Equality of insecurity is based on the equal desire of each
to preserve his life.

Of course, once the dynamism of the

market has set in over a sufficient period of time, "some
are more equal than others" in an important respect.
Nevertheless, it can be asserted that the market
subordinates everyone.

Macpherson believes it mistaken to

^^Macpherson, Possessive Individualism. 76-78.
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think that a rational man could not reject the market.
However, if the market is indeed inescapable, then everyone
must acknowledge the power that enforces the rules of market
society; this is the only possible morality.

Macpherson's

only objection is to the suggestion that these
considerations are necessary to anv civilized society; he
holds that it would have been more proper for Hobbes to have
claimed insight into the essential relations of his own
society only.
Hobbes thought that his doctrine would prove congenial
to the middle classes; their objections to it startled him.
What the middle classes took exception to was the selfperpetuating nature of the Hobbesian sovereign, who would
have the power to designate his own successor.

The middle

classes wanted a sovereign whom they could control.
Macpherson contends that Hobbes failed to realize that an
irresistible sovereign could be maintained even if not selfperpetuating.

Calculating men of property could see the

advantage of having a power capable of enforcing the rules
of the market; the non-propertied would be obedient as long
as they saw no alternative.

Hobbes acknowledged the

presence of classes, but he underestimated their effect; he
did not see the potential for cohesion within the propertied
class to provide a centripetal force that would compensate
for the centrifugal force of the dynamic market.

In fact.

ISjbid., 74-78, 81-87.
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Hobbes's doctrine provides effective support to the
propertied class in that it performs the task of primary
capital accumulation that is necessary to the establishment
of a possessive market society.

As a mercantilist, Hobbes

understands the accumulation of national wealth to be a
primary state function.

Macpherson mentions that he offers

a typically "bourgeois" justification of taxation: the
wealthy are liable to be taxed insofar as they are dependent
on the state for enforcing the rules and otherwise providing
the framework for accumulation on the open market.

One

limitation that Hobbes places on accumulation is that
property is to be an absolute right against everyone except
the sovereign; even this stipulation serves the purpose of
accumulation, however.

The sovereign must keep the right of

"eminent domain" in reserve against any claims of right held
over from traditional or status society that might form a
roadblock to the establishment of the possessive market
society.
Macpherson's attitude is that Hobbes could have headed
off many of the criticisms of his theory by claiming less
than universal validity for it; he could have claimed to
have discovered the laws of the essential relations of his

^®See Macpherson, Possessive Individualism. 95-100;
"Hobbes's Political Economy," chapter 11, Rise and Fall. 133-46;
and Introduction to Hobbes, Leviathan. ed. Macpherson
(Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Pelican Books, 1968;
reprint ed., Penguin English Library [Harmondsworth, England,
1981]), 51-60.
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own society only, or of societies of the same type.

The

objections are not so much to Hobbes's theory as to
possessive market society and possessive individualism
themselves.20
Possessive Individualism in EnglishSpeaking Political Thought
Macpherson sees English-speaking political thought from
Hobbes to the present as permeated with possessiveindividualist assumptions.

In Possessive Individualism, and

in a later work. The Life and Times of Liberal Democracv. he
traces the history of the assumptions as they appear in the
thought of leading Anglo-American thinkers from the
seventeenth to the twentieth centuries.

Harrington, Locke,

Bentham, and James and John Stuart Mill are the more
prominent figures treated.

It turns out that Hobbesian

assumptions are present even among the theorems of
twentieth-century political science.
Following immediately upon his treatment of Hobbes,
Macpherson considers a group of Hobbes's contemporaries from
the English Civil War period.

The Levellers were advocates

of an expanded franchise during the debates among the
republican forces following the first phase of the English
Civil War.

Macpherson emphasizes that they were not

advocates of a universal manhood suffrage, as is often
assumed.

Instead, they favored a "non-servant franchise"

2 0'Macpherson,
,

Possessive Individualism. 105-06.
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from which servants and beggars were to be excluded.

Their

rationale for this "non-servant franchise" reveals their
possessive-individualist assumptions.

They held that the

franchise was to be extended to all who had not lost their
birthright.

Servants and beggars had lost their birthright

by placing themselves in a position in which they were
dependent on the wills of others.

Such an argument reveals

that the Levellers must have thought of the birthright-tofranchise as something that men could forfeit (or, in
Marxian terminology, alienate).

They were not, however,

full-fledged possessive individualists.

They upheld the

natural right to the franchise for all who had not forfeited
it, and while they viewed the individual as the proprietor
of his own person, they did not carry this to extremes; they
held that some rights, such as civil and religious freedoms,
were inalienable.

Nevertheless, their arguments reveal the

influence of possessive-individualist assumptions in
substantive political debate as well as in political
philosophy.2i

Macpherson regards James Harrington, author of Oceana.
as a minor figure in comparison with Hobbes, but he is
nevertheless a thinker of some importance because of his
attention to considerations of class.

Harrington viewed

himself as what we would now call a political scientist
rather than a political philosopher; he meant to investigate

21jbid.,

107-157.
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the conditions necessary to political stability.

Central to

his thought was the crucial concept of "the balance."

He

believed that the distribution of political power
necessarily corresponded to the distribution of property;
the political regime could be a monarchy, an aristocracy, or
a democracy, depending on whether property is held by one, a
few, or many.

Harrington intended that his principle of

"the balance" would maintain an equilibrium among the
nobility, the gentry, and the yeomanry, so that political
stability would be preserved.

He proposed a constitution

that would divide power between the yeomanry and the gentry;
the yeomanry would predominate in the lower house of the
legislature, but most of the political class would come from
the gentry.

Harrington also placed great emphasis on an

"agrarian law," which was supposed to prevent an
overconcentration of property within the upper classes.
However, the agrarian law was phrased so permissively that
it would have permitted all the lands of England to come
into the possession of one percent of the population.
Essentially, Harrington believed the balance to be
maintained despite the extreme permissiveness of the
agrarian law because he shifted the focus of the balance
from a balance of propertv to a balance of opportunity.
Apparently, he thought that everyone would accept that the
balance was still in place as long as upward economic
mobility was possible.

This version of the balance
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principle embodies possessive-individualist assumptions
because it depends on everyone's assuming bourgeois economic
attitudes; everyone would have to place the highest priority
on maintaining the features of a competitive market
economy.22
Locke's Version of Possessive Individualism
John Locke deserves a more extended treatment as a
political theorist whose reputation is on a par with that of
Hobbes.

He was in some senses a more genuine natural rights

theorist than Hobbes.

Macpherson allows that Locke provided

a version of natural right that was less "wholesale," hence
more meaningful and specific, than that of Hobbes.
Furthermore, Locke provides for limited government and a
right to revolution.

Locke makes natural law prior to

natural right, so that his natural right is limited.

While

Hobbes provided for equal natural right, his right was not
reciprocal, since it amounted to a right to invade others.
Locke's natural right, while reciprocal in that it required
everyone to respect everyone else's right, was unequal in
that it permitted unlimited accumulation in its final
version.

For Macpherson, an acceptable natural right theory

must provide for both equal and reciprocal right; neither
Hobbes nor Locke met this
22%bid.,

r e q u i r e m e n t . 23

160-193.

23Macpherson, "Natural Right in Hobbes and Locke," essay 13,
Essavs in Retrieval. 224-37.
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A possessive-individualist assumption plays a central
role in Locke's theory, since he establishes a right to
appropriation through the assertion of a property right in
one's own person.

From this self-proprietorship it follows

that one has a right to that with which one mixes one's
labor.

The right to preserve one's life and the right to

the fruits of one's labor establish a right to individual
appropriation, prior to government.

Initially, at least,

this right of appropriation is limited.

There is the

stipulation that one must leave "enough and as good" for
others.

Also, one may take no more than one's share, so

that nothing perishes uselessly.

Finally, there is the

implicit limitation that one may take no more than what can
be obtained with one's own labor.

However, although Locke

limits natural rights initially, he effectively overthrows
the limitations in the final revision of his theory.

The

spoilage limitation is overcome by the introduction of
money, since gold and silver do not spoil.

Accumulations

larger than a single individual could use could nevertheless
be put to use as capital.

Since men have consented

implicitly to the use of money, capitalist accumulation is
justified as a natural right, prior to the establishment of
government.

A commercial economy that includes the use of

money, the suppression of the spoilage limit, and markets
and commerce beyond the level of barter is posited as
existing prior to the establishment of government;
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Macpherson calls this assumption historically improbable,
but not inconceivable.

There are two levels of consent,

first to the commercial economy and second to civil society.
From the viewpoint of a more standard interpretation of
Locke, to posit a commercial economy prior to civil society
appears tendentious; most interpreters hold that Locke
justifies capitalist accumulation within civil society only,
rather than as a natural right.

For his part, Macpherson

insists on pressing an interpretation in which the
"difficulty of enforcement [of contracts based on
institutions of property] is the main reason Locke finds for
men moving to the second level of consent and entering civil
society."

The "enough and as good" limitation is overcome

implicitly; it is assumed that increased productivity more
than makes up for the lack of land available to others after
capitalist appropriation.24
There remains one stipulation regarding accumulation
still to be overcome, the "implicit labor limitation."

This

limitation is transcended by means of the assumption that if
labor is property, it is alienable.

A right to labor that

one has purchased is asserted; one's servant's labor is the
same as one's own.

It is assumed that wage labor exists in

a state of nature.

Furthermore, it can be reiterated that

the general features of a commercial economy with unlimited
accumulation were consented to in the state of nature.
24Macpherson, Possessive Individualism. 199-214, esp. 210.
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Unlike Hobbes, Locke at least distinguishes between property
and life; some rights are inalienable, so that alienation of
labor does not confer

arbitrary power over life.

Nevertheless, traditional limitations on accumulation
generally have been overturned.

A limitation on

appropriation is a feature that has been read into Locke's
thought by modern liberals; the import of his theory is to
turn the tables on those who would limit appropriation.^5
After overcoming these traditional limits on
accumulation, Locke goes on to suggest a class differential
in rights and rationality between the propertied and
laboring classes.

The latter were viewed as not being full

members of the body politic, since they did not live fully
rational lives.

Macpherson cites a comment in which Locke

takes it for granted that wage laborers necessarily would
live from hand to mouth, since they would lack opportunity
to "raise their thoughts above that."

Full rationality was

associated not with labor, but with unlimited appropriation.
This class differential in rationality was ascribed to the
state of nature ; apparently, Locke observed a class
differential in his contemporaries and read this
differential back into the nature of man.

Macpherson

contends that the alleged difference in rationality is
simply a difference in ability or willingness to abide by a
bourgeois moral code.

A class differential in rationality

25ibid., 214-220.
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is a bourgeois concept.

When property is defined narrowly

as consisting merely of goods and land rather than "life,
liberty, and estate," then only those with goods and land
can be included in civil society.

The non-propertied were

in a position similar to the Calvinist "non-elect"; they
were to have no voice in government, despite being subject
to its discipline.

The native with no estate was to be

treated like a foreigner.

Possessive-individualist

assumptions, together with the overthrow of any limitations
on natural right, produce a political theory that can
justify the effective subordination of the non-propertied.26
Possessive Individualism in the Nineteenth
and Twentieth Centuries
The most vulgar version of possessive-individualist
political theory is the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham,
who built a system that provided for private enterprise and
unlimited private property, based on a few postulates.

He

took it for granted that in an advanced society there must
be a class of people who must labor or starve; the state
need make no provision for their subsistence other than to
maintain the physical incentive provided by the fear of
starvation.

After making a tentative case for an

egalitarian distribution of wealth, he overturns this
argument by giving security of property priority over
26jbid., 221-38. At 230, Macpherson refers to l
___
Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest
and Raising the Value of Monev. in Locke, Works. vol. 2 (1759, 19.
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equality; without security of property, there can be no
wealth, however it is to be distributed— indeed, there can
be no civilization.

Hence, "equality must yield."

Macpherson judges the entire theory to be influenced deeply
by bourgeois postulates.
pleasure-maximizer.

Man is viewed as a self-interested

Consideration of the pleasure to be

maximized is strictly limited to material goods.

A

Hobbesian society in which everyone opposes everyone else is
assumed.27
Bentham's model of society required government in order
to protect the free market, but government itself could
become rapacious.

To resolve this dilemma, Bentham had to

devote considerable attention to the extent of the
franchise.

He was not enthusiastic about a democratic

franchise, but he was driven to it by the logic of his
position, as well as by popular demands being put forward in
his day.

He presented a purely protective case for a

democratic franchise; subjects require the franchise in
order to protect themselves, since the rulers and the ruled
form naturally opposed classes.

It was a view that could be

deduced easily from a view of human nature which sees man as
unalterable and which acknowledges no essential political
potential in man to be developed through participation.28
27Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracv
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 23-34.
28nacpherson, Life and Times. 34-43.
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John Stuart Mill is Macpherson's favorite among the
English-speaking political thinkers he considers; he comes
closest to reconsidering the view of man that is reinforced
by possessive market society.

Instead of accepting a

reductionistic utilitarian view of man, Mill proposes a
political ideal which political society is to attempt to
approximate.

This revision of utilitarianism was provoked

by Mill's concern for the condition of the working class,
which he, along with many of his contemporaries, had come to
view as blatantly inhuman.

The poor could no longer be

consigned to living a hand-to-mouth existence; a model of
democracy was to be adopted that would contribute to the
self-development of all, rich or poor.

The essence of man

was to exert and develop his latent talents, including his
political capacities.

According to Macpherson, genuine

democracy should seek improvement "in the amount of personal
self-development of all members of the society, or, in John
Stuart Mill's phrase, the 'advancement of community . . .

in

intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and
efficiency.'"

Unfortunately from Macpherson's perspective,

the younger Mill stopped short of a critical evaluation of
capitalist institutions.

He attributed the inequality he

encountered to accident, perhaps an accidental injustice in
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the distribution of property before the establishment of
capitalist institutions.29
Mill's twentieth-century idealist successors were even
less realistic in their assumptions.

Theorists such as

Barker, Lindsay, and Maclver lost sight of class and
exploitation.

Any shortcomings in society could be overcome

by liberal democracy and the welfare state.

They hoped that

the class issue would recede, or that it could be mitigated
by the welfare state; essentially, they relied on good will.
John Dewey was at least less indulgent than these other
democratic theorists of the early twentieth century about
the actual operation of liberal democracies; he held out as
a hope what others treated as an achievement.

Dewey upheld

an experimental method, "cooperative intelligence," and
social control of economic processes.

He spoke of a

"socialized economy," but it was not clear what he had in
mind; he appeared to be more interested in the prospects of
democratic liberalism than in a critical analysis of
capitalism.

Macpherson's judgment is that Dewey and the

other twentieth-century idealist theorists were too
optimistic about liberal democracy because they failed to
see how the competitive party system had reduced political

29ibid., 44-56, esp. 47. Reference is to Mill,
Considerations on Representative Government. Ch. 2, in Collected
Works. ed. J. M. Robson, vol. 19 (Toronto and London, 1977), 392.
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responsiveness.

Later theorists would discredit their

postulate of overriding citizen rationality.30
The pluralist elitist models of such mid-twentiethcentury political scientists as Schumpeter and Dahl actually
represent a reversion to the "protective" democracy of the
utilitarians.

Rather than providing a means to make

decisions about social and moral ends, democracy becomes a
simple device for choosing governments.

The only genuine

participants are the sets of elites who compete for power as
the representatives of the political parties.

Voters do not

decide issues, they choose men; but, this at least protects
them from tyranny.

Otherwise, the moral content of

democracy is emptied out.
intrinsic value.

Political participation lacks

A "consumer sovereignty" model of

democracy as a simple market mechanism seemed realistic to
these theorists.

The model assumes that political demands

are so diffuse and shifting that a device is needed to
produce an effective majority.

The possessive-individualist

assumptions of Hobbes, transmitted via Benthamite
utilitarianism, continue to manifest themselves in the
supposedly sophisticated models of twentieth-century
political science.31

30Macpherson, Life and Times. 69-76.
31lbid.,

77-82.
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Escaping Possessive Individualism
Through Participatory Democracv
Descriptively, the model proposed by twentieth-century
equilibrium theory must be judged substantially adequate, at
least as long as we operate within the assumptions of
possessive market society.

However, Macpherson cannot

accept the claim that this theory has no justificatory
intent.

Most statements of the model imply that its account

of democracy is the only realistic one, and also that it
produces the self-evident goods of political stability and
consumer sovereignty.

It assumes that men's political

capacities are a fixed datum, which Macpherson treats as a
"claim not proven."

He holds that the model provides for a

market. but not for a democracv.

It establishes an

equilibrium in inequality; its consumer sovereignty is
largely illusory.

It registers effective political demand

only, giving an advantage to political professionals and
those with money.

Furthermore, the system encourages

apathy; it may even reguire it, lest stability be
endangered.
shaped.

Voter demands are not independent; choice is

Curiously, these features are held to reinforce the

validity of the

model.

Macpherson contends that such a liberal democracy
produces a level of participation too low to meet the
ethical requirements of democracy itself.

However, it would

32ibid., 82-92.
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seem that direct democracy is out of the question; a
representative system of some kind is required.

Not even

electronic technology can give us direct democracy; someone
would have to formulate the questions that people would be
asked to answer in plebiscites to be held via telephones or
home computer terminals.^3
Whatever the form that participatory democracy is to
take, certain conditions will have to be met before it can
come about; these include a change in political
consciousness and a reduction of social and economic
inequality.

We are left with a "vicious circle"; each of

these changes seems to require the other.

The changes will

have to come reciprocalIv. with an incremental change at one
level engendering a degree of change at the other, and so
on.

Developments during the nineteen-sixties and seventies

(reference to which may now appear somewhat dated) provided
Macpherson with a foundation for hope.

The public became

more aware of the ever-increasing costs of continuous
economic expansion, including pollution and overpopulation,
he thought.

An awareness of the costs of political apathv

engendered movements for "black power," "student power," and
industrial democracy.

The phenomenon of "stagflation"

prompted doubts about the ability of the capitalist system
to meet consumer expectations.
33ibid., 93-98.
34%bid., 98-108.
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If the competitive party system is to be bypassed, some
provision for political accountabilitv will have to be made;
the failure of Soviet-style "democratic centralism" must be
acknowledged.

Perhaps direct democracy can be reconciled

with the practical necessity for a representative system by
means of a "pyramid" device, by which direct democracy would
operate in local councils at the factory or neighborhood
level, each of which would elect delegates to representative
assemblies at higher levels.

Failing that, perhaps a more

participatory system could be combined with the existing
party system by enacting a "pyramid" arrangement within each
of the existing parties.^5
In an important sense, participatory democracy is
likely to have a broader purview than liberal democracy; it
is likely to reconsider property arrangements and downgrade
market assumptions.

An important component of the political

agenda of participatory democracy might be a demand for
economic democracy, in the form of political control or
direction of the economy (to one degree or another) for the
sake of "a kind of society where all persons have equal
effective right to a fully human life," as Macpherson puts
it.

Many features of a liberal society (at least in the

original nineteenth-century sense) are likely to be absent
under such an arrangement.

However, as long as

participatory democracy retains the developmental ideals put
35ibid., 108-114.
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forward by John Stuart Mill, there is no reason to deny it
to be liberal in essence, since liberalism, in a general
sense, has always stood for the abandonment of outmoded
restraints.
The Problem of the "Vanguard"
Macpherson remarks that the advent of participatory
democracy will require "a change in people's consciousness
(or unconsciousness), from seeing themselves and acting as
essentially consumers to seeing themselves and acting as
exerters and enjoyers of the exertion and development of
their own capacities."
such a

If an attempt is made to carry out

political program, it may prove difficult to raise

everyone's consciousness at once.

In fact, some will

suggest that this insistence upon the necessity of
"consciousness-raising" lends a sinister flavor to
Macpherson's political stance.

For instance, the

problematical nature of a plebiscitary democracy was noted
above, since the range of proposals to be settled within
such a polity would be determined by those who posed the
alternatives to be voted on.

If left unaccountable, the

person or body of persons who formulated the alternatives
might come to wield the real power within the polity.

Would

this function be performed by those of a "higher
^^Rise and Fall, chapter 3, "The Prospects of Economic and
Industrial Democracy," esp. 35-37; see also Essavs in Retrieval,
essay 6, "A Political Theory of Property," 120-140, and The Life
and Times of Liberal Democracv. 114-115.
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consciousness," for the benefit of those of us whose
consciousnesses are not so elevated?

Skeptics would

conclude that such an arrangement would be the epitome of an
Orwellian regime.37
At more than one point, Macpherson raises the dilemma
posed here, but he sets it aside almost as soon as he raises
it.

In The Real World of Democracy, he asks, "How can the

debasing society be changed by those who have themselves
been debased by it?

This is the problem that has faced not

only liberal and radical, but also conservative, reformers,
from Plato to Rousseau, from St. Thomas More to Marx.

The

debased people are, by definition, incapable of reforming
themselves en masse."

The strategies pursued by Plato,

Rousseau, and Lenin are all problematical.

"There can be no

guarantee that Plato's authoritarian rulers, or Rousseau's
charismatic leader, or Lenin's vanguard, will in fact use
their power for the ends for which it was supposed to be
used.

Yet, in the circumstances we are talking about, there

seems to be no less dangerous way."

He acknowledges Sir

Isaiah Berlin's criticism of "the doctrine that only they
can know," yet he claims that "the terrible thing about this
is that the postulate is often correct."38

37Macpherson, Life and Times. 99.

See also p. 144 above.

38The Real World of Democracv. 19; "Berlin's Division of
Liberty," essay 5, Essavs in Retrieval. 106-107.
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The issues raised here by Macpherson are discussed at
length by Thomas Spragens in his The Ironv of Liberal
Reason.

Spragens diagnoses the proposal for a "vanguard

class" as a symptom of "technocratic" liberal rationality,
in which sociopolitical knowledge is held to be accessible
only to a class of experts.

The claim of such a class or

political party could all too easily represent "the
fashioning by a well-intentioned, power-seeking intellectual
class of their own legitimacy myth."

Spragens's view is

that such a claim has dangerous and sinister implications.
He asks, "Who, in short, are the educators and who the
educated?

Who are the knowers and who the known?

Who

controls and who is controlled?"^^
Macpherson should at least be given credit for
acknowledging the difficulties posed here.

He affirms that

"the great majority of people in the Western liberaldemocracies place a high value on the unique characteristics
of the liberal-democratic state," including civil liberties
and governmental accountability.

In his response to Milton

Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom, he allows that
institutional safeguards will be needed in the socialist
commonwealth to offset the threat of "a ubiquitous party
hostile to political freedom."

His view, however, is that

institutional safeguards, necessary or not, will not be
decisive.
39,Spragens, The Ironv of Liberal Reason. 105-107.
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It is not the absence of a fully competitive labour
market that may disable a socialist government from
guaranteeing political freedom; it is the absence of a
firm will to do so. Where there's a will there's a way,
and, for all that Friedman has argued to the contrary,
the way need have nothing to do with a fully competitive
labour market. The real problem of political freedom in
socialism has to do with the will, not the way. The
real problem is whether a socialist state could ever
have the will to guarantee political freedom.
Macpherson thinks that in socialist regimes that might come
to power in the Western world, conditions would be more
favorable to the development of a will to maintain political
freedom than in those regimes currently dominated by
communist parties.

Nevertheless, as long as "consciousness-

raising" on the part of a "vanguard" is contemplated in the
place of more mundane forms of political persuasion, many
observers will be uneasy.
"Third World" versus "First World"
Conceptions of Democracv
Macpherson believes that the peoples of the
underdeveloped nations of the "Third World" are developing a
democratic theory that recalls the ancient notion of
democracy as rule by an oppressed class, even though
coercion by a "vanguard" may have been involved in the
establishment of these regimes.

These peoples see

competitive market society as unnatural, something imposed
from above.

They also see political competition and a

^(^Macpherson, The Real World of Democracv. 56-57; "Elegant
Tombstones: A Note on Friedman's Freedom," essay 7, Essavs in
Retrieval. 150-154.
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competitive party system as unnatural, since their societies
lack class division.

Since these nations are struggling to

escape the yoke of what they call "neo-colonialism," there
is a tendency to see any political opposition as treasonous;
the genuine liberal-democratic achievements of civil rights
and civil liberties are in danger of being shunted aside in
the drive to modernize, accumulate capital, and create
national loyalty.41
Nevertheless, the claim is made that these nations
manifest a genuine Rousseauian "general will" that they can
express only through a single dominant party.

This notion

of democracy is pre-liberal in that it emphasizes ends over
means.

These peoples find some aspects of Marxism

congenial, but not the doctrine of the class state.

They

see themselves as classless already; they seek a national
revolution, not a class revolution.42
Macpherson holds that the presence of nuclear weapons
means that the West can no longer hope to dominate the world
41see Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracv.
9-10; see also The Real World of Democracv. 23-27. The claim
that African nations lack class division may be met with
skepticism. Such nations are often divided along tribal lines
(which is not a class division in the strictest sense), and they
may also exhibit a self-generated class division in that the
members of their political and administrative apparatus may come
to constitute a privileged elite. For a discussion of the
prospects for democracy in Africa which emphasizes the
possibility that non-liberal versions of democracy may become
justifying doctrines for authoritarian regimes, see Richard L.
Sklar, Democracv in Africa (Los Angeles: African Studies Center,
University of California, Los Angeles, 1982).
42nacpherson, The Real World of Democracv. 27-30.
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outright; to win favor in the Third World, both superpower
blocs will have to compete on moral grounds.

This presents

the prospect of a non-military engagement between the West
and the Third World.

Macpherson remarks that if the civil

and political libertarianism of the West is to prevail,
respect will have to be shown for the legitimate aspirations
of Third World democracy.

Since the Third World ideologies

do not display the hegemonic tendencies of Marxist-Leninism,
the West need not be implacably hostile to them, Macpherson
argues.

"In recognizing the merits of the new ideologies'

humanism, the West would be going back to the roots of its
own democratic tradition."43
The record of Third World governments may not lend much
support to Macpherson's vision of a beneficent Third World
democracy, if the accounts of numerous journalists and other
specialists are to be believed.

Furthermore, his sanguine

attitude toward "vanguard" politics will lead many, Strauss
among them, to suspect that Macpherson is practicing his own
brand of "neo-Hobbesianism," in spite of his explicit
criticism of Hobbes's "possessive individualism."

In any

case, that Macpherson is a Hobbesian can be concluded by
implication only.

He criticizes Hobbes instead of affirming

him after the fashion of Michael Oakeshott, who lauds Hobbes

"Revolution and Ideology in the Late Twentieth Century,"
essay 8, Essavs in Retrieval. 169. See also essay 1, "The
Maximization of Democracy," Essavs in Retrieval. 19-23, and The
Real World of Democracv. 65-67.
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for his discovery of the nature of the human political
predicament.
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CHAPTER 5: MICHAEL OAKESHOTT— THE HOBBESIAN
STRUGGLE TO DELIMIT POLITICS
Michael Oakeshott, unlike Strauss or Macpherson^ looks
upon the political thought of Thomas Hobbes sympathetically.
While Strauss and Macpherson take Hobbes to be a culprit of
one sort or another, Oakeshott views him as contributing to
a proper conception of politics.

Hobbesian sovereignty is

not a justification of an authoritarian despotism, Oakeshott
argues; it simply is a justification of the authority that a
duly established government ought to have.

Government

authority is to be absolute within its proper sphere, but
this does not confer absolute power upon it.

According to

Oakeshott's interpretation, the Hobbesian theory seeks to
give government its due, no more and no less.

Governmental

power is to be absolute within the properly understood
bounds of politics, but this does not imply that government
must interfere and regulate outside these carefully limited
bounds.
Drawing upon Hobbes and other thinkers, Oakeshott seeks
to deflate the claims of politics to an extent.

Politics is

not an all-encompassing activity; philosophy, which seeks to
give a coherent account of the whole of experience, is the
only such activity.

Experience admits of modes, which, from

the perspective of philosophy, represent arrests or
distortions of experience.

This does not mean that the

modes can be avoided, especially not the mode of "practice"
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or practical activity, which is indispensible to the conduct
of life.

Each mode is legitimate within its own limits, but

each has a tendency to present itself as universally valid,
without qualifications; philosophy must resist these
grandiose claims.

Philosophy must criticize an activity

such as politics when it threatens to exceed its sphere of
legitimacy.

Such was the account of philosophy and

experience offered by Oakeshott in his first philosophical
endeavor. Experience and Its Modes.
Oakeshott believes that contemporary tendencies are
contributing to an understanding of politics as an
unlimited, all-encompassing activity.

Politics is becoming

a technical, managerial enterprise concerned with satisfying
whatever needs are most deeply felt at a particular moment,
he argues.

As such, politics tends to become a matter of

passion rather than moderation.

Such are the themes of

Oakeshott's collection of essays entitled Rationalism in
Politics.

In a more recent work. On Human Conduct.

Oakeshott has elaborated a concept of "civil association" or
civitas. to which, he suggests, the political realm ought to
be limited as far as possible.

Civitas would be a strictly

formal, legalistic, rule-governed relationship which would
not specify substantive performances, but would prescribe
conditions which would constitute constraints to be observed
by persons pursuing whatever substantive purposes they
choose.

This discussion of civitas is presented as an
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exacting specification of the understanding of politics
implicit in the Hobbesian theory, in which the concern of
the political realm is to secure its own authoritativeness,
not to satisfy substantive wants.

The legitimate concern of

the political is so carefully delimited that it appears to
approach the ideal of the "night-watchman state" of
classical liberal thought.

In his other political writings

Oakeshott appears less concerned with the specific content
of political proposals than with the tenor or spirit in
which they are put forward; here he is less concerned with
the construction of a minimalist state that with the
prevention and control of political fanaticism and
enthusiasm.

An ambiguity can thus be detected, especially

between the doctrine of On Human Conduct and the more
diffuse short political essays; found throughout all the
writings, however, is the influence of Hobbes as the
philosopher who would keep the political from getting out of
control.
Philosophy as Unqualified Experience
In Experience and Its Modes. Oakeshott delineates his
conception of philosophy and its relation to other
activities.

He stresses that philosophy does not consist of

an indiscriminate pursuit of universal knowledge.

The

mandate of philosophy is nothing more than to give a
coherent account of experience, without presupposition or
arrest, unhindered by the partial, the subsidiary, or the
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abstract.

Philosophy must take special care to maintain

detachment from that which is extraneous to it.

"Nearly

always a philosopher hides a secret ambition, foreign to
philosophy," Oakeshott remarks.

"But we must learn not to

follow the philosophers upon these holiday excursions."^
W. H. Greenleaf describes Oakeshott as an Hegelian
idealist of a sort.

According to Greenleaf, Oakeshott is

dissatisfied both with a transcendentalist realism that
placed truth only within a supersensible realm removed from
experience and with an anti-metaphysical empiricist
nominalism.

It is to be hoped that an idealist philosophy

can preserve the logical certainty of realism without
refusing to acknowledge the reality of any aspect of human
experience.

To this end, Oakeshott develops a theory of

truth in which the true is held to be that which renders our
experience coherent.

Truth and experience are not to be

dichotomized so that one is extraneous to the other;
coherence is to be taken as the criterion for truth, not
vice versa.2
Just as he criticizes the separation of truth from
experience, Oakeshott also objects to the dichotomization of
reality into a world of ideas and an external world of
things.

This distinction has only a practical, provisional

^Michael Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge;
Cambridge University Press, 1933, reprint ed., 1966), 1-8.
2w. H. Greenleaf, Oakeshott's Philosophical Politics
(London: Longmans, 1966), 6-16.
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validity, as does the distinction between thought and
perception.

His view of reality is derived from experience,

as is his view of truth.

To separate knowledge from

reality, to make reality independent of experience, would
render it unknowable.

Therefore, he rejects as a vicious

dualism any view which requires a divorce between experience
and reality.^
Philosophy, then, represents a unified world of
experience in terms of ideas.
admit of diversity.

This unity does, of course,

The whole, however, does not consist

simply of the sum of several different kinds of experience;
experience admits of modes rather than kinds.

The modes of

experience are defective from the standpoint of philosophy;
they represent defects or arrests in experience.

Their

perspective is limited or partial rather than holistic;
philosophy must supersede them logically.

Philosophy is

unitary, concrete experience, whereas the modes do not rise
above the merely abstract.

Philosophy represents the

completion of the modes; it is the pursuit of the
concreteness of experience for its own sake, without
hindrance, distortion, or presupposition.^
In Experience and Its Modes. Oakeshott designates the
historical, scientific, and practical modes as the central
objects of study, although this does not represent an
^Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes. 48-54.
4ibid., 69-82.
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exhaustive listing of the modes.

From the standpoint of

philosophy, these modes are all defective because they are
abstract and fail to achieve the character of fully
concrete, coherent experience.

They fail to overcome the

dichotomy of the observer and that which is observed; they
presuppose or designate the observed thing, rather than
providing a comprehensive, exhaustive, concrete definition,
which alone is satisfactory to philosophy.
The scientific and historical modes come closer than
the practical to seeking experience for its own sake, but
they still fall short.

The scientific mode is concerned

with definite, demonstrable knowledge, knowledge that is
perfectly and unambiguously communicable; for this reason,
science culminates in the search for quantitative knowledge.
The scientific mode, unlike the historical and the
practical, can admit relationships of cause and effect; the
latter two modes deal with human beings who attribute
significance, which is not reducible to causality, to their
own actions.

The historian, constructing an historical past

from a set of artifacts, seeks an explanation of contingent
relationships in terms of their significance.

The historian

projects truth and reality into the past, whereas the
practical man projects reality into the future.^
^Oakeshott elaborates on the historical and scientific modes
in chapters 3 and 4 of Experience and Its Modes (86-168 and 169246). Further discussions of the historical mode are to be found
in "The Activity of Being a Historian," in Rationalism in
Politics and Other Essays (London and New York: Methuen, 1962),
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Each of these modes of experience represents a
homogeneous world of abstract ideas; they are exclusive of
and irrelevant to each other.

Error arises when we attempt

to argue in one mode with the vocabulary of another.

For

instance, Oakeshott believes it to be illegitimate to argue
against a philosophical postulate on the grounds that its
propagation might be destructive to morality or religion;
such an argument illegitimately moves from the practical to
the philosophical mode.

Similarly, he thinks it incorrect

to speak of applying a scientific discovery to practical
life.

Such a discovery would have to be transformed—

perhaps from the scientific mode to the technical mode,
which would be a species of the practical mode— before it
could be so applied.®
"Each world of abstract ideas, we have seen, so long as
it is content to mind its own business, is unassailable,"
remarks Oakeshott.

However, he believed it would be

impossible for each mode so to limit itself.

Each mode

tends to assert its validity absolutely; to do otherwise, it
would have to be aware of its shortcoming or partiality,
which would mean it was already on the way to passing out of
modality into philosophy.

From the standpoint of totality,

each of the modes is incomplete and contains an element of
137-167, and in "Three Essays on History," in On History and
Other Essays (Totowa, N. J.; Barnes and Noble, 1983), 1-118.
®Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes. 311-315.
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self-contradiction.

Philosophy must assert itself against

the modes when they attempt to assert themselves outside
their realms of limited validity.

This obligation of

philosophy holds especially with respect to the ubiquitous
mode of practical experience.^
Politics as Practical Experience
The practical is the one mode in which we cannot avoid
participating.

Concerned with the satisfaction of

substantive wants, it is essential to the conduct of life.
Although most of our mundane existence is taken up with
practical activity, philosophy cannot abide the claim that
practice constitutes the whole of experience, providing what
the other modes lack.
Practice is defined by its essential concern with the
alteration of existence.

Alteration includes both change

and the prevention of change, as in an activity of
maintenance.

Practical experience is not to be confused

with a vulgar conception of "practicality."

Even the

religious mystic, living a life of quietism, is involved in
the mode of practical experience.

"Practice is activity,

the activity inseparable from the conduct of life and from
the necessity of which no living man can relieve himself."®

■7jbid., 329-330.
®Ibid., 256-57.
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Practice depends upon a movement from a "what is" to a
"to be" which is "not yet."

The "what is" and the "to be"

are always of the same character; the latter is implicit or
potential in the former.

(In a conserving or maintaining

activity, threatened change belongs to the "what is.")

The

"to be," or "not yet," represents a more coherent form of
the "what is"; it is equivalent to what ought to be.

The

activity of eliciting the "not yet" from the "what is"
represents a reconciliation of the world of fact with that
of value.
Practical activity requires a criterion for determining
what constitutes a satisfactory alteration; this reveals
that any claim on the part of practice to represent the
whole of experience must be false.

The world of practical

fact is inherently unstable and incoherent; science and
history at least deal with a world of unchanging fact.
Practical activity by its nature throws truth ahead into the
future; it seeks the criterion for a satisfactory alteration
in a worlc of value which is not itself the world of
practice.

To look to a sphere beyond itself is intrinsic to

practical experience; by itself, it cannot render experience
coherent.®
Oakeshott believes that practical activity can never
finally be satisfactory; in fact, it can be seen as
intrinsically self-frustrating.

The resolution of fact and

9jbid., 257-263.
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value attempted by practice can never fully be achieved; a
new discord will spring up as soon as a reconciliation is
achieved.

Each resolution affords a new perspective which

reveals new discords. Any resolution achieved by practical
activity will always be partial and incomplete, owing to the
character of practice as an abstract mode of experience.^®
Oakeshott criticizes contemporary society for having
become infatuated with practical activity; he sees practice
as driving out other spheres of activity.

In Experience and

Its Modes he had identified poetry as a form of practice;
later, he came to conceive it as a kind of contemplative
imagining that yields a delight inseparable from the
activity itself.

In his essay, "The Voice of Poetry in the

Conversation of Mankind," he represented the diverse modes
of experience as voices in a conversation; poetry is in
danger of being drowned out by the louder voices of science
and practice.

In a discussion of "The Study of 'Politics'

in a University," he discusses the technical and vocational
trend in university education, tending as it does to drive
out the historical and literary studies traditionally
associated with liberal education: "And consequently, in a
society (such as ours) which has a high standard of

l®Ibid., 289-291.
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practical relevance, universities have often to be
defended.
A technical trend can be discerned in politics as well
as in education.

Oakeshott held that an understanding of

politics as an exclusively technical pursuit was
characteristic of contemporary ideologies.

Such an

understanding excludes that element of tacit judgement or
political "connoisseurship” that Oakeshott identifies as
traditional political knowledge.

Modern ideologies

represent political "cribs" that may be necessary in order
that newly enfranchised groups, whose members may not have
had much opportunity to develop traditional political
skills, may nevertheless participate in politics.

Technical

political knowledge may be formulated in terms of precise
rules; traditional knowledge, which is more diffuse, appears
less precise and quickly falls out of favor, at least when
compared to the newfangled political

" c r i b s . "^2

The theme of the domination of technical activity at
the expense of all other such modes was central to
Oakeshott's reflections on politics.

An understanding of

politics as exclusively technical is one aspect of a selffrustrating "hyperactivity" that manifests itself in
^^Oakeshott, "The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of
Mankind" and "The Study of 'Politics' in a University,"
Rationalism in Politics end Other Essavs. 246-247, 310-311.
^^Greenleaf, 46-51; see also Oakeshott, "Rationalism in
Politics" and "Rational Conduct," 1-36 and 80-110 in Rationalism
in Politics and Other Essavs.
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societal immoderation and political "enthusiasm.”

A more

proper understanding of the political would emphasize its
more detached, formal aspects.

It would be preferable if

politics resembled the mode of civil association, rather
than mere technical activity, to as great an extent as
possible.
Hobbes! Politics as Artifice
"The rule of law denotes both a strict and an
unexacting relationship: here there is no place for
enthusiasm."

As with other thinkers identified with the

political right, Oakeshott diagnoses contemporary political
disorders as manifestations of an unbridled enthusiasm,
perhaps recalling the disenchantment of Hobbes with the
activities of religious sectarians before and during the
English Civil War.

Oakeshott seeks to delineate the

boundaries of "politics properly understood” in order to
exclude such enthusiasms.

Here he conceptualizes his

preferred mode of politics as "the rule of law"; elsewhere
he speaks of a preference for societas rather than
universitas.

Both conceptualizations are designed to

exclude an "enthusiastic" politics of mass movements and
charismatic leaders.
Oakeshott's determination to defeat political
enthusiasm

dictates that he disparage any reference to

^^Oakeshott, "The Rule of Law," in On Historv and Other
Essavs. 148.
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natural law as the foundation of political authority.

In

the first place, he finds the promulgation of such doctrines
to be attended by "enthusiasm" in the pejorative sense.
Furthermore, for good Hobbesian reasons he sees these
doctrines as threats to the political order, since they
threaten to become competitors with law as established by
duly constituted authority.

He speaks of "the fanciful

doctrine of the Declaration of Independence" and "the absurd
device of a Bill of Rights." "National interest" has no more
validity than "common good."

His "rule of law" has no use

for a "higher" or "fundamental" law in the sense of an
entrenched constitution or Basic Law.
To keep the polity from being overrun by political
enthusiasm, a detached stance toward matters political must
be reinforced by an insistence that politics falls within
the realm of artifice, not nature.

In his introduction to

the Leviathan. Oakeshott stresses that for Hobbes "civil
society is an artifact; it is artificial, not natural. . . .
The word 'civil', in Hobbes, means artifice springing from
more than one will."

Whereas Plato was the philosopher of

Reason and Nature, and Hegel was the theorist of Rational
Will, Hobbes provided the "master-conceptions" of Will and
Artifice. 15
14"Talking Politics," National Review. 5 December 1975,
1424-1427; "The Rule of Law," in On Historv. 158-9.
^^Introduction to Hobbes, Leviathan. ed. Oakeshott (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1946), xxviii-xxix, xii.
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Oakeshott believes that Hobbes provided a perspective
from which modern confusion about the scope of the political
could be overcome.

Hobbes understood that the crucial issue

was not the naturalness but the authoritativeness of rule.
In his most recent reflections, Oakeshott argues that "what
we need to be shown is how the ingredients of such an
association might be created and assembled; and, in
particular, how human beings might acquire the condition of
being obligated to observe the prescriptions of an humanus
legislator.

Among theorists of association in terms of the

rule of law, Thomas Hobbes is, I think, one of the few who
addressed himself exactly to this question.
In the same essay, Oakeshott speaks of Hobbes's "vision
of a state" in such a way as to suggest that this "vision"
closely parallels his own conception of "civil association"
or societas.

"Such a state, he [Hobbes] contended, is

composed of personae related solely in terms of obligations
to observe in all their self-chosen conduct certain non
instrumental (that is moral or procedural) conditions
prescribed by a sovereign legislative office expressly
authorized to deliberate, make and issue such prescriptions
which constitute the lex of the association."

This vision,

"superbly pioneered" by Hobbes along with Bodin, "is deeply
rooted in our civilization."^^
l^Oakeshott, "The Rule of Law," in On Historv. 149-150.
l^ibid., 157, 161-162.
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civil Association: Common Concern.
Not Common Purpose
In the second part of On Human Conduct, entitled "On
the Civil Condition," Oakeshott feels compelled to attempt
an exhaustive specification of the terms of the relationship
he called "civil association."

"It is a certain mode of

association, one among others," he remarks; "I shall call it
the relationship of civility."

Whether this relationship of

civility constitutes a distinct mode of experience. on the
same level as the historical, the scientific, and the
practical, is left ambiguous.
The engagement appropriate to civil association falls
somewhere between the sphere of the legal and that of the
political.

Oakeshott defines the political as "practical

activity concerned with the institutions and arrangements of
an association of human beings."

As a form of practical

activity, politics is concerned with whether particular
institutions are desirable, but civil association has a
concern more exacting and specific than that of "mere"
desirability.

A central component of civil association is

adjudication of the kind to be found in a disinterested
legal court, in which "merely" political considerations are
to be set to one side.

Civil association can no more

exclude legislation than adjudication, but legislation of a
certain kind, which would consider the satisfaction of
^®Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford; Oxford University
Press, Clarendon Press, 1975), 108.
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specific interests instead of adopting a disinterested
perspective, would remove us from civil association into the
realm of politics in the vulgar sense.
Civitas is a condition postulating relationships
"neither quite so narrow as those pointed to in the words
•legal' and 'legally', nor so indiscriminate as those now
commonly (but I think unfortunately) understood by the words
'political' and 'politically'."

Drawing upon the discussion

of the Greek polis in Aristotle's Politics. Oakeshott
characterizes the civil condition as "always self-complete
in the sense of having no extrinsic substantive purpose . .
. it is like 'friendship' but diluted or 'watery'."

As

such, it should be distinguished from a transactional
relationship between bargainers, which pursues a common
purpose or interest in the form of the satisfaction of a
substantive want.

This latter "enterprise association,"

which is strictly to be distinguished from civil
association, includes but is not limited to exchange
relationships in the economic marketplace.^0
Civil association, as an alternative to enterprise
association, is defined as association in terms of
subscription to a practice.

Subscription to a practice

should not be taken as equivalent to "practical engagement"
^^The above definition of the political is taken from
Oakeshott's preface to D. J. Manning, ed., The Form of Ideoloav
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1980), viii.
20oakeshott, On Human Conduct. 108-117.
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or a "mode of practical experience," since these latter
expressions designate concern with satisfaction of
substantive wants, while the notion of a practice seems to
be defined by the absence of just such substantive concerns.
A practice does not enjoin a substantive performance, but
instead sets conditions to be met in the course of any such
performance.

It is a formal rather than a substantial

relationship, similar to that among speakers of a common
language in that it is concerned with subscription to common
rules rather than pursuit of common purposes, akin to the
relation "of French-speakers in respect of their language,
not in respect of what they have to say.
Civil association is concerned with the propriety or
authority of actions rather than their substantive
desirability; essentially it is rule-articulated
association.

It calls only for assent, not approval or

disapproval.

All within the jurisdiction of a rule are

obligated; obligation is not a condition that one can deny
simply because one does not feel it.

A rule is a

prescription or standing order that remains in force for
unknown future occasions.

Rules do not enjoin particular

actions; they simply prescribe norms to be adhered to,
whatever the action.^2

2ilbid., 119-122.
22%bid., 122-127
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The rules of civil association are rules of a
particular kind.

An enterprise association may have its

constitution or bylaws, but the enforcement of these rules
does not constitute the substantive purpose of the
enterprise.

Similarly, the rules of a game do not have the

same status as those of civil association; players are in
the game to win, not just to follow the rules.

Civil

association begins and ends in terms of rules; the rules of
civil association, called lex or "law," define a
relationship among formal equals or gives.
sole terms in which cives are related.

Laws are the

Gives may be

understood as "fictional persons," and their creation by lex
may be understood as a "legal fiction"; no man is a "civic
person" and nothing else.

Men are cives only from the

perspective of civil association, the "mode of civility."
The rules of civil association go together to form a svstem
for the enforcement of norms of human behavior; they are
related to each other argumentatively. not merely
incidentally.

This system must specify conditions for

ascertaining its own authenticity and specifying its
jurisdiction, since there are no extrinsic standards for
doing so; lex specifies relations among cives who are not
otherwise related.
An essential feature of cives is that they may be
related to each other as suitors to a judicial court; civil
23ibid., 129-130.
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association sustains itself by means of continuous
adjudication.

Such adjudication is not a "managerial"

device; decisions are to be rendered and claims made only
with respect to general normative considerations derived
from lex.

Ideally, there should be no "interested" parties

in a judicial proceeding; not only the court, but also the
"plaintiff" and the "defendant," should be concerned with
the articulation or illustration of lex, with coming to a
conclusion that is acceptable to lex, rather than with the
satisfaction of a particulier substantive interest.24
Although adjudication is at the heart of lex, resort to
legislation cannot be avoided absolutely in the civil
condition.

This follows from the character of civil

association as a product of human artifice.

However,

Oakeshott cautions against a too hasty resort to
legislation; where possible, it is preferable for the courts
to articulate that which is implicit in lex as it exists
already.

Oakeshott contends that constant ad hoc

legislation constitutes a breakdown in civil association.
He would not regard much of the legislation passed by
contemporary legislatures as genuine lex.

He remarks that

"lex cannot be a schedule of current awards designed to
promote the achievement of some satisfactions at the expense
of others . . . .

Legislative opinion is concerned with the

desirable composition of a system of moral, not
24ibid., 130-138.
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instrumental, considerations and therefore it cannot be
concerned with the claims or merits of interest in procuring
substantive satisfactions."25
Civil association can no more avoid an element of
rulership and administration than it can forego completely
the passage of legislation.

Lex makes the issuance of

injunctions consistent with civil association by authorizing
specific offices wit:' — fficient authority to enjoin
performances that do not conform to legal conditions.

To

perform this enforcement function, the ruler requires an
enforcement apparatus; he cannot avoid entering into
managerial and administrative relations.

Judicial rule is

preferable to administrative edict, but both are necessary.
However, it should not be the case that the ruler becomes
nothing but a manager; in that case, civil association would
have disappeared, having been replaced by enterprise
association.
subjects."

"Rulers may employ clerks but they rule
Otherwise, "rulership" will have been supplanted

by "lordship."26
The comprehensive conditions of civil association
consist of the enforcement of a manifold of rules, not the
pursuit of a common substantive purpose or interest.
Civitas is concerned with law, not policy; the contemporary
understanding of government as the adoption of ..'.'public
25lbid., 138-141.
26ibid., 141-147.
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policy” constitutes a vulgarization of civil association.
Governmental authority should not be understood as a
derivative of the desirability of policies adopted; in civil
association, government is recognized as authoritative
solely because of a common recognition that it is duly
authorized.
ruled out.

Appeal to "natural law" or a "common good" is
Lex may include rules for testing what purports

to be authoritative, but such a "constitution" does not have
the status of a "higher law" of superior status, according
to which other law may be validated or invalidated; such a
constitution is no more immune to inquiry or interpretation
than the remainder of the law.

Civil association knows no

other "justice" than the "inner justice" of a legal
system.27
Civil association admits considerations both of
authoritativeness and of desirability.

However, a certain

danger arises when the latter considerations are involved.
"Politics" for Oakeshott takes on a double meaning, the
first of which is consistent with civil association, the
second of which is inimical to it; we may speak of "politics
properly speaking" and "vulgar politics."

The proper sense

of politics is the consideration of the conditions of civil
association in terms of their desirability; this is not an
undifferentiated engagement concerned with satisfying wants,
whatever they may be.

Ruling should be concerned with

27ibid., 147-154.
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authoritativeness, not persuasiveness; it has no place for
techniques of persuasion which present the ruler as a
charismatic figure who exercises an amorphous kind of
"leadership."

The requirements of electioneering threaten a

vulgarization of the civil condition.

If the ruler must

engage in electioneering, he should at least distinguish his
rulership from his participation in this vulgar kind of
politics.28
Oakeshott understood civil association, or "politics
properly speaking," as an exacting relationship which
demands a high degree of detachment.

Much of what is

described with the adjective "political" in contemporary
times would be excluded.

Civil association requires a

"disciplined imagination"; one must exercise a critical
intellect while accepting the requirement of assent to
authority.

Oakeshott remarks that his conception may appear

to "impose upon politics an implausibly circumspect
character," but he stipulates that he is articulating an
ideal form, not an account of just whatever happens to be in
the head of a typical politician.

As such, "it calls for so

exact a focus of attention and so uncommon a self-restraint
that one is not astonished to find this mode of human
relationship to be as rare as it is excellent."29

28ibid., 161-168.
29lbid., 163-165, 180.
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Oakeshott*s Reading of Hobbes; Philosopher
of Civil Association
Oakeshott invokes the authority of Hobbes in defence of
his conception of civil association as the proper
understanding of politics.

To make this case, he must

defend his interpretation of Hobbes as the philosopher of
politics-as-artifice against any suggestion that the author
of the Leviathan was a natural-law theorist.

Such is the

purpose of Oakeshott*s essay, "The Moral Life in the
Writings of Thomas Hobbes," in which he sets out to
establish his favored interpretation of Hobbes over two
alternatives.

The first alternative he attributes to

Strauss in The Political Philosophv of Hobbes.

On

Oakeshott's reading, Strauss holds that Hobbes's political
obligation is binding because it is rational.

Man is

compelled to endeavour to preserve his own existence; his
behavior is rational so long as he does not venture beyond
this.

It is rational for man to seek peace, which is

necessary for self-preservation.

To make war against others

is to claim more than a person is naturally entitled to; as
such, it is irrational and a violation of one's political
obligation.
Oakeshott presses several objections against this
reading.

First, he holds that Hobbes claimed for man more

than an obligation or compulsion to self-preservation; man
3®0akeshott, "The Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas
Hobbes," in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essavs. 264-266.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

186

had a right to such.

Further, the Straussian interpretation

excludes the essential feature of moral conduct as
disinterested ; this reading would make all peaceful
endeavors equally just, however interested.

Finally, this

reading goes astray by equating obligatorv conduct with
rational conduct.

"On no plausible reading of Hobbes is the

Law of Nature to be considered obligatory because it
represents rational conduct. . . . 'reason' for Hobbes
(except where he is being unmistakably equivocal) has no
prescriptive force."

Fear of death may be our motivation

for action consistent with our obligation, but it is not
necessarily a justification for doing so.
A second interpretation that Oakeshott seeks to defeat
is that put forward by Howard Warrender and others to the
effect that Hobbes is indeed a natural-law theorist.

The

Law of Nature enjoins us to "endeavour peace," and according
to Warrender the author of this Law of Nature is none other
than God.

Oakeshott objects that Hobbes could not admit

knowledge of God as the author of natural law as included
among our natural knowledge.

Acknowledgment of God is a

matter of belief, not knowledge.

Hobbes speaks of God as

"ruler" in a metaphorical sense only; God is the "ruler"
only of those who acknowledge him.

The duty to observe

political obligation is not apprehended naturally; the Law
of Nature lacks an authentic interpretation.

Oakeshott

31ibid.
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argues that for Hobbes political obligation can emerge only
by choice or covenant, not by direct apprehension of a
natural law ordained by God.
Oakeshott's preferred interpretation is that there is
no natural law for Hobbes.

Obligation is binding neither

because it is rational nor because it is natural, but only
because it is made by a duly constituted authority.

"The

question. Why am I morally bound to obey the commands of the
sovereign of my civitas? (which, for Hobbes, is the
important question) requires no other answer than. Because
I, in agreement with others in a similar plight to myself,
and with a common disposition to make covenants, having
•authorized' him, know him indubitable to be a law-giver and
know his commands as laws properly speaking."

Fear of

destruction may cause men to enter into a covenant, but
until a covenant is entered into, there is no law and no
obligation; obligation begins and ends with civil law.^^
What obligates men to go on keeping the covenant, once
it is made?
does.

Oakeshott offers an intriguing answer: nothing

A duty "to keep the covenant" would have to be

imposed by a law outside the civil law; Oakeshott concludes
that for Hobbes there can be no such law, hence no such
duty.

To continue to keep the covenant may be a desirable

32ibid., 273-279; see Warrender, The Political Philosophv of
Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, Clarendon Press, 1957).
^^Oakeshott, "Moral Life," in Rationalism in Politics. 266-269.
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action, but it is not a duty.
covenant . . .

"To make and keep the

are for Hobbes (on this reading) acts of

prudence which are reasonable and desirable to be performed
on condition that others perform them, or acts of 'nobility'
that make no conditions."

Assent to political authority

based on considerations of prudence or virtue would appear
to be the only version of political "obligation" that Hobbes
could admit; this is as obligatory as the political can be.
There is no general political obligation; there are only
duties to obey specific civil laws.

Outside of specific

laws, there is no obligation.
We find in Oakeshott a consistent denial of natural-law
content in the Hobbesian theory.

Why, then, do we find such

frequent references to natural law in the Hobbesian corpus?
Oakeshott argues that Hobbes was conducting an argument at
two levels, one for "initiates" and another for "the
ordinary man."
is recalled.

Strauss's doctrine of the esoteric reading
At one level we have an exercise in political

persuasion, conducted in language inoffensive to the settled
beliefs of the common people; at the philosophical level, we
have a strict logical deduction.

Roughly speaking, we may

identify the logical exercise with the first and second
parts of the Leviathan, and the polemics with the third and
fourth parts, especially since in those parts Hobbes is
concerned to convince the typical believing Christian of the
34ibid., 266-273.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

18 9

day that he need not feel a conflict between his obligation
to his God and to his sovereign; the two endeavors probably
cannot strictly be separated from each other, however.
Oakeshott mentions that this interpretation by no means
makes Hobbes unique in the history of political theory; he
cites Plato, Machiavelli, and Bentham as authors who
combined esoteric and exoteric doctrines in a single
document.
Since Strauss held that Hobbes placed Right before Law,
Oakeshott and Strauss would seem to be as one in denying
that Hobbes is a theorist of natural law.

Nevertheless,

Oakeshott takes some exception to Strauss's claims about
Hobbes ; he elaborates his objections in an article entitled
"Dr. Leo Strauss on Hcbbes."

In particular, Oakeshott

denies that Hobbes inaugurated a decisive break in the
history of political thought (a claim which Strauss finally
withdrew); Oakeshott holds that the Hobbesian theory has a
longer and more honorable pedigree than Strauss allows.
Oakeshott attributes the genesis of Hobbes's theory to the
Stoic-Christian as distinct from the Aristotelian tradition,
and also to the Epicurean tradition as it was revived in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Previously, in his

introduction to Leviathan. he had elaborated the lineage of
the Hobbesian theory in more detail:

35ibid , 286-288.
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But this theory of Hobbes has a lineage that
stretches back into the ancient world. It is true that
Greek thought, lacking the conception of the creative
will and the idea of sovereignty, contributed a
criticism of the Rational-Natural theory which fell
short of the construction of an alternative tradition:
Epicurus was an inspiration rather than a guide. But
there are in the political ideals of Roman civilization
and in the politico-theological ideas of Judaism strains
of thought . . . which may be said to constitute
beginnings of a tradition of Will and Artifice. . . .
The skepticism and the individualism, which are the
foundations of his [Hobbes's] civil philosophy, were the
gifts of late scholastic nominalism; the displacement of
Reason in favour of will and imagination and the
emancipation of passion were slowly mediated changes in
European thought that had gone far before Hobbes wrote.
While Oakeshott asserts several intellectual sources for
Hobbes in the above and in the article on Strauss, he
discusses none of them in great detail.

Nevertheless, he

must have felt that he had suggested enough potential
sources to dispose of the notion that Hobbes could not have
had any intellectual precursors.

Furthermore, just as

Hobbes did not mark the beginning of all skepticalnominalist theorizing, neither did he mark the conclusion of
natural law theory; "The natural law theory did not die at
once, even otherwise 'modern' thinkers such as Locke have it
embedded in their theories, and it did not die without
resurrection.
Oakeshott attributes to Hobbes an elevated status
within the Western political tradition; furthermore, he

^^cakeshott. Introduction to Leviathan, liii-liv; "Dr. Leo
Strauss on Hobbes," in Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975),
144-47.
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seeks to downplay the despotic or authoritarian implications
often attributed to the Hobbesian theory.

He affirms that

for Hobbes there can be no unjust law; however, "This does
not mean that the legislative office is magically insulated
from making 'unjust' law."

It means only that whatever law

is made is authoritative; law can be inequitable or
unnecessary while still being authoritative.

The crucial

question is whether the law, if inequitable or unnecessary,
may be criticized openly as such by the subjects of the
Hobbesian sovereign.

The criticism traditionally put

forward is that Hobbesian sovereignty obviates the
possibility of political life on the part of the subjects;
for the sovereign to admit criticism would appear to be to
admit challenges to his authority.
It might be supposed that, were the Hobbesian sovereign
to determine that dissent was not to be allowed, this could
not be criticized as unjust; however, he might not deem it
necessary to do so.

Discussion may be admissable so long as

disobedience is not countenanced.

"The absolutism

attributed to the sovereign authority implies no frenzy for
regulation or passion for interference.

The silence of the

law will brood over large tracts of the subject's life."
Furthermore, Oakeshott argues that an absolutely regulated
society is contrary to the spirit of rule of law; since law

^^Oakeshott, "The Rule of Law," in On History. 157-158.
also Introduction to Leviathan. xli-xlii.

See
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stipulates abstract conditions to be met, rather than
specific performances, command always implies a degree of
liberty in execution on the part of the subject.^8
Societas and Universitas; Alternative Conceptions
of Politics in the Modern European State
Oakeshott asserts that the European conception of the
state has now become a global phenomenon.

How faithful has

European civilization been to the ideal of politics proposed
by Oakeshott as the essence of the Hobbesian political
theory— the notion of civil association as rule of law?

Has

the opposing notion of "enterprise association" come to
predominate in the contemporary European state?

Or, is the

European state now a confused, ambiguous mixture of these
two concepts?

In exploring this issue, Oakeshott introduces

the terms societas and universitas as rough equivalents of
"civil association" and "enterprise association."

The fate

of these opposing conceptions of politics in the
contemporary world is the subject of the third part of On
Human Conduct, entitled "On the Character of a Modern
European State."
Oakeshott contends that the emergence of the concept
"state," as it emerged by the sixteenth century from the
breakup of the medieval realms, is marked by confusion.

The

new paradigm emerged from older forms of political
association, some of whose features pointed to the analogy
^^Oakeshott, Introduction to Leviathan. xliii-xliv.
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of societas. others to universitas.

The character of the

new regime and the understanding of the office of government
that it implied were not specified exactly.

Each of the two

available analogies offered its own loosely knit collection
of characteristics; a state could be defined as an
unresolved tension between the two.
Societas corresponds roughly to Oakeshott's "civil
association."

Citizens of societas accept its authority

under formal conditions described as "legality," which is
not equivalent to a common substantive purpose or interest.
It is a formal relationship with rules, not a substantive
relationship of common purpose or common action.

The office

of the ruler is to stipulate and enforce conditions of
conduct, not to adopt policies concerned with the
satisfaction of substantive wants.

Alongside societas is

the alternative conception of universitas. or what Oakeshott
calls "teleocratic" government.

It is an association of

persons which is itself like a person; individuals are
comparable in status to the organs of a larger body, united
in the pursuit of a common purpose or substantive end.
These two analogies may point in different directions, but
they are not mutually exclusive.
Oakeshott holds that the analogies of societas and
universitas were already being applied to reflection about
the political during the Middle Ages; they were "already in
^^Oakeshott, On Human Conduct. 201-206.
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use to denote some actual associations and communities.

The

human race was often reckoned to be a societas and so was a
civitas or regnum; while an imperial city, a gild, a
cathedral chapter, or a 'university' were recognized as
universitates."

Soon the two expressions were appropriated

for learned argument about politics.

While Oakeshott holds

that an actual state may partake of both analogies to some
extent, he believes that they should be kept distinct as
concepts; regrettably, he argues, their meanings have become
hopelessly muddled.

For instance, the terms societas and

universitas were translated into English respectively as
"partnership" and "corporation," which are now used
indifferently.

When we refer today to "law," "ruling," and

"politics," these terms partake of both the societas and
universitas analogies in a muddled fashion.
Oakeshott maintains that there is much to suggest that
the late medieval realm can be understood in terms of
societas.

It was constituted in judicial terms.

The

monarch was not a lordly proprietor but a ruler of subjects,
concerned with keeping the peace.

Revenue was collected,

but the realm was not treated as a piece of real estate to
be exploited.

The realm was not understood as a landed

estate, a commercial enterprise, or a military association,
but an association in terms of legal relationships.^^
40jbid., 199-201.
41lbid., 206-213.
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At the same time, some features of the late medieval
realm suggested the analogy of universitas.

The distinction

between the govern-ient oi a realm and the management of a
manor never emerged conclusively.

An element of lordship

survived from the medieval realm to the European state,
making it eligible to be understood as a kind of
universitas.

This was most convincing with respect to the

ruler's sacerdotal authority, in which the inculcation of
Christian culture is understood as part of the office of
government.

The Church was coming to be understood as one

among many corporate associations within the state; the
special authority once held by the Church passed to the
ruler.

Over the course of the sixteenth century, kingdoms with
pretensions to being modern states began to emerge.

Their

identifying marks were clear; their concern was to exclude
"rule from without" in the form of papal or imperial
authority.

Rulership was concerned primarily with

"pacification" aimed at encroachments from outside powers.
The character of rule changed from personal management by a
manorial lord to the formal relationship of ruler and
subject.

The new arrangement provided a liberation from the

threat of civil disorder, but the liberation was not
received without reservations; Oakeshott remarks that "this
liberating civil authority was seen also to have a menacing
42ibid., 214-224.
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aspect: it evoked misgivings commensurate with its
magnitude.”

Institutional arrangements were constructed to

guard against this potential menace, but by the nineteenth
century the pressure of circumstances led to a breakdown of
the notion of postulated limits on government.
The self-understanding of a particular state could
consist of a mixture of the societas and universitas
conceptions in any proportion, depending on the extent to
which the office of government is understood as being either
to rule or to manage.

The concept of the modern European

state partakes of ambiguity on this crucial question.
Oakeshott, for his part, makes it clear that persons of a
certain disposition will prefer the societas conception.
Furthermore, he suggests strongly that he holds this
disposition to societas to be morally superior; he calls it
"the strongest strand in the moral convictions of the
inhabitants of modern Europe."

This disposition understands

human conduct in terms of self-enactment, self-disclosure,
or self-actualization; it understands human conduct in terms
of its authenticity.

For persons of this disposition, the

conduct of life consists of a dramatic, contingent
engagement by intelligent beings rather than the completion
of an organic process upon beings subject to deterministic
causal laws. 44
43jbid., 224-231.
44ibid., 231-242.
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Circumstances have arisen during modern European
history that have given rise to a disposition opposed to
that of self-enactment and self-disclosure.
have contributed.

Several factors

The development of an administrative

apparatus, indispensible though it may be, inclines us to
conceive of government as an enterprise association.
Furthermore, the recurrence of warfare compelled states to
undertake activities inimical to civil association.
However, the most crucial such development was the emergence
of the so-called "problem of the poor," in which Europe saw
the emergence of a mass mentality incapable of undertaking
the demands of detachment and disinterest required by civil
association.
The individual manqué had suffered not only
substantive loss but also moral defeat. The morality of
respect for individuality and of virtuous self
enactment was certainly not without competitors in the
world of emerging European states, and it was soon to
encounter a resurgent (though somewhat rickety) morality
centered upon the pursuit of a so-called 'common good',
but it had swept aside both what was valuable and what
was not so valuable in the morality of communal ties.
And the weight of this moral victory bore heavily upon
the individual manqué. . . .
He had feelings rather than thoughts, impulses
rather than opinions, inabilities rather than passions.
He required to be told what to think, to ask for, and to
do, and in the course of time his natural submissiveness
prompted the emergence of 'leaders' to perform this
service for him.
Contemporary politics thus comes to partake of "mass
movements" composed of "mass men" or "anti-individuals" who
gravitate around politicians who use techniques of mass
persuasion, advertising, and propagandizing to exercise a
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charismatic "leadership” which would have no place within
the more constrained understanding of politics provided by
civil association.

If the charismatic "leader" is

sufficiently unscrupulous, he may take on the character of
the totalitarian dictator.
The concluding passages of "On the Character of a
Modern European State" consist of a complaint about the
compromised character of contemporary polities, in which
societas and universitas have become so badly conflated.
One commentator observes that Oakeshott subjects the
universitas conception to "restrained abuse."

We read that

modern states have become "development corporations" in
which the people are to be "made one in devotion to a
pattern of 'enlightened' conduct."

Government has become an

indiscriminate enterprise in pursuit of "well-being" or
"welfare"; education has been transformed from an initiation
into a moral and intellectual inheritance to the provision
of an apprenticeship in technical skills so that the people
may become assets to the state in pursuit of its enterprise.
Government takes on the character of a "therapeutic state"
intent upon remedying an ill-defined alienation,
frustration, insecurity, guilt, or anomie, at the expense of
all vestiges of civil association.'*®
45jbid., 263-279, esp. 277-278.
^®Ibid., 296-297, 306-310; see also Maurice Cowling,
Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England (Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 274.
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The character of modern European government would
appear to be hopelessly equivocal; the conceptions of
societas and universitas have been contingently joined and
thus confused.

The character of the people suffers under

this arrangement.

"The member of such a state enjoys the

composure of the conscript assured of his dinner.
•freedom' is warm, compensated servility."

His

Nevertheless, a

glimmer of a superior conception of political association
survives in European cultuie; "But, while those who are
disposed to take the other path are, perhaps, fewer and are
often denigrated as frivolous individuals merely out for the
walk, no European alive to his inheritance of moral
understanding has ever found it possible to deny the
superior desirability of civil association without a
profound feeling of guilt."^7
Oakeshott•s complaint about the character of modern
European government could be characterized as nothing more
than a visceral revulsion at the growth of the state and at
the spiritual condition of man under welfarism.

However, in

an essay in Political Studies, which appeared in a more
popularized version in National Review, he argues that the
confused self-understanding of contemporary polities
represents a threat to the very authority of government.

In

these two articles, he conceives the state as composed of an
office of authoritv. an apparatur -f power, and a mode of
^^oakeshott. On Human Conduct. 317-325.
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association.

By an office of authority is meant the

constitution by virtue of which we take governmental
authority to be legitimate; the vocabulary invoked here
includes that of "democracy," "republicanism," "monarchy,"
"autocracy," "tyranny," and the like.

The apparatus of

power is the administrative bureaucracy which government
cannot avoid constructing.

The mode of association is

either societas. universitas. or some mixture of the two.
Contemporary confusion is most acute with respect to the
office of authority, argues Oakeshott.

Government authority

ought to be affirmed on the basis of whether it has been
duly authorized, but the vocabulary of authority has been
appropriated for the evaluation of the performance of
government policy concerning some substantive purpose,
usually the pursuit of general economic prosperity.

We hear

talk of democratic and autocratic economies rather than
democratic and autocratic constitutions.

This may indicate

that the popular understanding of the legitimacy of
government is based on evaluation of substantive performance
rather than due authorization.

Indifference to government

authority may be the result; order may be endangered
whenever economic performance suffers a significant
decline."^®

Oakeshott, "The Vocabulary of a Modern European State,"
Political Studies 23(1975): 197-219, 409-414; "Talking Politics,"
1345-1347 and 1423-1428.
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Politics as "Second-Best Deliverence”
Oakeshott argued that several features of the medieval
realm anticipated the ideal form of societas.

As he

describes them, the duties of the ruler under this medieval
realm are "to provide courts in which all his subjects might
find redress for wrongs suffered and recognition for those
of their actions which subscribed to authoritative
procedures, to guard the realm against its enemies, and to
collect the revenue needed in these undertakings."

Is

societas therefore to be identified with the "night-watchman
state" of libertarianism, in which courts, police, the
military, and the collection of sufficient revenue for these
functions are stipulated to be the only legitimate functions
of government?
Typically, political theorists are quick to deny that
their reflections partake of ideology or partisanship.
Nevertheless, Oakeshott would appear to admit to a favorable
disposition to the laissez-faire position.

How does

Oakeshott distinguish his attitude from an "ideology" in the
pejorative sense?

We must "read between the lines" to

determine his attitude on this matter, since he does not
address it explicitly.

We might begin by examining one of

the few instances in wnich he addresses "the issues of the
day."

^^Oakeshott, On Human Conduct. 212.
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In the June 1951 Cambridge Journal. Oakeshott discussed
a British government report on the activities of the B. B.
C.

We would expect that a partisan of the "night-watchman

state" would call for the abolition of the B. B. C., leaving
broadcasting to private entrepreneurs.

Actually,

Oakeshott's criticism stopped far short of this.

He did

treat with "restrained abuse" the notion of "social
purpose," especially the concern to raise the level of
public taste, which the B. B. C. has always taken as part of
its mandate.^®
Oakeshott did not hold the concern with broadcast
standards to be illegitimate.

"Of course there must be

attention to standards; but it is not unreasonable to ask
whether these particular standards and this particular,
over-heated pursuit of a narrowly conceived social purpose
is the proper object for broadcasting, or whether what is
desirable is something less highfalutin'.

For if we are

bidden choose between broadcasting conducted in the manner
of the B. B. C. and the supposed standardless bedlam of
commercial broadcasting we are offered an incomplete range
of alternatives."

He did not oppose the continuation of the

B. B. C.'s broadcast monopoly; he conjectured that
commercial competition might result in less diversity rather
than more.

He objected to the B. B. C.'s manner of pursuing

50oakeshott, "The B. B. C.," Cambridge Journal 4 (June 1951);
545.
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its "social purpose” because it struck him as a form of
"enthusiasm" in the pejorative sense.

In particular, he was

concerned that the B. B. C.'s movement toward "around-theclock" broadcasting was threatening to turn radio into a
kind of "background noise."

He favored "monopoly joined

with a less grandiose purpose than that which guides the B.
B. C."51
Philosophically, Oakeshott placed concrete practice
above abstract theory.

His approach to the broadcasting

issue reveals a political practice characterized by a
particular sensibility or disposition, rather than the
application of a programmatic ideology.

We might conjecture

that he would argue that it is this feature which saves his
position from becoming an "ideology" in the pejorative
sense.

He praised the University of Chicago economist Henry

Simons for the non-abstract character of his libertarianism:
"The freedom which he is to inquire into is neither an
abstraction or a dream.

He is a libertarian, not because he

begins with an abstract definition of liberty, but because
he has actually enjoyed a way of living (and seen others
enjoy it) which those who have enjoyed it are accustomed (on
account of certain precise characteristics) to call a free
way of living, and because he has found it to be good."

On

the other hand, he criticized Hayek for turning
libertarianism into a "politics of the textbook” which
Sljbid., 550-554.
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reflected the kind of political "enthusiasm" which he
opposed.

"A plan to resist all planning may be better than

its opposite, but it belongs to the same style of
politics."52
Oakeshott's "man of conservative disposition" "believes
that the more closely an innovation resembles growth (that
is, the more clearly it is intimated in and not merely
imposed upon the situation) the less likely it is to result
in a preponderance of loss."

Gradual change is preferable

to a programmatic politics that would begin from a "blank
slate" and attempt to construct a political association ex
nihilo.

The preference provides the connecting link between

the "traditionalism" of the Rationalism in Politics essays
and the elaboration of civil association or societas in On
Human Conduct and "The Rule of Law."

In these later works

he was attempting to put into the form of postulates what
were, in fact, the working traditions of British political
practice as he understood them: a network of interlocking
institutions, developed over centuries of practice rather
than imposed on the basis of an ideologist’s doctrines,
which provided for a way of life in which overwhelming
concentrations of power were avoided.53
52oakeshott, "The Political Economy of Freedom," 39-40, and
"Rationalism in Politics," 21, in Rationalism in Politics and
Other Essavs.
53Oakeshott, "On Being Conservative," 172, and "The
Political Economy of Freedom," 40-41, in Rationalism in Politics
and Other Essavs.
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Such a network of institutions provided for a îsarket
economy, but not for what Oakeshott calls an "imaginary"
laissez-faire program.

His political prescriptions vary

from those of an "absolutist" libertarianism at several
points.

For instance, he discusses Simons's advocacy of

suppression of private monopoly; public operation may even
be necessary in case of gross market failure.

Rule of law

may not be sustainable without certain qualifications; it is
not necessarily compromised fatally if, for instance, local
authorities provide certain substantive services to be paid
for by a "rate.
It could be that just about any "qualification" of
societas might be acceptable to Oakeshott, as long as it is
put forward in the proper spirit; he is disturbed not so
much by the substantive content of certain proposals as by
the temperament of those who advocate them.

Politics

requires of us a "disinterested acknowledgment of all others
as one's equal"; such disinterestedness may, given certain
contingent conditions, require us to consider such
"qualifications" of civil association as welfare measures.
Proposals for such measures may originate in a want or a
felt grievance, but Oakeshott insists that they "must lose
this character and acquire another (a political character)
in being understood, advanced and considered as a proposal
^'^Oakeshott, "The Political Economy of Freedom," in
Rationalism in Politics. 55-58; "The Rule of Law," in On History.
162-163.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

206

for the amendment of the respublica of civil association.”
Do the myriad proposals and demands put forward in
contemporary polities have this specifically political
character, or do they resemble "payoffs" to preferred
interests or powerful voting blocs?

Do political advocates

have the capacity for detachment and deliberation to be
expected of those to whom we would describe as statesmen, or
do they more nearly resemble the charismatic leader around
whom great masses of "anti-individuals" have been known to
coalesce?

The answers will determine whether these

proposals and movements reflect the moderation that
Oakeshott thought appropriate to politics, or whether they
threaten to turn politics into an instrument of the
passions.55
The above considerations suggest the possibility that
Oakeshott's exacting effort to distinguish societas from
universitas in On Human Conduct constitutes a diversion from
the main current of his thought.

Here he may have deviated

from his general intention of capturing the essence of the
living political traditions of British civilization,
providing instead a pair of definitions according to which a
society may be judged to have conformed to or deviated from
an abstract ideal of political propriety.

The discussion of

societas and universitas may be the closest that Oakeshott
55oakeshott, "Moral Life," in Rationalism in Politics, 265;
On Human Conduct. 169-170; "On Being Conservative," in
Rationalism in Politics. 191-193.
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comes to providing a political "crib," an abridged account
of the British tradition for those who are not conversant
with it.

He may have felt compelled to provide that which

he criticized Hayek for proposing, an "ideology of freedom."
Elsewhere, he seems more concerned with the spirit or temper
characterizing a political tendency or proposal than its
conformity or lack of same to an abstract definition of
societas.

The former concern predominates in most of

Oakeshott's briefer essays on politics as opposed to the
meticulous distinction between societas and universitas tc
be found in On Human Conduct.
Oakeshott's mention of the "World State (of H. G. Wells
or anyone else)" recalls Strauss's concept of the "universal
and homogeneous state."

However, Oakeshott's opposition to

such a project is not rooted in a concern for
constitutionalism or for natural law as

with Strauss, but

in the perception that such a proposal does not display the
sobriety that he thinks appropriate to politics.

One

measure of this sobriety (or its absence) might be the
nature of the "salvation" or "deliverance" to be expected
from politics.

For Oakeshott, politics could only provide a

"second-best" deliverance.

In his introduction to

Leviathan, he argued that while politics might provide
something instrumental to "the good life," the achievement
of this good was not to be equated with "the good life"
itself.

"We may, then, enquire of any political philosophy
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conceived on this plan, whether the gift of politics to
mankind is, in principle, the gift of salvation itself, or
whether it is something less, and if the latter, what
relation it bears to salvation. . . . the achievement in
politics is a tangible good and not, therefore, to be
separated from the deliverance that constitutes the whole
good, but something less than the deliverance itself."

For

the Greeks, the end of politics was to make possible
something beyond itself, the contemplative, intellectual
life.

The end of politics for Hobbes was more mundane than

for the Greeks; it was not contemplation but felicity, "a
negative gift, merely making not impossible that which is
desirable," promising "neither fulfillment nor wisdom to
discern fulfillment, but peace, . . . the only thing in
human life, on Hobbes's theory, that can be permanently
established."

Hobbes brings sobriety to politics by

stipulating that the political realm is to seek something
less than an ultimate deliverance; Oakeshott, therefore,
sees in him an ally where Strauss sees an opponent.^®

SGoakeshott, "Rationalism in Politics," in Rationalism in
Politics. 6-7; Introduction to Leviathan. Ixiv-lxvi.
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CHAPTER 6: HANNAH ARENDT AND ERIC
VOEGELIN— FRAGMENTS ON HOBBES
A survey of commentaries on Hobbes in twentiethcentury political thought would be incomplete without a
comparison and contrast of the brief but provocative remarks
offered by Hannah Arendt and Eric Voegelin.

Arendt,

Voegelin, and Strauss are often categorized by American
political theorists as the three great twentieth-century
critics of modernity; the three are often spoken of as
"backward-looking" thirlcers who recall a "golden age" which
serves as a standard in comparison with which contemporary
disintegration is to be understood.

Since they all regarded

Hobbes with suspicion, a comparison among them may be
instructive, although the treatments of Hobbes provided by
the two thinkers discussed below are more fragmentary than
that offered by Strauss.
To oversimplify, Strauss held Hobbes culpable for the
undermining of philosophy, while Arendt implicated him in
the degradation of politics, and Voegelin accused him of
subverting spiritual life.

According to Strauss, Hobbes had

provided an opening for a modern, reductionistic,
egalitarian version of natural right which endangered the
ability of the philosopher to justify himself before the
city.

Arendt argued that Hobbes placed the right to

material accumulation over the right to speak up in public,
leading to a "mass society" of politically incapacitated.
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solitary individuals.

Voegelin claimed that Hobbes had made

the spiritual the mere handmaiden of the political by giving
the temporal sovereign the sole authority to judge the
admissibility of religious opinions and doctrines.
Arendt emphasized the centrality of the capacities of
speech and persuasion, as exercised in political discussion,
to man's humanity.

Her theory of contemporary "mass

society" emphasized the atrophy of political engagement in
the modern world.

She first gained prominence with The

Origins of Totalitarianism, in which she analyzed the Nazi
and Communist phenomena as consequences of the confluence of
several "subterranean" streams in Western culture that had
come to the surface over the course of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries; this work includes her criticism of
Hobbes.

In The Human Condition she presents her conception

of human action, which she holds to have been overwhelmed in
the modern world by the activities of labor and work.

In On

Revolution she compared the American Revolution favorably to
the revolution in France because of its emphasis on the
political rather than the social aspects of revolution.
Voegelin, after attempting a standard history of
political ideas (which was partially completed and published
under the title From Enlightenment to Revolution^^, turned
his attention from ideas to experiences, especially what he

^Eric Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution, ed. John
H. Hallowell (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1975).
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called experiences of transcendence.

Man's humanity is most

fully realized when he is oriented to a reality beyond
himself, he contended.

His multivolume work. Order and

History, was a study of civilizational symbols of
transcendence, especially those of the ancient Greek and
Hebrew civilizations, which he considered superior.
Contemporary disorder is to be understood as symptomatic of
a retreat from the civilizational achievements of Israel and
Hellas.

Prior to Order and History. Voegelin provided a

more concise statement of his perspective in The New Science
of Politics.
Arendt on the Atrophy of the Political
Arendt interpreted the contemporary civilizational
crisis in terms of the eclipse of the political.

She

emphasized the human capacity for action as manifested in
the exercise of the capacity for persuasive speech.

Ancient

Greek civilization was superior because it had taken the
greatest care to create and preserve a space for human
action— the polis.

In Greek life, economic activity was

confined to the household; in Aristotelian terms, economics
was a matter of household management.

To participate in the

deliberations of the polis was one of the few reasons for
men to leave the household, so that, to an extent, life was
neatly divided into the economic activity of the household
and the political life of the polis.

The household may be

identified with the private realm, the realm of necessity.
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while the polis is to be equated with public life, the realm
of freedom.
Arendt made her reputation as a critic of contemporary
"mass society," which is marked by the development of the
social realm— that which is neither public nor private.

The

social may be defined as that portion of our lives that is
lived outside the household but which is nonpolitical
nonetheless.

Arendt's interpretation of mass society is

that the social has grown to a point at which it has nearly
driven out both the private and the public, the life of both
the household and the polis.

We spend most of our lives in

the workaday world of "making a living," at the expense of
both family and community life.

Such an existence is marked

by an experience of loneliness and atomization.
Furthermore, such a mass society may become so politically
inarticulate that it may lack the resources to face any
political challenges which may confront it.2
For Arendt, the human condition was rooted in the
circumstances of pluralitv and natality, in light of which
human action is possible.

Plurality is the condition of

action; "If men were not distinct, each human being
distinguished from any other who is, was, or ever will be,
they would need neither speech nor action. . . .

A life

without speech and without action . . . has ceased to be a

^Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1958), 28-67.
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human life because it is no longer lived among men."

The

circumstance of natality, of our being born into the world,
suggests the possibility of action: "The miracle that saves
the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal,
'natural' ruin is ultimately the fact of natality, in which
the faculty of action is ontologically rooted."

This

circumstance of natality suggests to man that there is hope
that he might be able to initiate something new, including
but not limited to a political foundation (the French and
American instances of which Arendt would explore in On
Revolution).

Plurality, then, sets the condition for human

action, while natality suggests its possibility.

However,

action exists alongside the parallel activities of labor and
work, which may come to threaten it.^
In The Human Condition. Arendt elaborated upon the
distinction among labor, work, and action, and upon the
threat posed by the first two of these to the third under
modern conditions, which she found increasingly inimical to
her understanding of an existence fit for human beings.
"The human condition of labor is life itself," she remarked.
By labor she understood the continual reproduction of the
conditions of life.

Arendt would say that in the saying,

"Woman’s work is never done," what is here meant by work
might better be conceptualized as labor.

Cooking,

disciplining children, and cleaning up after them are tasks
^Arendt, The Human Condition. 175-176 and 247.
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that are never really finished; they may cease for a short
interval but they must soon be done over.

Agriculture, the

cyclical process of sowing and reaping, is also a
paradigmatic example of labor, although traditionally it has
been considered man's rather than woman's work.

"Labor is

the activity which corresponds to the biological process of
the human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and
eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced
and fed into the life process by labor."

Arendt contends

that the ancient Greeks considered labor of this sort to be
inherently slavish; they instituted slavery so that at least
some citizens would not be bound by these necessities and
could become the genuinely free citizens of the polis.^
"The human condition of work is worldliness."

Work, as

distinguished from labor, constitutes the fabrication of
objects for use.
work.

Human artifice represents the sum total of

Work, properly understood, is the "work of our hands

as distinguished from the labor of our bodies."

Used

properly, the products of this work should not be used up or
consumed, at least not immediately; work, as distinguished
from labor, creates enduring objects.

While work is

indispensible, the danger arises that if it comes to be
understood as the paradigmatic form of human activity, an

'^Ibid., 7 and 79-93, esp. 82-84.
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instrumentalist, utilitarian kind of thinking will come to
predominate.^
Of these three species of human activity— labor, work,
and action— Arendt contends that the latter is the most
truly human.

It consists of the engagement of the

intelligence of our fellows by means of our capacity for
persuasive speech.

Action is undertaken for extrinsic

reasons— to take care of the public business— and for
intrinsic reasons as well.

Arendt contends that a life of

action is a component of the Greek concept of eudaimonia.
which may be translated roughly as happiness, blessedness,
or well-being.

Action consists not only of persuasion but

also of self-revelation of one's potential or essence.

By

acting one overcomes human frailty and contingency by
creating a public record of words and deeds that may enable
one to attain an earthly immortality of a sort.

The

achievement of the ancient Greek polis was that it
institutionalized a space for human action in this sense.®
Arendt diagnosed the eclipse of the public space and
the loss of concern with earthly immortality in the modern
world as pathological.

The public realm might be threatened

by the private; in modernity it has been besieged especially
by the social.

The better part of most people's lives is

occupied with neither public nor private concerns; we are
Sjbid., 7, 136-139, 158.
®Ibid., 17-21, 175-181, and 192-199.
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now a society of jobholders, so that we characterize the
activities with which we occupy much of our time as "making
a living," which suggests the reproduction of life in the
sense of Arendt's labor, not action or even work.

From

political opinions to relatively trivial matters of
"lifestyle," we see a tendency toward conformism, such that
we tend to become behavers. not actors.

Our conformity does

not constitute true public life because the workplace is not
a true public place; instead, it resembles a little
"household" removed from the home.

With the possible

exception of the learned professions, our work does not
afford us an opportunity for expression that potentially can
be seen by everyone in our neighborhood or community (much
less our state or nation), such that we would have to
transcend our own partial perspective.

Men's sense of

anomie may come from a withdrawal into self, a self
alienation from the world, dictated by the atrophy of the
public realm, the true realm of human excellence, which
provides a satisfaction that cannot be approximated by
private or social life, even at their best.^
To overcome the modern political incapacity, a
reconstitution of the public space would be required.
Public views. rather than an undifferentiated, anonymous
"public opinion," must be built into the structure of
government.

Arendt contended that the need for such a

"^Ibid., 38-67, 126-135, and 248-257.
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public space was well understood by the American founders:
"The Americans knew that public freedom consisted in having
a share in public business, and that the activities
connected with this business by no means constituted a
burden but gave those who discharged them in public a
feeling of happiness they could acquire nowhere else."®
Unfortunately in Arendt's view, the American
Constitution failed to institutionalize the public space by
means of the town meeting or township form of local
government that had been employed so successfully in New
England.

Without such a feature, representative government

cannot make political participation accessible to those who
do not wish to make politics their career.

Party politics

tends to become oligarchic, even in such stable two-party
system as America and Britain, where an atrophy of the
public space may be noted.

She notes approvingly a letter

written late in Jefferson's career in which the American
statesman proposed a system of wards or "elementary
republics" as the basic units of local government, in order
to preserve the political ideals of the Revolution.®
Throughout her own career, Arendt remained attached to
the ideal of a ward or council system of government.

She

saw such a system as the only way to prevent a "massified"
®Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking, 1963), 115-116;
see also 24-26, 23J-31.
®Arendt, On Revolution. 234-235, 271-274, 252-258.
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society that might be susceptible to totalitarianism.

In

her view, an important source of the tendency to
totalitarianism was the appearance of a "mob" of "massified"
men in whom political participation had atrophied, who were
susceptible to being brought back suddenly into politics by
being attracted to a charismatic totalitarian "leader."

The

Russian system of "soviets" may have approximated the form
of government she preferred; ironically, the Soviet Union
has neutralized these "soviets" in favor of rule by a
hegemonic party.

When that country invaded Hungary to put

down a political uprising in 1956, Arendt was heartened
nonetheless to hear reports that a council system had arisen
spontaneously in the few weeks before the rebellion was
suppressed.

She memorialized these short-lived Hungarian

councils in an epilogue to The Origins of Totalitarianism;
"The rise of the councils, not the restoration of parties,
was the clear sign of a true upsurge of democracy against
dictatorship, of freedom against tyranny.
Arendt on Hobbes
Arendt cherished the presence of a public space in
which public business could be conducted.

Totalitarianism

represented a horrible obliteration of the public space; as
one survivor of the Nazi concentration camps observed,
"There are hundreds of thousands of us here, all living in
^^Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. 2d ed. (Cleveland,
Ohio: World, 1958), 492-502, esp. 501.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

219

absolute solitude."

Even under the most terrible tyranny

known hitherto, martyrdom was possible; even if the tyrant
could not be overthrown, the martyr's protest would go down
in history.

Arendt discovered that the Nazis had

established conditions in the camps so demoralizing that the
possibility of martyrdom was foreclosed.

The inmates were

convinced that no one would escape, hence no report of any
protest would ever reach the world outside; it would be as
though any protest had never happened.

"To demonstrate when

death can no longer be postponed is an attempt to give death
a meaning, to act beyond one's own death," but "How many
people here still believe that a protest has even historic
importance? . . . When no witnesses are left, there can be
no testimony."

Arendt concluded that, by effectively

eliminating the possibility even of the most desperate of
political acts, the Nazis had constructed an environment in
which the inmates' political capacities had completely
atrophied.
Although the appearance of totalitarianism most
probably involved an element of accident, Arendt believed
that certain developments in European culture traceable back
at least to the nineteenth century were contributing
factors— in particular, anti-Semitism and imperialism.

She

viewed the rise of bourgeois man and bourgeois civilization

^^Arendt, Origins. 451. Reference is to David Rousset, Les
Jours de Notre Mort (Paris, 1947), 464.
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as implicated in the development of imperialism, and hence
implicated in totalitarianism.

Bourgeois civilization gave

free play to a drive for power in the form of accumulation,
as exemplified by Cecil Rhodes's comment that "I would annex
the planets if I could."

Eventually this drive for power

would be directed toward the riches of Asia, Africa, and
America.

The European state would be put in the service of

accumulation in the drive for imperial domination and
colonization.

Bourgeois civilization required ideological

justification for its power drive, including its imperial
ambition; the significance of the thought of Hobbes, at
least in part, is that it contributed to this justification.
Justification of bourgeois civilization included
justification of imperialism, and justification of
imperialism was likely to include an element of racethinking, since the territories to be colonized were
inhabited by nonwhite peoples.

Hobbes may not have been a

racist thinker himself, but he contributed to a
civilizational movement of which race-thinking would later
become a

p a r t . ^2

To Arendt, Hobbes was the paradigmatic philosopher of
an emerging bourgeois civilization.

He presented a

political theory appropriate for a completely privatized
^2por commentary on the remark by Rhodes, see Arendt,
Origins. 124. For a discussion of nineteenth- and early-to-midtwentieth-century race-thinking with respect to South Africa and
its parallels with twentieth-century race-thinking in general,
see Origins, 185-207.
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mankind.

The theory was based on a calculation of

individual interests rather than the acknowledgment of a law
or standard that surpasses particular interests.

For such

men, the fundamental political fact would be a drive for
power rather than an orientation toward the good or the
right.

"He gives an almost complete picture, not of Man but

bourgeois man, an analysis which in three hundred years has
neither been outdated nor excelled. . . .

A being without

reason, without the capacity for truth, and without free
will— that is, without the capacity for responsibility— man
is essentially a function of society and judged therefore
according to his 'value or worth . . . his price; that is to
say so much as would be given for the use of his power.
Arendt held that Hobbes presented a picture of man not
as he was but "as he ought to become and ought to behave if
he wanted to fit into the coming bourgeois society."
Hobbesian man is a depoliticized, atomized being whose
connections to his fellows are strictly instrumental and
contingent.
Thus membership in any form of community is for
Hobbes a temporary and limited affair which essentially
does not change the solitary and private character of
the individual
. . . or create permanent bonds between
him and his fellow-men. It seems as though Hobbes's
picture of man defeats his purpose of providing the
basis for a Commonwealth and gives instead a consistent
pattern of attitudes through which every genuine
community can easily be destroyed. This results in the
inherent and admitted instability of Hobbes's
^^Arendt, Origins, p. 139.
Works 3:76).

See Hobbes, Leviathan (English
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Commonwealth, whose very conception includes its own
dissolution . . . an instability that is all the more
striking as Hobbes's primary and frequently repeated aim
was to secure a maximum of safety and stability.
Along with several other commentators, Arendt thus concluded
that Hobbes's political theory was contradictory and selfdefeating in that men as he imagined them to be could never
form a commonwealth.

Hobbesian men are so dissociated from

each other that "Hobbes's Commonwealth is a vacillating
structure and must always provide itself with new props from
the outside; otherwise it would collapse overnight into the
aimless, senseless chaos of the private interests from which
it sprang.
Decisive for Arendt was her conclusion that political
life as we commonly understand it would be wholly absent
from the Hobbesian Commonwealth.

So that he will be free to

pursue his private interests, including the accumulation of
wealth, Hobbesian man gives up his political rights to a
sovereign who is to settle all political controversies by
fiat.

"Deprived of political rights, the individual, to

whom public and official life manifests itself in the guise
of necessity, acquires a new and increased interest in his
private life and his personal fate.

Excluded from

participation in the management of public affairs that
involve all citizens, the individual loses his rightful
place in society and his natural connection with his fellow-

^^Arendt, Origins. 140-143.
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men."

Such an anti-political tendency is a reflection of

"the bourgeoisie's instinctive distrust of and its innate
hostility to public affairs."

Carried to its logical

conclusion, however, the outcome of this hostility to the
political would be ironic for bourgeois man, since,
beginning from an inexorable drive to accumulate evermore
power and wealth, this same bourgeois man ends up as a
politically powerless subject, unable even to rise up
against an oppressor.
Arendt's point is confirmed unwittingly by the remarks
of the Nobel laureate in economics, James Buchanan.

For

Buchanan, the state is more nearly a necessary evil than the
end or perfection of man's nature.

He argues that "the

ideal society is anarchy, in which no one man or group of
men coerces another."

Man balks at being governed; each

man's ideal is a world in which he is completely and utterly
free, even to the extent that others are compelled to serve
his desires; "That is to say, each person seeks mastery over
a world of slaves."

However, a moment's reflection by the

rational actor suggests that for everyone to attempt to
attain this "ideal society" in which "each man seeks
mastery" immediately presents a problem analogous to that
faced by Hobbesian man in the "state of nature."

Therefore

the rational actor decides to pursue his "ideal society" "at
one remove," such that "the anarchistic regime of free men.
l^ibid., 141-147.
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each of whom respects the rights of others, becomes the
utopian dream."

In The Calculus of Consent. Buchanan and

his collaborator, Gordon Tullock, present a rationale for
such an "anarchistic regime," which they contend will put an
end to "feeding at the public trough" by insatiable special
interests.

In a foreword to Tullock's The Politics of

Bureaucracy. Buchanan remarks: "Tullock distinguishes,
basically, between the relationship of exchange. which he
calls the economic, and the relationship of slavery, which
he calls the political.
deliberately."

I use bold words here, but 1 do so

For Buchanan and Tullock, the political

realm represents the realm of slavery, whereas for Arendt
the political represents the realm of freedom.
Buchanan puts forward a procedure from which a
political equilibrium emerges, but he cannot establish that
this equilibrium process justifies anything.

His procedure

sounds suspiciously like the sequence that results in the
establishment of the Hobbesian sovereign out of a state of
nature; in fact, at the outset of his presentation he>
observes that "as Thomas Hobbes perceptively noted, in the
James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy
and Leviathan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 92;
Foreword to Gordon Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy
(Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965), reprinted in
Buchanan, Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral
Philosophy, compiled and with a preface by Robert D. Tollison and
Victor J. Vanberg (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University
Press, 1987), 202-03. See also Buchanan and Tullock, The
Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional
Democracy (Ann Arbor, Mich: University of Michigan Press, 1962).
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State of nature each person has a 'right' to everything."
In such a state, the distribution of "goods" will be
determined by the distribution of "physical strength,
cajolery, stealth," and "other personal qualities."
Eventually an equilibrium is reached in the form of a
"natural distribution"; employing "econo-speak," we might
say that this is a state in which the "marginal utility" of
further employment of physical strength, cajolery, and
stealth approaches zero.

Once everyone has had enough of

this predatory competition, we have arrived at "a definition
. . . from which contractual agreements become possible."
Yet, as Buchanan notes, "This cannot properly be classified
as a structure of rights."

A detractor might suggest that

this "equilibrium" resembles nothing so much as a peace
settlement imposed by the stronger of two belligerents.
Still, he claims that "It is appropriate to call this a
genuine basis for the emergence of property rights."

Such

an appeal to the justice of pure procedure involves one in
an infinite regress; at some point the justice of an
"original" distribution would have to be established, and we
have no reason to believe that Buchanan's "physical
strength, cajolery, and stealth" might not manifest itself
as far back as we could possibly look.
Buchanan and Tullock profess an attachment to anarchy
as an ideal, but to establish such an ideal may require an
Buchanan, Limits. 23-25.
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authoritarian element that they do not acknowledge.

If we

push their tenets to more of an extreme than they are
willing to, we might end up with a regime in which political
participation

plays no part, because freedom has come to be

defined as the right to undertake voluntary economic
exchange rather than to participate in collective decision
making.

Political agitation on behalf of collective action

would be interpreted as a threat to undertake "political
exploitation" and thereby to violate everyone's rights; the
authorities might feel compelled to cut off political
freedom as we understand it, in defense of their
libertarian-individualist version of freedom.

Such was the

conclusion anticipated by Arendt when she conjectured that
Hobbesian man, who is "flattered at being called a powerthirsty animal," ultimately would become "the poor meek
little fellow who has not even the right to rise against
tyranny," who "submits to any existing government and does
not even stir when his best friend falls an innocent victim
to an incomprehensible raison d'état."^^
Voeaelin on the Atrophv of the Spiritual
While Arendt interpreted the contemporary crisis in
terms of an eclipse of the political, Voegelin spoke of an
eclipse of the spiritual.

Man's humanity is to be

understood in terms of his ability to transcend the mundane

Arendt, Origins. 146.
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world.

A partial or relative transcendence might be

attainable by means of participation in one's community, but
this transcendence, valuable though it might be, points to
another, higher mode of transcendence.

To transcend the

temporal and attain an experience of an eternal, absolute
reality would constitute the fullest realization of man's
humanity, and would furthermore provide a perspective from
which principles of social and political order could be
derived.

Modern disorder may thus be understood in terms of

the loss of this experience of transcendence.
A turning point in Voegelin's career came when he
turned his attention from political ideas to spiritual
experience; henceforth, he regarded philosophy as an
experiential rather than an ideational matter.

As Eugene

Webb notes, for Voegelin "the ideational expression of
philosophy is the most superficial level of the philosophic
life."

Ideational language may sacrifice the richness of

experience for the sake of clarity.

What is required is

analogical-mythical rather than logical-propositional
language.

"Voegelin has spoken in various places of the

necessary grounding of philosophy in meditative experience"
rather than prepositional analysis, notes Webb.^®
Voegelin's intent was to recapture the substance of a
fundamental meditative experience that he believed had been

^^Eugene Webb, Eric Voeaelin; Philosopher of History
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), 8, 26.
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lost.

In order to communicate this meditative experience,

the philosopher must have recourse to svmbolic language,
without which this subject matter might prove utterly
inscrutable.

"Unless the spiritual substance of the order

within the soul can be communicated through symbols, it can
never become the ordering principle of a society," remarks
Webb.

Voegelin devoted much of his career to an exposition

of the history of symbols of transcendence in ancient
civilizations with the hope that he could thereby make
transcendental experience more accessible to modern man.

By

so doing, he believed he might be able to make a
contribution to the resolution of the contemporary
civilizational crisis.

"What may seem at times like

abstract theory is in fact the expression of an effort to
understand human concreteness and to offer an interpretation
of man and his life in society that may help him to find a
way to live less murderously with his fellows."20
Voegelin believed that contemporary tendencies toward
positivism in political science were prejudicial toward any
attempt to explore the implications of the transcendental
dimension for the political sphere.

By mimicking a natural-

science model, we end up subordinating relevance to method.
A distortion of this sort could be found in the attempt of
Max Weber to found a "value-free" social science.

Voegelin

remarked that Weber himself ended up bringing "value2°Webb, Eric Voeaelin. 30, 151.
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judgments" back into his projects in a "back-door” manner,
by rechristening them as "legitimizing

b e l i e f s . "21

A richer language than that admitted by Weber was
necessary in order to render the phenomena of politics
intelligible.

Voegelin took the matter of political

representation as an example.

In Western polities we

commonly speak of representation as an arrangement in which
a member of a legislature elected from a particular
geographic constituency is said to represent that
constituency.

However, this cannot exhaust the meaning of

representation.

If we reflect a moment we will note that

this common version of representation is effective only in a
small percentage of the nations on earth, most of which are
either in northern Europe or have their political roots in
northern European civilization.

In a state such as the

Soviet Union, representative institutions of this sort are
not effective; nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the
Soviet government effectively represents Soviet society.22
Voegelin designated representation in the sense of
correspondence of elected representatives to geographical
constituencies as elemental representation.

However, he

held that any society represents itself in an existential
sense through its governmental institutions, even if it
lacks the institutions of elemental representation.

Any

21voegelin, New Science of Politics. 1-26.
22ibid., 27-37.
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society may be said to have articulated a representative by
the very fact of producing governmental institutions.
Undoubtedly, the degree of representation attained in the
representative institutions of northern European
civilization is a great achievement; in such societies, "the
membership of the society has become politically articulate
down to the last individual, and, correspondingly, the
society becomes the representative of itself."

However,

such an achievement is the culmination of a long historical
development, the conditions for which cannot be created on
demand.

"Our own foreign policy was a factor in aggravating

international disorder through its sincere but naive
endeavor of curing the evils of the world by spreading
representative institutions in the elemental sense to areas
where the existential conditions for their functioning were
not given."2^
There can be representation in a transcendental sense
as well as an elemental or existential sense; a society may
come to understand itself as representing not just itself
but something beyond itself.

Representation in this sense

has manifested itself in the clashes between empires
throughout history.

Voegelin discusses the clash between

the Western and Mongol empires during the thirteenth
century, in which neither empire was willing to acknowledge
the legitimacy of the other; each empire saw itself as
23ibid., 27-51, esp. 40, 51.
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representing truth and the enemy as representing falsehood
and disorder.

He detected a parallel between the Mongol

empire and the contemporary Soviet Union; "Its order is in
harmony with the truth of history; its aim is the
establishment of the realm of freedom and peace; the
opponents run counter to the truth of history and will be
defeated in the end; nobody can be at war with the Soviet
Union legitimately but must be a representative of untruth
in history, or, in contemporary language, an aggressor; and
the victims are not conquered but liberated from their
oppressors and therewith from the untruth of their
existence."24
Ancient Greek philosophy represented a truth that
challenged the truth of empire.

Empires could represent

themselves, but not a truth beyond themselves ; this was
reserved to reason in Greek philosophy and to revelation in
Christian religion.

Voegelin discerns parallels of the

deepest significance between the Greek and Christian
civilizations.

Both elaborated a set of civilizational

symbols that represented a maximum of "differentiation" as
opposed to "compactness."

They both separated strictly the

truth represented by empire from that represented by reason
or revelation, as opposed to both the Roman civilization and
the modern totalitarian mass movements, which tended to
collapse the two truths.

Christianity had accomplished a

24lbid., 52-75, esp. 59.
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radical "de-divinization" of the world; only the Church, not
a political power organization, could represent the
spiritual destiny of man.

The Roman government tried to

accommodate Christianity, but the radicalism of the new
religion made it incompatible with empire in a way that
pagan religious practice was

n o t . 25

In the modern world, the experience of transcendence
underlying this "de-divinization" of the world has
atrophied, and disorder has followed.

The notion that our

ultimate fulfillment lies beyond this world lost its power
over men.

This development was accompanied by an impressive

civilizational dynamism, but Voegelin questioned whether the
benefits outweighed what had been lost, although he conceded
that "an age that began to feel its muscles would not easily
bear the Augustinian defeatism with regard to the mundane
sphere of existence."
The historical result was stupendous. The resources of
man that came to light under such pressure were in
themselves a revelation, and their application to
civilizational work produced the truly magnificent
spectacle of Western progressive society. However
fatuous the surface arguments may be, the widespread
belief that modern civilization is Civilization in a
pre-eminent sense is experientially justified; the
endowment with the meaning of salvation has made the
rise of the West, indeed, an apocalypse of civilization.
On this apocalyptic spectacle, however, falls a
shadow; for this brilliant expansion is accompanied by a
danger that grows apace with progress.
"The death of the spirit is the price of progress," Voegelin
concluded.

Civilizational progress had been accompanied by

25ibid., 70-106.
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a "re-divinization” of temporal existence.

Men began to

speculate that historical laws were pointing toward a
qualitative transformation of mundane human existence.

Such

a speculation amounted to a claim to be able to discern the
end or eidos of history, which Voegelin held to be
unknowable; he discerned in such a claim a parallel with
heretical claims to privileged spiritual knowledge which the
Church had defeated during the early history of
institutionalized Christianity.

Such is the source of the

term for which Voegelin has become so well-known, his
designation of the modern phenomenon as "modern gnosticism."
This "secular salvation" came to displace the Christian
notion of an eschatological salvation; Voegelin
characterized it as the pursuit of a fallacious
"immanentization of the eschaton."

The millennium was now

to be attained within history, not beyond it.

The

development constituted not a neo-paganism but a
secularized, immanentized version of Christianity.

Since

the temporal realization of the end of history is impossible
in principle, men were likely to become frustrated when
reality failed to conform to their expectations.

This

frustration led to evermore fanatical attempts to make
reality conform to such an intoxicating speculation,
culminating in the totalitarian excesses of the twentieth
c e n t u r y . 26

26jbid.,

107-132, esp. 119, 130-131.
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Voeaelin on Hobbes
A precursor of the modern ideological mass movements
was the fanatical Puritanism with which Hobbes was
confronted before and during the English Revolution,
typified by its culmination in a fanatical insistence that
the king be killed because this supposedly had been ordered
by God.

Voegelin acknowledged that Hobbes had been

confronted with a genuine threat to public order that
required a response, but he held that Hobbes's response
itself constituted an ideological deformation.
Voegelin remarked that Hobbes's theory had "purchased
its impressive consistency at the price of a simplification
which itself belongs in the class of gnostic misdeeds; but,
when a fierce and relentless thinker simplifies, he will
nevertheless bring a new clarity to the issue."

Hobbes

perceived that to defeat the Puritans, English society
needed a new civil theology.

This new political doctrine

employed the following argument: A "law of nature" disposes
men to live together in peace and to obey civil government.
However, to be effective, this "law of nature" must be
understood as the word of God.

Therefore, effective rule

requires the establishment of an all-powerful sovereign
whose interpretation of the law of nature shall be accepted
as definitive.

Talk of a "law of nature" put a more

pleasant gloss on a political justification based
27ibid., 133-161, esp. 152-153.
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exclusively on men's fear of violent death; subjection to
force on pain of death replaces any orientation to a higher
purpose or summum

b o n u m .28

A crucial tenet of the new civil theology is that the
sovereign shall have the authority to declare any opinion
conducive to discord untrue ipso facto.

"There will be no

freedom of debate concerning the truth of human existence in
society; public expression of opinion and doctrine must be
under regulation and permanent supervision of the
government."

The sovereign will have power "to decide who

will be allowed to speak in public to an audience, on what
subject and in what tendency," as well as to censor books.
Voegelin agrees with Arendt, then, that the subjects of the
Hobbesian Commonwealth will not enjoy a substantive
political life.

They will, however, be free to pursue any

other "peaceable, civilizational

p u r s u i t s . "29

The imperative to censor political debate extends to
man's spiritual life as well.

The sovereign's

interpretation of scripture shall be authoritative;
ultimately, scripture is to receive its authority not by
revelation but by sovereign fiat.

This must be so because

otherwise someone might conclude that his religious duties
conflicted with his duty to obey sovereign authority, thus
placing the realm in the same danger that England faced from
28jbid., 152-153, 155-156, 162, 180.
29jbid., 154-155.
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the Puritan divines.

It is this that Voegelin found most

offensive about the Hobbesian political doctrine.

In the

Hobbesian Commonwealth, Christianity would be a truth of the
state, not of the soul.

What would be required is a mankind

devoid of the experience of transcendence that might move
him to question the official account of the substance of
Christianity.

For Voegelin, Hobbes's cure for the

disruption represented by the Puritans was worse than the
disease.
"Hobbes countered the Gnostic immanentization of the
eschaton which endangered existence by a radical immanence
of existence which denied the eschaton," concluded Voegelin.
His intention in constructing a devastating psychological
portrayal of his Puritan opponents was admirable
nonetheless: "His achievements in unmasking the libido
dominandi behind the pretense of religious zeal and
reforming idealism are as solid today as they were at the
time when he wrote."

However, the symbols Hobbes elaborated

in order to defeat his opponents amounted to an ideological
distortion; his psychology and anthropology accepted as
normative a self-sufficient, power-hungry being that
classical philosophy would have diagnosed as pathological,
and his sovereign absolutism anticipated the prohibition on
political debate that would characterize totalitarian
regimes.

"The Hobbesian principle that the validity of

3°Ibid., 154-161.
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Scripture derives from governmental sanction and that its
public teaching should be supervised by the sovereign is
carried out by the Soviet government in the reduction of
communism to the 'party

line,

Perspectives on Hobbes; Arendt
and Voeaelin Compared
A recent contribution in political philosophy mentions
an imperative "to prevent men, particularly the philosophers
themselves, the politicians, and the theologians, from
making politics and those disciplines that are related to it
in the classics, especially economics, into a 'substitute
metaphysics,' that is, into a full explanation in their own
terms, of all that is."

We are told next that "to argue

that politics in particular is a prime, perhaps the prime
candidate for this dangerous role, to be sure, need not
constitute an attack on or an undermining of politics as
such."

We might wonder whether this latter statement

represents a mere statement of fact or an expression of a
fervent hope.

A standard interpretation might be that

Arendt is concerned with a contemporary "undermining of
politics as such," while Voegelin's intent is to prevent
politics from assuming a "dangerous role."

Arendt opposes

Hobbes because he undermines politics, while Voegelin

31lbid., 178-180, 184-187.
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criticizes him for usurping the spiritual on behalf of the
political.

Are these two intentions reconcilable? 32

Both Arendt and Voegelin upheld the memory of the
"Golden Age" of Periclean Athens as a standard to which
politics ought to conform as nearly as possible.

For

Arendt, the Athenian polis represented the finest expression
of genuine human action.

According to a recent commentator,

"Western history preserves the clear memory of at least one
community of men who, for a brief moment, prized the web of
human relationships— frail, frustrating, and paradox-ridden
as it is— so highly that it can almost be said they lived
for it alone."

Athenian man "sailed forth into the polis to

act and speak in the company of his true peers. . . . Here
alone did the opportunity to reveal his individuality, to
distinguish himself from all others, fully present
itself."33
In Arendt's conception, political activity is to have
both intrinsic and extrinsic significance.

She spoke

severely of those who would make politics into a mere means
to some higher end, including those who conceived of the end
of politics as the protection of the philosophers from their
"vulgar" fellows.

Her severity concerning Plato is

32james V. Schall, Reason. Revelation, and the Foundations
of Political Philosophy (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State
University Press, 1987), 225.
33Peter Fuss, "Hannah Arendt's Conception of Political
Community," in Melvyn A. Hill, ed., Hannah Arendt: The Recovery
of the Public World (New York: St. Martin's, 1979), 167.
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instructive, especially in contrast to the regard in which
Voegelin held him.
Escape from the frailty of human affairs into the
solidity of quiet and order has in fact so much to
recommend it that the greater part of political
philosophy since Plato could easily be interpreted as
various attempts to find theoretical foundations and
practical ways for an escape from politics altogether.
The hallmark of all such escapes is the concept of rule,
that is, the notion that men can lawfully and
politically live together only when some are entitled to
command and the others forced to obey. . . . It is a
common error to interpret Plato as though he wanted to
abolish the family and the household; he wanted, on the
contrary, to extend this type of life until one family
embraced every citizen.
Arendt thus opposes conceptions of politics which depend on
a strict separation of ruler from ruled (among which we
might count the Hobbesian Commonwealth).

Such conceptions

present an analogy between politics and fabrication
(Ar&rdt's "work”), rather than genuine human action.

"The

substitution of making for acting and the concomitant
degradation of politics into a means to obtain an allegedly
'higher' end— in antiquity the protection of the good men
from the rule of the bad in general, and the safety of the
philosopher in particular, in the Middle Ages the salvation
of souls, in the modern age the productivity and progress of
society— is as old as the tradition of political
philosophy."

To secure the acceptance of such an

arrangement, the rulers must propagate "the well-entrenched
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notions that politics need not be everyone's concern, and
that it is a necessary evil or even a dirty business.
Arendt detected in the American founding generation a
conception of the intrinsic worth of politics that was more
appropriate than that which she attributed to Plato.

The

Americans, she argued, sought something beyond what they had
known as the "rights and liberties of Englishmen."
This freedom they called later, when they had come to
taste it, "public happiness," and it consisted in the
citizen's right of access to the public realm, in his
share in public power— to be "a participator in the
government of affairs" in Jefferson's telling phrase—
as distinct from the generally recognized right of
subjects to be protected by the government in the
pursuit of private happiness. . . . The very fact that
the word "happiness" was chosen in laying claim to a
share in public power indicates strongly that there
existed in the country, prior to the revolution, such a
thing as "public happiness," and that men knew that they
could not be altogether "happy" if their happiness was
located and enjoyed only in private life.
Unfortunately, Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence
spoke of the "pursuit of happiness" in such a way that this
happiness could be understood as entirely private,
contributing to the construction of what the world has come
to know as "a specifically American ideology."
Nevertheless, Arendt's judgement was that this talk of
private happiness carried little weight.

More decisive were

the remarks of Jefferson late in his life in a letter to
John Adams, during a period in which they had begun to

^^Arendt, The Human Condition. 220-23, 229-30; Fuss,
"Hannah Arendt's Conception," in Hill, ed., The Recovery of
the Public World. 171.
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address, at least half-seriously, the possibility of an
afterlife.

"May we meet there again, in Congress, with our

antient Colleagues, and receive with them the seal of
approbation 'Well done, good and faithful servants,"' wrote
Jefferson.

Arendt remarks, "Here, behind the irony, we have

the candid admission that life in Congress, the joys of
discourse, of legislation, of transacting business, of
persuading and being persuaded, were to Jefferson . . .
foretaste of an eternal bliss to come. . . .

a

It is the

applause, the demonstration of acclaim, 'the esteem of the
world' of which Jefferson in another context says that there
had been a time when it 'was of higher value in my eye than
everything in it.
As does Arendt, Voegelin speaks in glowing terms of the
"Golden Age" of Periclean Athens.

However, he speaks not so

much of the Athens of the polis as of what he calls "the
Athens of Marathon and the tragedy."

In his discussion of

the Suppliants of Aeschylus, for instance, he treats the
tragedy as capturing the essence of Athenian politics.

The

ruler, confronted with a tragic choice, addresses the
citizens in an attempt to come to a decision together with
them, in conformity with a standard higher than (for
example) a utilitarian calculation of losses and gains.
"The Peitho, the persuasion of the king, forms the souls of
^^Arendt, On Revolution. 123-128. References are to
Jefferson's letter to Joseph C. Cabell of February 2, 1816; to
John Adams, April 11, 1823; and to James Madison, June 9, 1793.
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his listeners, who are willing to let themselves be formed,
and makes the Dike of Zeus prevail against passion, so that
the mature decision represents the truth of the God.”
Political persuasion conducted at this level includes an
element of conversion or movement of the soul that Voegelin
might argue is missing from Arendt's account of the activity
of the polis.

If people's souls are in such a condition

that they are not even susceptible to such a conversion,
then politics will take on the character of "splitting the
difference" between passionate, irreconcilable interests
rather than a reciprocal persuasive engagement involving
men's souls and intellects.^®
Voegelin's discussion of the Athenian tragedy
represents one of his most affirmative statements about the
value of the political.

However, contemporary politics did

not live up to the standards of the Athenian polis in his
view.

He appeared disgusted by most of what passed for

political practice in the twentieth century.

Instead of an

engagement of men's intellects and souls, politics had
degenerated into a passionate contest of interests, or, even
worse, a fanatical expression of "modern gnosticism."

In an

earlier time, a proper civilizational symbolization gave men
a sense of perspective with respect to the political and
kept them from getting carried away with eschatological
Voegelin, New Science of Politics. 70-73. See also
Voegelin, The World of the Polis. vol. 2 of Order and History
(Baton Rouge, La., 1957), 243-253.
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political projects.

Political action had now become a

surrogate for the spiritual life in the souls of some men.
He spoke of a "volitional gnosis" which assumed "the form of
activist redemption of man and society, as in the instance
of revolutionary activists like Comte, Marx, or Hitler."37
Such a perspective on political action represents a
potential danger.

Voegelin's (and Arendt's) criticism of

the Hobbesian commonwealth for its alleged summary cutoff of
political discussion has been discussed above.

This

criticism may afford us with a helpful perspective from
which to consider Voegelin's attitude toward political
reform.

Recall, for instance, his praise of Hobbes's

psychological analysis of the Puritan divines.

"Under the

impression of the Puritan Revolution one of the greatest
psychologists of all times laid down the rule that men who
are moved by their religious conscience to civil war . . .
are guilty of pride, of superbia in the Augustinian sense,
to the point of madness. . . .

A conscience may be good in

the moral sense and nevertheless thoroughly evil in the
spiritual sense, as Hobbes's predecessor in this question,
Richard Hooker, had already shown in his acid portrait of
the Puritan, in the Preface to his Ecclesiastical Politv."
From this psychological portrait of the Puritan, Voegelin
appeared to generalize to the case of any contemporary
reformer.

His attitude suggested a summary cutoff of

37voegelin, New Science of Politics. 124.
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political discussion in the Hobbesian sense.

No proposal

for political reform can be taken at face value, because we
are somehow entitled to assume that any reformer must
exhibit the same psychological deformation as a Puritan
revolutionary; discussion of reform proposals on their
merits are to be bypassed in favor of an ad hominem attack
to be directed against any reformer.

Here we are confronted

with the question of Voegelin's partisanship and the
identification of him as an opponent of the party of reform
on behalf of the conservative party; his students object
vociferously to the characterization of his thought as
partisan.

Suffice it to say that Voegelin may not have made

himself sufficiently clear on this point.

As Webb remarks,

"Voegelin has left comparatively undeveloped the area of
practical political implications."^®
This much said, it may be conceded that men indeed have
made religions out of their political doctrines, and that a
proper politics requires an element of restraint and
sobriety that have been missing for much of the twentieth
century.

Arendt herself assented to this in an exchange

with Hans Jonas, who was an associate of Voegelin also.
Jonas; I share with Hannah Arendt the position that
we are not in possession of any ultimates, either by
knowledge or by conviction or faith. And I also believe
that we cannot have this as a command performance

®®Voegelin, "The Oxford Political Philosophers,"
Philosophical Quarterly 3 (April 1953): 106; Webb, Eric Voegelin.
274.
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because "we need it so bitterly therefore should have
it."
However, a part of wisdom is knowledge of ignorance.
The Socratic attitude is to know that one does not know.
And this realization of our ignorance can be of great
practical importance in the exercise of the power of
judgment, which is after all related to action in the
political sphere, into future action, and far-reaching
action.
Our enterprises have an eschatological tendency in
them— a built-in utopianism, namely, to move towards
ultimate situations. Lacking the knowledge of ultimate
values— or, of what is ultimately desirable— or, of what
man is so that the world can be fitting for man, we
should at least abstain from allowing eschatological
situations to come about. This alone is a very
important practical injunction that we can draw from the
insight that only with some conception of ultimates are
we entitled to embark on certain things. So that at
least as a restraining force the point of view I brought
in may be of some relevance.
Arendt: With this I would

a g r e e . ^9

Postscript! The Voeoelin-Arendt Exchange of 1953
A comparison and contrast of Arendt and Voegelin would
be incomplete without mention of the exchange prompted by
his 1953 review of her The Origins of Totalitarianism.
Despite his admiration for the work as a whole, he professed
astonishment at her remark that in totalitarianism "human
nature itself is at stake."

To make such a concession was

to imply that a change in human nature was indeed possible.
That assumption meant that "the author, in fact, adopts the
immanentist ideology; . . . These sentences . . . reflect a

^^Arendt, "On Hannah Arendt," in Hill, ed., The Recovery of
the Public World, pp. 314-315.
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typically liberal, progressive, pragmatist attitude toward
philosophical problems."^0
Arendt did not dogmatically rule out the possibility of
an unchanging human nature, but she held that if there is
such a nature, man could not know what it is; only a god
could know such a thing.

She might say that for man to

attempt to know his own nature would be hubristic.

As she

wrote in The Human Condition. "It is highly unlikely that
we, who can know, determine, and define the natural essences
of all things surrounding us, which we are not, should ever
be able to do the same for ourselves— this would be like
jumping over our own shadows."

Her biographer comments that

"Voegelin thought that Arendt's viewpoint was disturbingly
secular, but, in fact, it was respectfully and
nondoctrinally religious."41
Arendt objected to Voegelin's procedure— which seemed
to her a kind of petitio princinii— of treating "'phenomenal
differences'— which to me as differences of factuality are
all-important— as minor outgrowths of some 'essential
sameness' of a doctrinal nature."

She viewed such doctrines

as ideological: "Ideologies always assume that one idea is
40voegelin, review of Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism,
with "Reply" by Arendt and "Concluding Remark" by Voegelin,
Review of Politics 15(1953): 68-85. The remark of Arendt in
question is found in Origins. 459.
4^Arendt, The Human Condition. 10; Elisabeth Young-Bruehl,
Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1982), 254.
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sx-fficient to explain everything in the development from the
premise, and that no experience can teach anything because
everything is comprehended in this consistent process of
logical deduction.”

Against Voegelin's insistence that

totalitarianism and liberalism may "prove to be closely
related on the level of essence,” she held that her own
approach was more properly empirical.

To present a brief

that liberalism was somehow culpable for totalitarian crimes
was to ignore the unique horror of totalitarianism.
"Numerous affinities between totalitarianism and some other
trends in Occidental political or intellectual history have
been described with this result, in my opinion: they all
failed to point out the distinct quality of what was
actually

h a p p e n i n g . ”^2

Arendt was not a "gushing optimist" about the
possibilities of a changed and improved human nature;
rather, she was afraid that the totalitarians would succeed
in their project which threatened as it did those capacities
which she held to be central to the human condition as she
understood it.

Her painstaking evaluation of the available

evidence about life in the concentration camps, included in
the closing chapters of the Origins. convinced her that they
presented a danger of a "change in human nature" in the
sense of "a change in human conditions radical enough to

42Arendt, "Reply," 80, and Origins. 470; Voegelin,
"Concluding Remark," 85.
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make impossible the exercise of capabilities observable
under other, less radical conditions . . . the destruction
of any possibility for those capabilities to appear."

For

such a change to take place, "the world would have to be a
concentration camp."

We might ask, along with Arendt: Were

the appearance of these tendencies in the camps just minor
"phenomenal differences"?

Furthermore, if the whole world

were to be changed into a concentration camp, would nothing
essential be changed?^^
This exchange illustrates the distinctive Platonic
essentialism of Voegelin as opposed to the Aristotelian
empiricism of Arendt (at least from the perspective of a
"standard" interpretation that Voegelin might reject).
According to Barker, a paradigmatic example of this contrast
is the matter of the relation of the universal to the
particular, or "the problem of the one and the many."
Barker asks, "Shall the one be destructive of the individual
existence of the many, or shall the many retain that
existence, while yet sharing in a common existence which
'blends, transcends, them all'?"

His view is that Aristotle

opts for the latter alternative.

"In metaphysics, he holds,

the one does not exist above and beyond the many: it is in
and among, in the sense that it is predicable of, all its
individual constituents."

That this contrast was evident to

Arendt may be shown by her comment that "I think that what
^^Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt. 254.
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separates my approach from Professor Voegelin's is that I
proceed from facts and events instead of intellectual
affinities and influences . . . [there may be such
affinities and influences,] but such affinities would only
mean that one has to draw even sharper distinctions because
of the fact that liberals are not totalitarians."44

^^Ernest Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and
Aristotle (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), 232; Arendt, "A
Reply," 80.
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CHAPTER 7: THOMAS SPRAGENS— HOBBESIANISM
AND SCIENTISTIC POLITICS
Thomas Spragens, a political theorist of a newer
generation than those discussed hitherto, is a party to the
same argument about the nature of modernity as theorists of
the era represented by Strauss, Macpherson, Oakeshott,
Arendt, and Voegelin.

He describes his most comprehensive

work. The Irony of Liberal Reason, as "principally a work of
synthesis and interpretation."

The breadth and depth of his

learning qualify him to attempt to adjudicate among the
disparate interpretations of the contemporary crisis that
are on offer.

"I owe a large debt to others who have given

us their thoughtful and provocative interpretations of the
general problems that have concerned me," he notes; among
these interpreters he includes Strauss, Voegelin, Robert
Nisbet, Reinhold Niebuhr, Jürgen Habermas, and Michael
Polanyi.^

He also offers an exhaustive and provocative

interpretation of Hobbes, to whom he attributes a central
place in the sequence of developments that have led to the
civilizational impasse of the late twentieth century.
Spragens has been concerned with broad questions of
theoretical approach in political science and practice,
especially with respect to the intellectual transformation
associated with the "scientific revolution."

He argues that

in the wake of this intellectual transformation, the social
^Spragens, The Ironv of Liberal Reason, xi-xii.
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sciences have adopted a natural-science model as
paradigmatic for all inquiry, leading to a theoretically
impoverished political science and a "technocratic”
political practice that belies the humane claims of
liberalism.
Spragens holds that the contribution of Hobbes was
central to the reductionistic turn in modern political
thought.

Actually, Spragens speaks as though Aristotle is

implicated as well in this development.

Both Hobbes and

Aristotle accepted to some extent a "scientistic"
epistemology in which scientific rigor is taken as the goal
of all inquiry.

According to Spragens, Hobbes's political

theory preserves an Aristotelian form, but alters the
content.

Hobbes substitutes motion for Aristotelian inertia

as a physical analogue for the political.

For Aristotle,

rest or inertia represented the end of motion; motion, not
inertia, required explanation.

Political activity, like

physical motion, is presumed to be directed toward an end or
telos.

Hobbes's physics posits "motion without end," rather

than inertia, as paradigmatic for the physical world;
similarly, his political thought removes any notion of
teleology or purpose.

Such is the framework in which

Spragens operates in his analysis of Hobbes's thought. The
Politics of Motion.

This chapter will explore Spragens's

analysis of the scientistic corruption of liberal politics.
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including his treatment of the thought of Hobbes as both
exemplar of and contributor to this development.
Politics. Epistemoloov. and Liberal Rationalism
The makers of the "scientific revolution," in
developing the techniques that have so vastly revolutionized
our understanding of the natural world, made certain tacit
assumptions about what constituted reliable knowledge.

The

achievements of modern science were so impressive that these
standards of reliability were taken as the norm for all
forms of intellectual inquiry.

What could not be known with

scientistic precision was held not to be knowable.

Spragens

contends that these assumptions are fatal to moral inquiry,
including political theory, which differs qualitatively from
the disciplines of the natural sciences.
Spragens detects two conceptions of value (a kind of
"cover term" including but not limited to moral, ethical,
and political knowledge) within the liberal rationalism that
has developed in the wake of the scientific revolution.

One

is "value noncognitivism," which simply holds that there is
no such thing as knowledge of value, or at least that no
such knowledge is accessible to human reason.

A common

version of value noncognitivism is "emotivism," the view
that value statements represent nothing more than visceral
emotional reactions that are not susceptible to rational
justification.

An alternative to value noncognitivism is

the "technocratic" conception, which admits rational
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principles of value but reduces them to technical knowledge
accessible only to a cadre of "technocrats" who are adept at
the techniques of critical reason.

Liberal rationalism

therefore renders knowledge of principles of value either
utterly inaccessible or accessible only to an elite.

Both

these versions of liberal rationalism are based on
"unrealistic premises about the possibilities of human
knowledge," Spragens

argues.2

The success of the new science cut short any reflection
about the unreality of the premises of the paradigm of
liberal reason.

Thinkers as disparate as Locke and

Descartes adopted the new program.

Despite the usual

distinction between Locke's empiricism and the rationalism
of Descartes, Spragens contends that the two thinkers shared
several fundamental assumptions.

The search for knowledge

was to begin with a "clean slate"; the traditions of
scholasticism are to be replaced with distinct, indubitable
foundations for knowledge.

A mathematical mode of inquiry,

stipulating precise rules of method, is to be the norm
across all disciplines.
verifiable and explicit.

Genuine knowledge is that which is
Such knowledge could only be a

boon to mankind; the new paradigm would help to inaugurate a
vast expansion of human powers and a new era of untold
progress.^
^Spragens, Ironv. 15.
3lbid, 22-23.
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Hobbes would find it convenient to adopt the program of
liberal rationalism.

It represented a weapon that he could

employ against the Aristotelian-scholastic "pseudoexplanations” to which he was so vehemently opposed, which
were of a kind with the speculations of the Puritan divines
who represented such a threat to the English constitutional
order during his lifetime.

The new version of reason

represented a weapon against religious enthusiasm; reason
would never again be subjugated by authority.

A

mathematical-geometrical model of knowledge would help to
break the "spell of words" cast by the religious
enthusiasts.

Concomitantly, any discipline that was

incapable of producing unambiguous, precise definitions fell
into disrepute.

A monistic model was adopted to cover all

inquiry; poetry and imagination came to be identified with
superstition and prejudice and were shunted aside.^
An alternative interpretation would be that Hobbes did
not seize the new paradigm with enthusiasm, but was simply
attempting to come to grips with the implications of the
assumptions that had come to be accepted by the European
intellectual elite.

Spragens remarks that Hobbes "saw quite

early that acceptance of the new philosophy made morality
and politics problematic; it required establishing a
conception of human order on a thoroughgoing nominalist and
materialist footing."

Nevertheless, Hobbes's contemporaries

^Ibid., 23-30.
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reacted to his initiatives with revulsion.

"His ideas were

universally reviled from the pulpit and almost uniformly
rebutted by academicians.

The hunting of Leviathan became a

popular late-seventeenth-century British preoccupation."
The more observant of his contemporaries realized that
Hobbes was not trying to be merely eccentric or provocative;
he was trying to face the genuine intellectual challenges
which confronted European civilization.

"If Hobbes's answer

was not persuasive, the questions he had confronted could
not be shunted aside so easily.
Other liberal reformers were not as perceptive about
the difficulties as Hobbes may have been, persisting as they
did in the pursuit of secure foundations for knowledge.
Locke, for instance, pushed forward with the construction of
a reductionistic ontology of simple primary quantities, as
opposed to a theory of Platonic essences or Aristotelian
forms.

"Sensations could no longer be 'of substances, for

there were none.

Sensations could, therefore, only be

impressions of corpuscular 'data,' since that was all there
was out there for them to register."

Genuine knowledge is

to be understood as knowledge of these "simples," which
define the limits of the knowable.

There is no knowledge

other than knowledge of these "simples"; the theory of
"simples" establishes a clear and distinct boundary between
the knowable and the unknowable.

Spragens remarks that this

^Ibid., 198.
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is "a conception remarkably different from the real,
concrete, experience of everyday life, but it is
nevertheless presented as what, at bottom,

'experience'

really is. . . . It is not a description of experience; it
is instead a description of what experience must be, given
the corpuscular construction of the world.”®
The liberal reformers seemed to think that the new
epistemology and the accompanying reductionist ontology
would engender a "moral science" that would reinforce and
validate traditional standards.

What really happened was

the appearance of a full-fledged reductionism that would
threaten these very standards.

Hobbes attempted to put

forward a relatively modest version of the new moral
science.

Given human self-interest, all that was necessary

was foresight of consequences.

Knowledge of consequences

would enlighten those in power, who could use the new
knowledge on behalf of the existing order.

Such was the

substance of the "politically conservative liberalism" that
Spragens attributes to Bacon, Locke, and Descartes as well
as to Hobbes.^
This "politically conservative liberalism" was not the
only political doctrine that could follow from the new moral
science, however.
possibilities.

Spragens identifies at least three other

One would be the "democratic natural-right

®Ibid., 209.
■7jbid., 66-76.
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liberalism" of Concordet, Jefferson, or Paine.

Here, the

source of political improvement was to be not merely an
enlightened ruling class but an enlightened public opinion,
filtered through the institutions of representative
government.

Another version might be the "natural-

reconciliation-of-interests liberalism" of an Adam Smith,
although in Smith's own thought it appears that social order
is to be generated from man's "moral sense" as well as from
natural equilibrating forces.

Finally there is the

"artificial-reconciliation-of-interests liberalism"
represented by the intricately balanced governmental
institutions constructed by Madison in the Federalist
Papers, in which institutional artifice is to generate the
general interest out of the confluence of private interests.
Spragens contends that this artificial reconciliation could
take a more sinister, less limited form; if the new science
promises us the domination of nature for the sake of
progress, why could not human nature itself be included
within the nature to be dominated?

The result might be a

politics of domination that could be tyrannical as well as
beneficent.

"For the beneficent and scientific legislator,

human nature should present no more of an obstacle to the
construction of the good society than would any other part
of the cosmic mechanism.

His knowledge would enable him to
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divine the requisites of social order and to shape men
accordingly."®
Hobbes and Liberal Empiricism;
The Politics of Motion
Spragens suggests that Hobbes's "politically
conservative liberalism" may not be sustainable.

Others,

working from the same assumptions as does Hobbes, might
produce a politics of domination and manipulation.

Spragens

holds that Hobbes made a crucial contribution to the
development of a political paradigm that inclines
contemporary polities toward just such manipulation and
domination.

An elaboration of the sources and implications

of Hobbes's assumptions was Spragens's intent in The
Politics of Motion.
Spragens insists on a consideration of Hobbes's thought
as a coherent whole.

He breaks with the thesis of Taylor

and Warrender, which holds that Hobbes's political thought
and his cosmology are independent of each other.

He argues

that this Tay1or/Warrender thesis "involves a laborious
separation of what Hobbes equally laboriously strove to
reconcile, namely, his psychological postulates and his
account of the origin of political obligation."

Spragens's

view is that Hobbes's attraction to modern science
influenced his political philosophy, although "the impact of

®Ibid., 76-90.
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Hobbes's natural philosophy upon his political philosophy is
not the product of purely deductive derivation."®
Spragens emphasizes Hobbes's obsession with the problem
of motion.

Hobbes reacted against the Aristotelian

conception of motion as a synapse from potential to actual.
Aristotle assumes that an object's natural state is one of
rest; rest or inertia represents the end, fulfillment, or
final cause of motion.

It is a teleological conception of

motion in which motion is held to seek its end in a state of
rest.

Hobbes in his theory of motion would eliminate this

element of tension between the potential and the actual.
Aristotle presents a universe of beings (including both
physical and human phenomena) who desire to become what they
essentially are.

In the physical world, it is movement that

requires explanation; movement is expected to terminate
itself in a state of rest or inertia.

However, the account

of the motion of projectiles proved to be the "Achilles'
heel" of this Aristotelian physics.

The modern physics

initiated by Galileo proved to be its downfall.

"This

impressive conceptual framework concerning the phenomenon of
motion was totally abandoned as a piece of unintelligible

®Spragens, The Politics of Motion; The World of Thomas
Hobbes (Lexington, Ky.: The University Press of Kentucky, 1973),
31, 37.
^Ogpragens, Motion. 57.
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and obscurantist nonsense by the principal thinkers of the
seventeenth century," remarks Spragens.
Hobbes followed Aristotle in making motion the key to
reality, but he broke with Aristotle in disposing with rest
or inertia as the end of motion, making motion the whole of
reality.

Where Aristotle turned to biological growth,

Hobbes adopted a geometric model as the paradigm of motion.
Teleology disappears; final and formal causality are
abandoned in favor of efficient causes only.

We are left

with a "rest-less" world in which motion lacks an end.

In

this monism of motion, life is taken to be nothing but
motion, which tends to persist; life's motion lacks any
telos other than striving to persist.

Will, intellect, and

emotions are all held to be reducible to motion; even
knowledge and the intellectual faculties are understood as,
at bottom, nothing but motion.

Motion admits of no

qualitative distinctions; it is nothing but a vector,
lacking form or substance.
Not only did Hobbes replace inertia with pure motion,
he also substituted mere bodv for the Aristotelian concept
of substance or ousia.

Aristotle's ousia is a broad concept

designating that which makes something what it is.

On this

basis, Aristotle constructs what might be taken as an
incipiently materialistic world of "nesses."

His procedure

lllbid., 59-61.
12ibid., 63-71.
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is to anthropomorphize the physical.

Hobbes reverses this,

physicalizing the human realm at the expense of politics.
Once the Aristotelian conception of movement is lost,
substance is converted into the "empty vehicle" of body.

A

world of undifferentiated body is a world of Hobbesian
nominalism, in which definitions lose their explanatory
function.

Order is now to come from motion, not

substance.
The Hobbesian universe overthrows the Aristotelian
sense of the orderliness and coherence of nature.

Lost is

any sense of man as having a social nature that could serve
as a source of obligation; also lost is any sense of the
polity as prior to the individual in the sense of being the
individual's final cause, completion, or fulfillment.
Nature is characterized by enmity, not sociability; ruthless
egocentrism is understood to be natural.

Simple,

dissociated components, rather than a state of fulfillment
or coherence, are taken as the starting points for reasoning
about politics.
Although Spragens disagrees with Macpherson in holding
that a certain degree of "power-lust" is part of human
nature, rather than being specific to capitalist society, he
agrees that Hobbes's "natural man" is an abstraction from
civilized man as Hobbes knew him; Hobbes arrives at his
l^ibid., 77-92.
l^ibid., 97-106.
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state of nature by speculating about how a society of
typical seventeenth-century men would behave if political
authority were suddenly removed.

In general, for Hobbes we

arrive at nature by performing an act of analytical
dissolution on the whole, "resolving" the whole into its
fundamental components.

The whole is not natural; nature is

intrinsically dissociated.
Spragens acknowledges the importance of Macpherson's
insight into Hobbes's "disassociationism" with respect to
its implications for the political.

Hobbes can speak of

"meer nature," which, as Spragens notes, would have been
unthinkable to the Aristotelian tradition.

If nature is

essentially dissociated rather than holistic, then it cannot
be the source of ethical or political injunctions.

Order

will have to be a wholly artificial creation of the
sovereign.

Ethical statements will be understood only as

expressions of will or preference.

As Spragens notes, "The

ramifications of this position extend into Hobbes's
doctrines in the area of political economy and economic
justice."
Viewing economic activity as only one aspect of a
broader human order, the Aristotelian tradition placed
certain limitations upon it which followed from the
larger order. The demands of economic justice were
expressions of the belief that commerce must be
integrated into a wider framework of human nature, and
these demands had been elaborated in theories of just
price, commutative justice, and distributive justice.
Here, as elsewhere, however, the concept of justice is
l^ibid., 106-107.
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an ontological one, and Hobbes's destruction of the
classical ontology leaves him no basis for these
traditional theories of economic justice. Hobbes
therefore concludes, again quite logically from his
premises, that the only criterion of value is
•appetite,' and hence there is no distinction between
value and market price.
When the tenets of laissez-faire capitalism were pushed to
their logical conclusion, an anguished response was provoked
in the form of the Marxian theory, Spragens argues.
"Marxian economics . . .

is actually a systematic

restitution of economics to a contingent place within the
entire human economy and has a root affinity with the
classical concepts of just price and distributive justice."
Hobbes's premises left no basis for the limitations on
economic activity that Western polities had inherited from
the Aristotelian tradition.

Whereas the Marxian system "was

normative in the classical sense, that is, anchored in a
humanized ontology," Hobbes's position represented "a
complete relinquishing of moral control over the market.
Rather than being a contingent facet of human social life,
economic relations become the autonomous standard to which
all other facets of political order must conform.
^^Ibid., 107-111. On the relation between Marx and
Aristotle, see also Richard W. Miller, "Marx and Aristotle: A
Kind of Consequentialism," in Kai Nielsen and Steven C. Patten,
eds., Marx and Morality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Supplementary Volume VII, 1981, 323-352; Arendt, The Human
Condition. 254, n. ("Incidentally, the influence of Aristotle on
the style of Marx's thought seems to me almost as characteristic
and decisive as the influence of Hegel's philosophy"); and George
Grant, Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism,
Carleton Library No. 50 (Ottawa, Canada: Carleton University
Press, 1982), 56 ("Marx is not purely a philosopher of the age of
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We might conclude, then, that Aristotle would have been
repulsed by Hobbes's conclusions regarding the relation of
the economic to the political.

According to Spragens,

however, there are some aspects of Aristotle's thought that
leave his system susceptible to reversals of content at
certain crucial points, allowing Hobbes to draw the
conclusions he does.

Both Aristotle and Hobbes are

antidualistic thinkers, insisting on the unity of the world.
Both conceive the world as a universe. conferring no special
status on man.

Furthermore, they both agree that science

should aim at certain, demonstrable knowledge.

Both seek

definitions, but they disagree on the nature of the
definitions.^^
Aristotle is a realist who believes that the universe
is susceptible to real definitions.
realism with nominalism.
explications of names.

Hobbes replaces this

There are no essences, just
Aristotle deals in the induction of

natural essences; Hobbes, in the resolution of nature into
its smallest components.

To arrive at a natural state, we

first resolve it into its components, then recompose it into
an artificial whole.

The resolutive-compositional procedure

puts Hobbesian science in a better position to claim
precision than does the approach of Aristotle.

"That is.

progress; he is rooted in the teleological philosophy that
predates the age of progress").
^^Spragens, Motion. 129-139.
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for Hobbes, unlike for Aristotle, political science is a
theoretical science— a form of knowledge which can be
precise because it deals with necessary truths."

Hobbesian

science yields pleasures which are not purely intrinsic; it
is oriented toward action— action that will help the
sovereign ruler to manipulate the realm so that violent
disorder may be avoided.^®
In sum, Spragens's view is that Hobbes preserved an
Aristotelian form, but reversed the substance of Aristotle's
theory at certain crucial points.
that nature is an integrated whole.

Both thinkers insisted
Furthermore, both of

them adopted the "externalizing" perspective of modern
science to some extent, with the scientist as a detached
outsider looking down upon nature.
their starting point.

Both took motion as

However, whereas Aristotle's motion

was analogous to biological growth, Hobbes employed the
analogy of a mere vector, a quantity rather than a quality,
tending only to persist rather than to grow.

While the

circle was the symbol of the Aristotelian universe, for
Hobbes the symbol was a line.

The Hobbesian model of

motion, taken as an analogy for politics, led to the
rejection of any intelligible end or summum bonum.

Lacking

an intelligible fulfillment or completion, politics becomes
concerned with passion rather than reason.

Men are taken to

be naturally antisocial rather than social; they act
l®Ibid., 139-158.
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politically to avoid meeting their natural end, that of
violent death.

In a state of irremediable anxiety, men must

seek an excess of power to stay ahead of others.

Politics

consists of the management of passion; ironically, passion
leads men toward disaster, up to a point at which a latent
passion (fear of violent death) is awakened, bringing
salvation.
How Liberal Reason Corrupts Politics
According to Spragens, this Hobbesian reversal of the
substance of Aristotelianism constituted a philosophical
reductionism that set the stage for a vulgarization of
politics.

Instead of understanding the political on the

basis of an Aristotelian analogy with biological growth and
development, Hobbes presents a mechanistic model for
politics.

The political mechanism could be understood as a

self-regulating machine that operates according to its own
law, or, in a potentially sinister interpretation, as a
machine to be manipulated from outside itself.

This

manipulative model for politics opens the possibility of a
"technocratic” politics of "social engineering.
For instance, in Locke's doctrine of sensationalism we
have a close analogy to a Hobbesian universe of "mere" body
rather than Aristotelian substance.

The mind at birth is to

l^Ibid., 163-197 and 203-204.
20spragens, Irony. 91-93.
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be understood as a "white paper," its content determined
strictly by the sensations it receives.

Aristotle also

suggests the analogy of the tabula rasa, but for him the
mind at least contains a potentiality that awaits
actualization; at least there were limits to the ways in
which this potentiality could be actualized.

The moderns

understood the emptiness of the mind as constituting utter
plasticity.

Locke was not able to carry this line of

thought through to its logical conclusion.

Spragens notes

that he leaves a "ten percent residual category" of men who
were "self-made" rather than being completely the products
of their environment.
The modern version of the mind-as-tabula rasa theory
was a development concomitant with the modern reversal of
the Aristotelian concept of nature.

Where Aristotle

understood the nature of something to be its end in the
sense of a final cause, the moderns associated nature with
origin or beginning.

Sensationalist or other reductionist

doctrines of mind merely involved emptying the mind's
origins of all content.

When Hobbes and Locke traced the

origins of political man to a state of nature, the
inhabitants of this natural state were still recognizably
human, but by the time the process they initiated was

21ibid.,

94-101.
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complete, man's nature was understood as nothing more than
the mere capacity to receive sensation.22
Sensationalist conceptions of mind notwithstanding, it
would be argued that some people were capable of breaking
out of the deterministic circle suggested by the new
theories.

While most men might be mere "objects" who

inhabit the realm of necessity, those in possession of the
knowledge provided by the new sciences were "subjects" who
could attain the realm of freedom.

Spragens suggests that

this development amounts to "the fashioning by a wellintentioned power-seeking intellectual class of their own
legitimacy myth."

When enthusiasts of the new sciences

claim that "we" can put science in the service of human
progress, they may only be revealing their ignorance of what
Spragens calls the "'we, who?' problem" of "technocratic"
politics.
Who is this "man" who is nothing more than the product
of his education?" And who, then, is the producer? Who
are the "they" whose hands will hold "the instrument of
their greatness and felicity"? Who are the "we" who
"may learn how to cherish and improve" some passions and
a i f e e Lions while "checking and rooting out" others?
Who, in short, are the educators and who the educated?
Who are the knowers and who are the known? Who controls
and who is controlled?
Although the solution to these problems is rarely
clear (since it remains cloaked in the rhetoric of "man
making himself"), it seems clear that we are not really
talking about the same people in each case. Instead,
one "class" of man is envisaged as educating or
improving another "class." And this difference provides
the escape from fatalism.

22ibid., 101-104.
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The possessor of positive science becomes the "ideal
legislator" whose task it is to fabricate the good political
order.

"Rousseau stated the qualifications of the

technocratic Legislator; Helvetius declared them attainable;
and Bentham applied for the job," remarks Spragens.

He

argues that this "technocrat" represents a "sentimentalized
version" of the Hobbesian

s o v e r e i g n . ^3

The "technocratic" conception makes politics into a
science

of rewards and punishments.

As Spragens notes, all

polities must engage in the application of rewards and
punishments to some extent--in the application of a criminal
code, for instance.

What distinguishes the technocrat is

the unbounded scope given to such scientistic reasoning.
Technocracy attempts to control the environment for the
purposes of education and character formation; in so doing,
it runs the risk of becoming morally reductionistic,
rendering liberty meaningless.
political interaction.

Social control replaces

Malleable man would seem incapable

of holding politically accountable the technocrats who are
able to so thoroughly manipulate him.

The moral content of

the traditional understanding of politics becomes
unintelligible.

Technocratic leanings may be seen in the

conservative, liberal, or radical varieties of modern
politics.

23jbid.,

Spragens thinks that the reason that

105-109.
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"technocracy" has not developed into a full-fledged ideology
is simply that its assumptions are so ubiquitous.
In technocratic politics, social-scientific techniques
are endowed with an authority sufficient to override the
requirements of democratic consent.

Social scientists such

as Lester Frank Ward and B. F. Skinner sought a scientific
"cure" for "pathological" social dynamics; they professed to
be baffled by the "irrational" resistance they sometimes
encountered in their "subjects."

Such "technocrats" tend to

make optimistic assumptions to the effect that their schemes
will require a minimal amount of coercion.

Dr. Karl

Menninger's discussion of the "crime of punishment" could be
taken as an exemplification of technocratic tendencies.
Menninger seeks to mitigate the cruelties of the penal
system by converting the criminal into a deviant to be
treated rather than punished.

He fails to realize that in

so doing he has converted the criminal into a mere "object"
to whom responsibility cannot be attributed.

Society, not

the criminal, is spoken of as responsible, but this
evocation of societal guilt is followed by an arrogation of
power.

This conceptual shift culminates in the abuse of

psychiatry, in which psychiatric "treatment" becomes
indistinguishable from a prison sentence with no hope of
appeal.25

24ibid., 110-129.
25ibid., 161-195.
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It will be recalled that in Spragens*s presentation the
major modern alternative to a "technocratic” conception of
value

is "value noncognitivism."

One exponent of

iioncognitivism was David Hume, whose political thought
Spragens characterizes as degenerating into emotivism and
irrationalism.

His phenomenalism parallels Locke's

sensationalism in that it holds that there is nothing to
reality but impressions.

Such a philosophy can provide

nothing more than a conventionalist moral theory in which we
are to accept habit and custom because they are safe; the
desire for stability corresponds to Hobbes's fear of violent
death.

Standards of value were to be found only in such

internal standards, not the external world.

Hume spoke of

an internal moral sense "which nature has made universal in
the whole species"; evidently, "moral taste" was to do the
work of Aristotelian substance.

However, a reductionistic

metaphysics of impressions could not account for a
phenomenon so complex as moral taste.

Immanuel Kant would

try to save ethics by appealing to the radically free will
as a standard of value, but Spragens asserts that neither
Hume nor Kant could avoid "importing" traditional moral
content into his theory.
It turns out, then, that the only alternative available
to the scientific rationalist who wishes to avoid a
26ibid., 213-255. At 227, Spragens refers to Hume,
Principles of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon
Press, 1975), sec. I.
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technocratic politics of domination is a skeptical denial of
the possibility of a rational standard for political life.
Scientific "value noncognitivism" places the political
outside the realm of the rationally apprehensible,
culminating in political irrationalism.

Such a skepticism

can affirm nothing positive; debunking and critique are its
strong suits, but Spragens thinks that this "animus against
enthusiasm is itself an enthusiasm."

In its conservative

form, such an irrationalism appeals to custom in opposition
to affirmative political standards.

Liberal irrationalism

denies metaphysical holism or transcendentalism, seeing
appetite or desire as the only reality.

Radical

irrationalism appeals to imaginative fantasy in a romantic
reaction against pretensions to rational political
discourse.

Spragens remarks that "the radical irrationalist

may turn out to be anything from a relatively amiable
absurdist to a furious nihilist— from a Yippie to a
terrorist."27
A Non-Reductionistic Standard
for Political Knowledge
Spragens concludes that neither the technocratic nor
the value-noncognitivist conception of value can provide us
with an adequate theoretical framework for political
science.

Both these versions of modern rationalism rule out

any recourse to norms of completion or fulfillment in an
27gpragens, Irony. 256-261.
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Aristotelian sense, without which politics cannot be
rendered intelligible.

The influence of positivistic

rationalism has had a deformative effect on several
otherwise fruitful theoretical developments in contemporary
political science.

Without any reference to political

purposes, an Eastonian "systems model" may generate nothing
more than a universalized "pork-barrel" politics.

Robert

Dahl's version of democratic theory preserves Madison's
concern with "constitutional engineering," but it eliminates
Madison's intent to limit the "mischiefs of faction," since
on its assumptions the term "faction" cannot be
"operationalized."

Perhaps the most poignant instance of

positivistic theoretical impoverishment has been in the area
of development theory, the very mention of which carries
Aristotelian overtones.

A truly profound theory of

development would have to refer to a substantive standard
for a good societv to which development ought to contribute.
Lacking a theoretical framework that can speak of "the good
society" intelligibly, development theory has, in Spragens's
view, lapsed into a kind of ethnocentrism in which
"development" is taken to be equivalent to conformity to the
patterns of the Western industrialized world.^8
From Sptagens's perspective, a wholesome intellectual
development has been the rise, and especially the fall, of
2®Spragens, The Dilemma of Contemporary Political Theory;
Toward a Postbehavioral Science of Politics (New York: Dunellen,
1973), 73-106 and 127-28.
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logical positivism in the twentieth century.

Logical

positivism represented a radicalized, unsentimental version
of the program of liberal reason; it may be considered the
culmination of the development initiated by Hobbes, Locke,
and Descartes.

The logical positivists' standard of

"verificationism" parallels the Hobbesian procedure of
"resolution."

However, logical positivism quickly

encountered difficulties.

For one thing, on the basis of

the verification principle, logical positivism appeared
incapable of giving an account of itself.

The verification

principle insists that only empirical statements are
admissible, but the principle itself appears to be normative
or regulative, purporting as it does to settle questions
about what uses of language are "proper," the protests of
positivists to the contrary notwithstanding.

It appears,

then, that the verification principle is not self-reflexive.
Furthermore, protests were heard to the effect that
positivistic verificationism gave a distorted account of
investigative procedures in the natural sciences.
Scientists objected that scientific statements are
universally context-laden; there is no such thing as a
completely theory-neutral observation.

Representative of

all these developments was Wittgenstein's shift from the
program of the Tractatus to that of the Philosophical
Investigations ; in the latter work he rejected the "picture
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theory" of language and its implication of a radical
separation of observer and object.29
Wittgenstein initiated a version of linguistic analysis
that was not reductionistic.

The notion of "simples" was

abandoned; it was accepted that language represents an
irreducibly complex reality.

Language was seen as not

susceptible to purification; an absolute boundary between
the knowable and the unknowable could not be drawn.

This

Wittgensteinian shift was soon reflected in a new turn in
the philosophy of science on the part of thinkers such as
Michael Polanyi and Thomas Kuhn.

Knowledge was now seen as

contingent and subject to interpretation.

Scientific

knowing contains an ubiquitous element of tacit judgment.
Science can attain "warranted beliefs," not "positive"
knowledge.

Any verification of scientific knowledge is

necessarily intersubi ective and therefore less than totally
certain.

The new philosophy of science puts forward a

"lower” standard for knowledge in that it stipulates that
not all ambiguity and uncertainty can be eliminated.^0
Spragens characterizes the new philosophy of science as
part of a quiet intellectual revolution.

Ironically,

political science embraced positivism just as it was being
discredited.

In any case, the political implications of the

more modest conception of scientific rationality are clear.
29gpragens, Irony. 319-332.
30lbid., 347-356.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

276

On the one hand, it becomes obvious that a degree of
humility is appropriate to politics.

If the natural

sciences cannot obtain absolutely certain knowledge, it is
clear that all claims in an area such as politics must be
regarded as dubitable.

"Technocratic" politics loses its

warrant; we may be able tentatively to identify some people
as mistaken, but within a proper understanding of politics
it will be stipulated that the mistaken are to be persuaded,
not coerced.

On the other hand, if our "post-liberal"

understanding dictates that the aims of politics are to be
somewhat modest, this understanding also rehabilitates
politics in an important respect, because we are freed from
the constricting dogma of the fact-value dichotomy and may
make evaluative statements with a clear conscience.

"Value

noncognitivism" and its concomitant political irrationalism
may be set aside.
In adopting the model of the natural sciences as
paradigmatic for the study of man and society, modern
liberals failed to realize that the successes of modern
science have been due to its political institutions as well
as its technical virtuosity.

The "scientific republic"

enforces norms of consensus, authority, and freedom, just as
a well-ordered polity does.

The scientific enterprise is

predicated on a consensus on behalf of the pursuit of truth;
it accredits scientific authorities who are charged with
31lbid., 357-368.
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determining what does or does not constitute a legitimate
advance in scientific knowledge.

Within this context,

science affirms the competence of the human mind to
apprehend truth, and so it enforces norms such as those of
academic freedom in order that free inquiry may proceed.
Political enterprises are of a different order from those of
science, but both undertakings attempt a "progressive
adaptation"; science seeks to narrow the gap between
observation and theory, while politics attempts to adapt
extant institutions to the requirements of human existence
properly understood.

Reason is not simply equivalent to

either science or politics, but according to Spragens it is
reason that makes science "scientific" and politics
"political," rather than "military": in either undertaking
it is reason that allows us to arbitrate between competing
claims of authoritativeness.

Spragens hopes that a more

appropriate understanding of reason and its role in politics
will enable our political enterprises to attain their
legitimate ends.

"Perhaps a revised appraisal of human

understanding will permit us to escape the strange
oscillation between pride and despair that has characterized
political life in the modern West— to replace that unhappy
pattern with a more felicitous dialectic of hope and
h u m i l i t y . "32

32ibid., 368-395.
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Fallibilism and Absolutism; An Uneasy Coexistence?
Spragens offers a provocative interpretation of the
philosophical vulgarization of liberal politics and of the
role of thinkers such as Hobbes in this development.

To

save liberalism from itself, in the sense of preserving its
better rather than its worse tendencies, is his intent.

His

view is that the most defensible tenet of modern liberalism
is its epistemological fallibilism— the view that certain
truths are apprehensible only imperfectly.

A fallibilist in

the realm of ethics, for instance, would argue that there
are ethical truths to be known, but that our minds can
apprehend them only imperfectly— in opposition to the view
of a relativist who would argue that there are no such
ethical truths that the mind is capable of apprehending.
Fallibilism argues from the fallibility of all views, not
their equivalence or parity.

"The strongest part of the

relativist and empiricist justifications of liberal and
democratic institutions is their common focus on
epistemological fallibilism. . . .

if the limitations of the

human mind are such as to render all moral beliefs somewhat
uncertain, then the case for the politics of freedom and
toleration improves dramatically.
This epistemological fallibilism represents something
of a two-sided philosophical coin.

On the one hand, what

can be known is only known with some uncertainty, but, on
33lbid.,

285-286.
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the other hand, there is definitely something to be known.
The latter consideration apparently has prompted Spragens to
become attracted to philosophical absolutism of a sort.
The accreditation of "objective" values can contribute
and has contributed to the ethos of liberal democracy,
especially when this absolutism is transcendentalist (or
at least sees perfection as an unreasonable expectation
for historical existence) and includes an appreciation
of the contingencies of human knowledge— if, for
example, it realizes that these absolute goods are
perceived "through a glass darkly". . . . Indeed, the
argument for toleration may be based on theological
grounds, . . . [ i. e.] in the contention that the
claim to know God's will is a sinful presumption. While
it respects the pluralist element in democracy,
moreover, this kind of philosophical "absolutism" can
also provide the basis for insisting on the justice, the
human dignity, and the intrinsic limits on the
legitimate scope of government that are the essence of
political constitutionalism— which is, in turn, a
crucial element in Western liberal democracy.
Can Spragens have both absolutism of this or any sort and
also epistemological fallibilism?

One could probably come

up with any number of absolutists who were unwilling to
admit any uncertainty regarding their absolutist tenets.
One might even argue that the two requirements of absolutism
and fallibility are contradictory.

If one claims for one's

tenets the status of absolutes, why admit that their truth
is known with anything less than absolute certainty?

If

there is uncertainty, are the absolutes really absolute?
For science, the nearest thing to a philosophical
absolute is the disinterested inquirer's commitment to the
truth.

This commitment requires an affirmation by the

34ibid., 290.
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inquirer of the ability of the mind to apprehend reality;
such an affirmation is not susceptible to the empirical
verification demanded by the logical positivist.

According

to Spragens, "we must confess our faith in this
complementary rationality of known reality and knowing
person to be finally just that— a faith," albeit a "not
unreasonable faith."

Such faith must underlie the

"uneliminable act of intellectual judgment on the part of a
responsible knower" which is a component of any inquiry.
The irreducible necessity for this intellectual judgment
reveals the "tacit coefficient in all knowledge" in light of
which the project of the logical positivist is rendered
obsolete.
Talk of "faith" may suggest that the commitment of the
disinterested inquirer is to be equated with religious
commitment, but that this is Spragens's intent is not clear.
He speaks, for instance, of the political theorist's
attaining transcendence, but this transcendence is
explicitly described as a relative transcendence.

The

theorist is to be aware of his own personal and social
milieu so that he can move beyond his own limited
perspective and take into account the viewpoints of others.
In so doing, the theorist's perspective "reaches what might
be called a relative transcendence of its origins; it can
move beyond its partiality to a more comprehensive vision.
^^Spragens, Dilemma. 148-149.
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but it can never escape from its grounding in the
contingency of historicity.''^^
The import of Spragens's critique of liberal reason is
that liberals have failed to acknowledge the tacit component
of human knowledge and have, as a result, pursued either a
discredited verificationism or a politically nihilistic
value noncognitivism. The influence of thinkers such as
Hobbes was crucial to this development.

Spragens sometimes

speaks as though the thought of Aristotle were also
implicated; it will be recalled that he detects continuity
as well as divergence in his comparison of these two
theorists.

Both thinkers insisted upon "the demonstrative

character of scientific knowledge."

The movement toward an

insistence on radical certitude may be traced back to
ancient Greek thought: "Once one has apprehended the ousia
of anything, he may feel confident that his understanding
will retain its validity forever, because the lines of
substance, the species of being, are assumed to be eternal.
...

It was conceivable to Aristotle that the entire cosmos

could be exhaustively represented by a complete set of
univocal definitions."^^
Spragens may have jumped to a conclusion in drawing
such a close parallel between Hobbes and Aristotle.

Not all

his statements concerning Aristotle on this matter are
36ibid., 153.
37gpragens, Motion. 138-139; Dilemma. 139-141.
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consistent.

Any claim of certain knowledge on the part of

Aristotle would have to refer to theoretical reason only,
not practical reason, as Spragens acknowledges.

Perhaps the

fairest statement by Spragens on this matter is his
observation that the "Aristotelian claim that the first
principles of science are known 'with certainty' is either
mistaken or else it simply refers to a quality of belief— to
strength of conviction."^®

®Spragens, Motion. 156-157; Irony, 143, 351-353.
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CHAPTER 8; HOBBES AND ARISTOTLE— IMPLICATIONS
FOR CONTEMPORARY POLITICS
That the mention of Hobbes continues to arouse fear and
suspicion is testified to by the enduring tendency of
political partisans to hurl the epithet "Hobbesian" at their
opponents.

The accusation of Hobbesianism is not entirely

neutral in its political implications; Hobbes's title
"Leviathan" has been appropriated by those who wish to
portray the contemporary state as monstrous in its
proportions, as in discussions of "the Leviathan state."
"Hobbesianism" thus has become a weapon of the libertarian
right against the "collectivist" left; those who would
shrink the state point their fingers at those who would
maintain or expand it, calling them Hobbesians.^
Two of the commentators on Hobbes discussed herein
present themselves as critics of the proportions of the
contemporary state.

Strauss, a critic of Hobbes, portrayed

modern governments as moving inexorably toward the
establishment of a "universal and homogeneous state," a goal
acknowledged tacitly and almost unanimously, as though it
had been enacted as official doctrine by a Hobbesian
sovereign.

It may have been an embarrassment to Strauss to

find that Oakeshott, an admitted admirer of Hobbes, agreed
nevertheless that the contemporary state had overextended
^See, for instance, Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan:
Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
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itself, that it resembled a universitas that tiireatened to
smother individuality rather than a societas that left
people free to pursue their own life plans and projects.
Macpherson, who sympathized somewhat with Strauss as a
critic of Hobbes, should be considered a critic of the
contemporary state only in a highly qualified sense, because
of his Marxian leanings; given a choice between maintaining
the contemporary state and limiting it in the way that an
Oakeshott might, he would probably take the former option.
Strauss considered Macpherson an advocate of the "universal
socialist society," a thinly veiled equivalent of the
"universal and homogeneous state"; it will be suggested
below that Macpherson may indeed have left himself open to
such a sinister portrayal.^
In considering whether a thinker ought to be acquitted
or convicted of the charge of Hobbesianism, not only his
stance toward the contemporary state but also his position
regarding the openness of political discussion and debate
should be considered.^ Voegelin's remarks about the
Hobbesian proclivity to censor political discussion should
be recalled, as should Arendt's contrast between the
classical Greek emphasis on political action and the
Hobbesian tendency toward subjection to an absolute
^Strauss, review of Macpherson, The Political Theorv of
Possessive Individualism, in Studies in Platonic Political
Philosophy. 231.
^See chapter 2, 46 above.
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sovereign.

Such concerns are shared by Macpherson in his

criticism of the passive consumer society that has driven
out participatory democracy, and by Spragens in his
observations about the danger that technological
manipulation will come to supplant politics.

Hobbes and

Aristotle, to whom Hobbes so often set himself in
opposition, provide an instructive contrast for the
illumination of the issues of the place of the state and of
open political discussion.

For instance, passing

consideration at least should be given to the attitudes
toward Hobbes and Aristotle of contemporary classical
liberal "anti-statists," who so effectively have
appropriated the Leviathan symbol for polemical purposes.
Aristotle. Hobbes, and the Latter-Dav Hobbesians
In Spragens's presentation, Aristotle puts forward a
holistic metaphysics, whereas Hobbes propounds an atomistic
ontology in which everything is to be resolved into its
simplest components.

Borrowing from biology, Aristotle

speaks of motion in terms of growth, which points toward a
natural state of full development or completeness.

Hobbes,

taking his inspiration from Galilean mechanics, identifies
the natural not with development but with origin or
beginning; his motion amounts not to growth but to mere
persistence, a never-ending "motion after motion" within an
"end-less" universe.

The Galilean model eventually

supplanted the Aristotelian conception as a more successful
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explanation of the motion of physical bodies,

"What is

absurd in the context of physical motion is not so absurd in
the context of human action, however," Spragens argues.^
Hobbes presents a universe in which motion is devoid of
termination.

The opposing Aristotelian metaphysics contains

a principle of inertia.

Motion is not expected to continue

without end; it requires explanation.

Motion is presumed to

terminate in a state of rest, which represents the final
cause or telos of motion.

The Hobbesian universe disposes

of such talk of an end or telos. constructing instead a
universe in which the Aristotelian formal and final causes
are subsumed under either material or efficient cause.
Hobbes thus constructs a purposeless universe, devoid of
ends, both in the sense of termination and the sense of a
goal or purpose toward which things tend and in terms of
which they may be explained.^
The Hobbesian metaphysics implies a political theory
that a devotee of Hobbes would probably describe as
realistic and unsentimentalized; others find it stark and
demoralizing.

Men in the state of nature are capable of

doing to their fellows absolutely anything that their
strength and guile permits them to get away with; at this
stage, there exists nothing to provide a basis for a
sanction against unprovoked violence, for instance.
4Spragens, Dilemma. 133.

To

See also Motion. 97-110 and 189-97.

^Spragens, Motion. 53-74.
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escape from such a state, men rush for the cover to be
provided by the Hobbesian sovereign, but even after the
sovereign is acknowledged, they may not be sanguine about
their circumstances.

In return for the sovereign's

protection, men must place themselves at their mercy.

No

matter what burdens the sovereign places on his subjects, no
rebellion is legitimate— unless, of course, a successful
rebellion takes place, in which case it may be spoken of as
legitimate "after the fact."
Contrastively, Aristotelian politics places natural
limits on both rulers and their subjects (including limits
on the accumulation of wealth).

Men as well as natural

objects have an end, the polis, which is the appropriate
environment for an existence fit for human beings.

That a

political community is man's natural setting is revealed by
his natural capacity for speech, which makes possible
discussion, persuasion, and political action generally.
"Nature, according to our theory, makes nothing in vain; and
man alone of the animals is furnished with the faculty of
language."

There is a sense in which the community is prior

to its members, just as a hand or foot cannot perform its
natural function when severed from the rest of the body.
Genuinely human existence cannot be achieved outside of the
political community; it would be perverse for a man to
insist on living in isolation.

"The man who is isolated—

who is unable to share in the benefits of political

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

28 8

association, or has no need to share because he is
self-sufficient— is no part of the polis,
be either a beast or a god."

already

and musttherefore

The collective has an

interest, but in the normal case this does not constitute a
pretext for the sacrifice of the individual; the interest of
the community is nothing apart from the full development and
truly human existence of its members.®
Strauss considered Aristotle to be the source of one of
three versions of the doctrine that he called "classic
natural right," along with Plato and Aquinas.

He thought

that this doctrine dictated an

opposition to

the

contemporary tendency which he

identified as

culminating in

the "universal and homogeneous state."

Before we accept the

conclusion that the teaching of classical political
philosophy requires a campaign to shrink and diminish the
state, we should examine the attitude of other opponents of
the "Leviathan state" concerning the issues dividing
Aristotle and the classics from Hobbes and the teachings of
modern political philosophy.^
It might be thought that Strauss, as an opponent of the
"universal and homogeneous state," would be sympathetic to
the perspective of F. A. Hayek, whose contributions have
been the inspiration of much of the "anti-statist" tendency
®Aristotle, Politics, trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, Clarendon Press, 1946; reprint, London, Oxford,
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 1.2.1253a.
^Strauss, Natural Right and History. 146, 156-63.
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in recent right-of-center thought.

Even a casual

comparison, however, will reveal that Strauss and Hayek have
little in common beyond their mutual political dislikes.
Far from hearkening back to the tradition of classical
political philosophy, Hayek celebrates the achievements of
modern civilization, in particular the development of an
"extended order" featuring free economic markets and an
interdependent network of exchange that exceeds by several
degrees of magnitude the scale of the classical Greek polis.
In such an extended order, Aristotelian teleology has no
place, since order emerges spontaneously, without anyone
intending it, out of the interaction among individuals, each
acting to attain his or her own purpose, in or out of the
economic sphere.

Each of us has an intimate, tacit

knowledge of our own immediate environment; no single person
or group could have access to sufficient knowledge to act to
achieve the purpose of the entire social organization,
conceived in Aristotelian fashion.

In fact, in his most

recent monograph. The Fatal Conceit; The Errors of
Socialism. Hayek explicitly dismisses Aristotle and the
Aristotelian approach to politics.
"Aristotle spoke from his instincts, and not from
observation or reflection, when he confined human order to
the reach of the herald's cry," claims Hayek at the outset
of The Fatal Conceit.

He objects to any attempt to impose

limits on the scale of human organization or economic
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accumulation based on teleological considerations foreign to
the rational calculator of economic theory.

He has no use

for a world-view in which, according to Barker's
description, "everywhere things are regarded as determined
towards an end."

Indeed, he blames such a Weltanschauung

for a corruption of political language, due to its tacit
assumption that where there is order there must be an
orderer.

He argues that "the naive or untutored mind . . .

tends to assume the activity of mind or spirit wherever it
imagines that there is purpose."

He goes so far as to

attribute to Aristotle "a naive and childlike animistic view
of the world," comparable to that described by Jean Piaget
(The Child's Conception of the World).

For Hayek the

Aristotelian "postulated perfection of social life"
mentioned by Spragens is inadmissable.

In his earlier

statement on politics. The Constitution of Libertv, Hayek
remarked that "it has been perfectionism of one kind or
another that has destroyed whatever degree of decency
societies have achieved."®
John Gray, an Oxford political philosopher, has
attempted to synthesize the contributions of Hayek and other
®F. A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit; The Errors of Socialism,
vol. 1, The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek. ed. W. W. Bartley III
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 11; Barker, The
Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle. 219; Hayek, Conceit.
106-110, 47; Spragens, Dilemma. 45; Hayek, The Constitution of
Libertv (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960; Phoenix
Edition, 1978), 8. Hayek's reference to Piaget in Conceit (at
47) is to The Child's Conception of the World (London: K. Paul,
Trench, Trubner & Co., 1929).
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contemporary right-of-center theorists such as James
Buchanan, along with borrowings from thinkers as diverse as
Kant, Rawls, and John Stuart Mill, into a coherent
libertarian-individualist outlook that would destroy the
pretensions of the intellectual left.

Gray, along with

Hayek and Buchanan, affirms a "modern” idea of freedom in
which political participation plays little part.

The

ancient Greek and Roman idea of freedom "rarely connoted any
immunity from control by the community, but only an
entitlement to participation in its deliberations.

The

ancient idea of freedom is so far in sharp contrast with the
modern one."

However, there does appear an intimation of

modern liberal freedom at one crucial point in ancient Greek
history; Gray cites the Funeral Oration of Pericles as "a
statement of liberal egalitarian and individualist
premises."

The liberal outlook of Pericles was shared by

others of the "Great Generation" of Periclean Athens, "which
encompasses the schools of the Sophists, Protagoras and
Gorgias, and of Democritus the atomist."

In Gray's view,

Plato and Aristotle form a reactionary opposition to this
"Great Generation."

"In the works of Plato and Aristotle,

we find, not the further development of the liberal outlook
of the Great Generation, but instead a reaction against
it. "9

9John Gray, Liberalism. Concepts in Social Thought
(Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 1-3.
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A theory of justice based on this "liberal outlook," in
which justice is based not on nature but on convention or
agreement, is offered by economist James Buchanan.

Buchanan

equates justice strictly with the outcome of agreement among
men, independent of any substantive evaluation of the terms
of agreement.

To "offer a description of the 'good society'

. . . often promotes intellectual and moral arrogance," he
remarks.

"By contrast, my natural proclivity as an

economist is to place ultimate value on process or
procedure, and by implication to define as 'good' that which
emerges from agreement among free men, independently of
intrinsic evaluation of the outcome itself."

Buchanan

further affirms his affinity with a political theory of
"conventionalism" when, in an appendix to his and Tullock's
The Calculus of Consent, he remarks that "initially we look
to Glaucon in Plato's Republic, to Thomas Hobbes, and to
Benedict Spinoza.
Strauss was familiar with a political science which
identified justice and the public good with "the rules of
the game,” but he identified such an approach with the
pluralist democratic theory of contemporary political
scientists such as Robert Dahl rather than with free-market
economics.

He thought that this approach emptied the notion

of 'common good' of any substance, such that "even if an
^°Buchanan, Limits. 167, and "Appendix I: Marginal Notes on
Reading Political Philosophy," in Buchanan and Tullock, The
Calculus of Consent. 312.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

29 3

objective is to the interest of the overwhelming majority,
it is not to the interest of all. . . . Everyone is by
nature the sole judge of what is to his interest: his
judgment regarding his interest is not subject to anybody
else's examination on the issue whether his judgment is
sound.”

Such a perspective was not original to contemporary

political science, observed Strauss; "it was stated with the
greatest vigor by Hobbes.
A prohibition on intersubjective evaluation of
individual judgments of self-interest is a feature of the
principles of justice stipulated with economistic precision
by Buchanan and Tullock in The Calculus of Consent.

These

principles are subsumed under the rubric of a term of
technical economics, "Pareto optimality."

Under the Pareto

criterion, the "welfare" of the whole group of individuals
is said to be increased if either "(1) every individual in
the group is made better off, or (2) if at least one member
of the group is made better off without anyone being made
worse off."

Buchanan and Tullock observe that the standard

of "Pareto optimality" is "a criterion that is implicit in
the individualist conception of the State itself"; to be
precise, no one is to be "made worse off" (i. e., taxed) for
the sake of anyone else.

Such a criterion for political and

^^Strauss, "An Epilogue," in Political Philosophv: Six Essays
bv Leo Strauss, ed. Hilail Gildin (Indianapolis, Ind.: Pegasus,
Bobbs-Merrill, 1975), 123-24; reprinted from Herbert J. Storing,
ed., Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, 1962).
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economic "betterment" enables the economist (or the
political scientist) to be "scientific" in the strict sense.
To adopt any other criterion would be presumptuous and
intellectually arrogant; the economist, unlike the
"collectivist" intellectual, "cannot play at being God, no
matter how joyful the pretense; hubris cannot be descriptive
of his attitude."

The social scientist can at least avoid

the subjectivity inherent in "interpersonal comparisons of
utility"; "No external observer is presumed able to make
comparisons of utility among separate individuals."

Such

talk of a prohibition on "interpersonal comparisons of
utility" represents a restatement in economists' jargon of
the Hobbesian premise identified by Strauss, that no
evaluation may be made of individual judgments about selfinterest.

The Pareto criterion implies, in Buchanan and

Tullock's interpretation, that majority rule in politics
ought to be replaced, at least in principle, by a rule of
unanimity, in order to prevent "deliberate political
exploitation."

As a practical matter, they concede that to

enforce a unanimity rule in a modern nation-state would
render collective action impossible; in their terms, the
"decision-making costs" would be astronomical.

They are, in

a magnanimous concession to reality, willing to replace the
unanimity rule in practice with a requirement for a
"supermajority" rule— the closer to unanimity the better— in
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order at least to place limits on "political exploitation"
of the taxpayer.
Buchanan and Tullock's refusal to make "interpersonal
comparisons of utility" is a reflection of their acceptance
of the "fact-value distinction" that has come to predominate
in modern social science under the influence of Max Weber.
As Buchanan writes, "Positive science is concerned with the
discovery of 'what is'; normative science, with 'what ought
to be' . . . . Political economy has a non-normative role in
discovering 'what is the structure of individual values.'"
Economists are charged with the collection of empirical data
in the form of the preferences expressed by persons.

It may

not be possible to eradicate a degree of subjectivity in
drawing a conclusion about what a person's preference is,
but "the presence of subj ective evaluation of the outside
world (which includes the preference fields of other
individuals) does not imply the infusion of an individual
value judgment concerning the 'goodness' of the proposal
presented.
Strauss addressed the fact-value distinction in several
of his books and essays; he regarded it as a tenet of a
degenerate modern political science which was
^^Buchanan and Tullock, Calculus. 171-74, 13-14; Buchanan,
Limits. 1; Calculus. 43-46.
Buchanan, "Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and
Political Economy," in Economics. p. 16; reprinted from Journal
of Law and Economics 2 (October 1959): 124-38.
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constitutionally incapable of understanding political
phenomena.

To continue to study politics while under the

spell of the fact-value distinction, the political scientist
must draw parasitically upon the fund of commonsensical,
pre-scientific political knowledge possessed by the citizen
or statesman; in fact, such common-sense knowledge is
probably involved even in Buchanan's assumption that the
economist is entitled to make a "subjective evaluation" of
what persons actually prefer.

"The citizen does not make

the fact-value distinction. . . . The distinction between
facts and values is alien to the citizen's understanding of
political things. "^4
It should be clear by now that the radical curtailment
of the state proposed by the libertarian-individualists
cannot be reconciled with Strauss's Aristotelian natural
right.

For example, Foster argues that when Aristotle

remarks that "the end of the state is not mere life; it is,
rather, a good quality of life,"

he initiates an argument

directed against the radical "limitation of the state's
functions," in Lockean or Hobbesian fashion, contemplated by
Hayek, Buchanan, and Gray.

Buchanan goes so far as to

compare the collective unconstrained by unanimity or
"supermajority" rules to a thief.

Barker identifies this

"taxation-is-theft" argument with the teachings of the

^^Strauss, "Crisis," in Graham and Carey, eds., PostBehavioral Era. 225.
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Radical Sophists, which were rebutted by Aristotle.

"The

State is no artificial construction, whereby the weak have
defrauded the strong of the right of their might, and
defeated Nature's intentions; it is the natural supplement
of the weakness of us all, which has grown inevitably out of
our needs and

instincts.

According to both Barker and Foster, this antiSophistic posture follows directly from Aristotle's most
fundamental metaphysical tenets.

When he asserts in the

Politics that "the polis belongs to the class of things that
exist by nature, and that man is by nature an animal
intended to live in a polis," and that political
participation is natural to man because "nature, according
to our theory, makes nothing in vain; and man alone of the
animals is furnished with the faculty of language," his
basic metaphysics of natural movement toward an end, of the
actualization of natural potential, is reflected.

In

Aristotelian metaphysics, "everywhere things are regarded as
determined towards an end," remarks Barker.

In contrast to

Hobbes, the final state or condition is regarded as more
natural than the origin, so that the polity is viewed as
more natural than whatever primeval condition might have
preceded it.

"While he holds primitive society to be

^^Aristotle Politics 3.9.1280a; Michael B. Foster, Plato to
Machiavelli. vol. 1 of Masters of Political Thought. 3 vols.
(Cambridge, Mass., 1941), 127 (see also 122); Buchanan, Limits.
42-43; Barker, Plato and Aristotle. 272.
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natural (like Hobbes), he also holds the final State to be
natural, and still more natural (whereas Hobbes would regard
it as artificial).'*^®
Against Strauss on the "Universal
and Homogeneous State"
From a Straussian perspective, it might appear that
Hayek, Buchanan, and Gray have committed a litany of sins
against "classic natural right."

It would seem strange,

then, that Harvard philosopher John Rawls has been selected
for a "fire-breathing" Straussian attack while the
individualist-libertarians have been passed over; the
admiration for Rawls expressed by both Buchanan and Gray
suggest the affinities among them.

The explanation must be

that Rawls provides a wedge by means of which the
redistributive state may slip in, and this places him on the
side of the "universal and homogeneous state" in the eyes of
the Straussians.

In fact, the critique of the "universal

and homogeneous state" represents only one of several
objections (on the part of Voegelin and Oakeshott as well as
Strauss) to an apologetic on behalf of the contemporary
state, the Aristotelain rationale offered above
notwithstanding.
l®Aristotle Politics 1.2.1253a; Barker, Plato and Aristotle.
218-222.
^^See Buchanan, Limits. 175-77, and Gray, Liberalism. 54-56,
for laudatory remarks about Rawls. The Straussian attack on
Rawls is found in David Lewis Schaefer, Justice or Tvrannv? A
Critique of John Rawls's "A Theorv of Justice" (Port Washington,
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Talk of the "universal and homogeneous state" tends to
partake of mystification.

Apparently, Strauss has been

gifted with an intuitive understanding which allows him
immediately to "see" the parallel between the tyranny of
Hiero and the modern welfare state; those incapable of
perceiving this connection simply lack the appropriate
intellectual gifts.

As Gourevitch has remarked, "Strauss's

interpretations enjoy an immunity not enjoyed by
interpretations of Strauss," as Kojève and others have
discovered.
At no point in Strauss's discussion of "the universal
and homogeneous state" do we find reference to the
discussion of the preservation of kingships and tyrannies
offered by Aristotle in book 5 of the Politics, the content
of which closely parallels Xenophon's Hiero.

This

discussion does not present the difficulties of
interpretation due to dramatic setting that so occupied
Strauss with respect to the Hiero. since Aristotle speaks
straightforwardly for himself.

Furthermore, Aristotle's

presentation is obviously moral.

A tyrant might pursue one

of two courses of action to preserve his rule; the first of
these comprises measures which we would consider
authoritarian, but by pursuing the second course "his rule
N. Y . : Kennikat Press, 1979).
^®Victor Gourevitch, "Philosophy and Politics, I," Review of
Metaphysics 22(1968): 62-63.
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will be a nobler and more enviable rule . . . and he will
himself attain a habit of character, if not wholly disposed
to goodness, at any rate half-good— half-good and yet halfbad, but at any rate not wholly bad.
It is not clear that the political program recommended
to the tyrant by Aristotle can be placed precisely along the
contemporary left-right spectrum.

The tyrant is to "plan

and adorn his city as if he were not a tyrant, but a trustee
for its benefit," but at the same time "he should levy taxes
...

in such a way that they can be seen to be intended for

the proper management of public services. . . .

He should

act in the role of a guardian, or steward, who is handling
public revenues rather than private income."

A tyrant,

then, could be either frugal or a spendthrift; so might a
legitimate ruler.
tyrannical.

Neither course is intrinsically

In matters of expenditure, the tyrant and the

legitimate king might pursue the same policies.

In fact, it

is Aristotle's view that while authoritarian measures "plumb
the depth of wrongdoing," the tyrant who pursues the
Stagirite's second, preferred course "should be the opposite
of nearly everything which we have previously described as
characteristic of tyrants."20
A tyrant might be a spendthrift, but to be a
spendthrift is not intrinsic to tyranny; the tyrant could
l^Aristotle Politics 5.11.1315b.
20Aristotle Politics 1314a-1314b.
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just as easily adopt a program in which he would, in the
words of Barker, "tax lightly and spend rightly."
Aristotle's non-authoritarian tyrant is to pursue aims which
"exactly correspond to the general principles for the
preservation of constitutions which we have already
studied."

To follow such principles would make the tyrant

less of a tvrant. either by acting to "adorn the city" or to
"tax lightly."

Aristotle's treatment of this matter does

not indicate that he attributes to it the same central
importance given by Strauss to Xenophon's Hiero. in spite of
the similarity in subject matter.

The scale of government

expenditures is not Aristotle's measuring rod for judging
whether a regime is tyrannical. One is left to wonder
whether the whole stream of speculation stemming from
Strauss's development of the concept of "the universal and
homogeneous state" is not illicit.

In any case, there is no

reason to believe that, given his generally affirmative
attitude to the political community and his disinclination
to narrow the sphere of government, Aristotle would accept
that a more extensive state which "adorns the city" is
tyrannical ipso

f a c t o . 21

Strauss is forced to admit that not every extension of
the state represents a step in the direction of the
tyrannical "universal and homogeneous state."

Suppose, for

instance, that there were to come into existence a worldwide
2^Barker, Plato and Aristotle. 494-96.
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federation of nations for the sake of preventing a
thermonuclear war.

Such a federation would not qualify as a

"universal and homogeneous state" because it would preserve
the existence of the individual states, whose boundaries
would be accepted tacitly as legitimate, within the
federation.

Similarly, not every expansion of the domestic

state represents a step toward universal tyranny; some such
initiatives are undertaken in order to preserve an existing
state with respect to some of its crucial particulars.22
The anthropologist Karl Polanyi emphasized the
Aristotelian insistence on a natural limit to trade and
accumulation in economics. When Aristotle remarks that "it
is the business of nature to furnish subsistence for each
being brought into the world; and this is shown by the fact
that the offspring of animals always gets nourishment from
the residuum of the matter that gives it its birth," he
offers us an alternative to the "scarcity postulate" of
modern economics.

We are provided with subsistence

naturally, and our economic arrangements should do no more
than augment the abundance that has been provided for us by
nature.

When, instead, those arrangements become positively

destructive to us, that is a perversion of the natural
limits of the economic against which political authority may
legitimately be invoked.

Therefore, Aristotle (paraphrased

22gtrauss, "Crisis," in Graham and Carey, eds., PostBehavioral Era. 220-221.
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by Polanyi) stipulates that "trade that served to restore
self-sufficiency was 'in accordance with nature'; trade that
did not, was 'contrary to nature' . . . prices should be
such as to strengthen the bond of community; otherwise
exchange will not continue to take place and the community
will cease to exist."

Keeping such strictures in mind, what

might Aristotle say about a proposal to throw a nation's
borders completely open to international trade, regardless
of the effect on stable communities of textile, steel, or
automobile workers, for instance?
"strengthen the bond of community"?

Do these policies
Of course, to enforce

restrictions on trade, government bureaus will have to be
created and officials appointed in order, perhaps, to
collect import duties, but these measures are taken not in
order to construct a universal state but to preserve our
particular communities because we value them as they are.
Polanyi contends that these considerations apply to the
entire program of economic protection (broadly interpreted)
that contemporary states have enacted.

If contrary policies

are pursued, this is due to (paraphrasing Aristotle once
again) "a misconceived notion of the good life as a desire
for a greater abundance of physical goods and enjoyments,"
for which we ought to hold responsible not the state but the
seductive appeal of advertising and the market.23
23Karl Polanyi, "Aristotle Dicccvcrs the Economy," in
Primitive. Archaic, and Modern Economies; Essavs of Karl Polanyi,
ed. George Dalton (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 98-100.
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Aristotle's insistence on a natural limit on trade and
accumulation represents a defense of the "micro-order"
against the "extended order" upheld by Hayek, who often
during his career has encountered a visceral reaction
against the requirements of this "extended order"; "That
this tradition arouses great resistance we already know and
will witness again repeatedly."

His "extended order"

"requires further restraint on the innate feelings of the
micro-order . . . for these instinctual feelings are often
threatened" by it.

If we may speak of such a thing as human

nature, these "innate feelings of the micro-order" may be a
constituent part of it, such that Hayek is in the position
of placing himself in opposition to human nature, or at
least to a deep-seated human tendency; Polanyi argued that a
spontaneous protective reaction always accompanies any
attempt to establish a self-regulating market order.

Is it

the critic or the advocate of an "extended order" who comes
nearer to the advocacy of a "universal and homogeneous"
condition?24

Tvrannv and Technoloov
A more subtle line of argument suggests that the modern
state partakes of tyranny as a result of its efforts to free
its citizens from the constraints of physical necessity.
Indeed, the Aristotelian political theory holds that while
^^Hayek, Conceit. 31-37; Polanyi, The Great Transformation
(New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1944), 83.
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the polis is the realm of freedom, the household is the
realm of necessity; it would therefore be unsuitable for the
free man who is to participate in politics to be required to
perform household labor.

The Athenians sought to secure

this freedom for a portion of the population— those
designated as citizens— by having the more menial tasks
performed by slaves.

Moderns have attempted to secure for

everyone the freedom of the Athenian citizen by means of an
economy of affluence.

In large part, this affluence has

been attained through the exploitation of technology;
critics of technology argue that the very means by which we
have achieved a partial "freedom from want" have contributed
to the perfection of techniques of control and regulation to
such a degree that they now threaten our political freedom.
As George Grant, Canadian political theorist and follower of
Strauss, argued, those who "want both high standards of
spontaneous democracy and the egalitarian benefits accruing
from technique . . . share, with those who appear to them as
enemies, the deeper assumptions which have made the
technological society."

While the ancient Greeks enslaved

some of their fellow men, we have attempted to subjugate
nature, argues Grant; the techniques that have enabled the
subjugation of nature are so powerful that they may turn out
to be the means of our own enslavement.

^^George Grant, Technoloov and Empire; Perspectives on North
America (Toronto: House of Anansi, 1969), 31.
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The argument appears to be that the contemporary state
is tyrannical because it seeks to subjugate and enslave
nature, just as the ancient polis enslaved certain men;
furthermore, the conquest of nature may permit the
enslavement of men in a far more efficient fashion than was
available to ancient regimes.

If the argument is meant to

imply that the ancient Greek polis was itself tyrannical by
virtue of its institution of slavery, its exponents may have
misperceived the nature of ancient Greek slavery.

The

Athenian practice was different enough from the institution
of the ante-bellum American South that the same term perhaps
ought not to be applied to both.

As Barker describes the

conditions under which slaves lived in Attica;
Their lot was comfortable; there were no features of
dress to distinguish them from the ordinary citizen. . .
. Legally as well as socially, they were not degraded;
they were protected from ill-usage by the State; and
they could not be punished by death except by its
tribunals. . . . The Athenian policeman was a slave; and
slaves also filled the lower posts in the civil service.
Emancipation was not difficult; the slave might even
purchase his own freedom. . . . One feels, too, the
difference between this domestic slavery, in which the
slave is not separated by a gulf from his master, and
the slavery of the modern plantation, with its deep
lines of demarcation, and its exploitation of the slave
to the uttermost farthing.
A summary condemnation of Athenian slavery neglects the
moral dimension of the Greek version of the practice.

As

Foster notes, "slavery is justified from the point of view
of the master. . . . But it is also justified from the point
of view of the slave."

A natural difference in capacity

between the master and the slave is assumed here.

The slave
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working in a master's household could at least share in
Athenian cultural and political life in a way that the
mechanical laborer who was not a slave could not.
Furthermore, to be a master is justified only insofar as one
utilizes one's slaves to attain moral and intellectual
excellence; virtue, not wealth, is the end of the
institution.^ 6
The Greeks believed in the relevance of natural
differences.

They may have assumed more of a clear and

distinct difference between the capacities of slaves and
masters than was justified.

If so, this may be attributable

more to a failure of Greek political science, sociology, and
anthropology than to a broader moral failure.

In any case,

it appears that the substantive conditions to which the
Greek slave was subject were certainly no worse than those
of the menial laborer of the present-day world.

It should

also be remembered that Aristotle's defense of slavery
condemned the practice as it often existed, as when slaves
were taken as part of the spoils of military conquest.

In

justifiable slavery there should obtain "a community of
interest . . . between master and slave," but this will not
be present when "slavery rests merely on legal sanction and
superior power.ii27
2^Barker, Plato and Aristotle. 360-61; Foster, Plato to
Machiavelli. 134-35.
Z^Aristotle Politics 1.6.1255b.
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Arendt acknowledged the problematic of necessity,
slavery, and technology when she wrote that "man's wish to
emancipate himself from life's necessity . . . was the core
of slavery."

In fact, when Arendt argues that "it is only

the rise of technology, and not the rise of modern political
ideas as such, which has refuted the old and terrible truth
that only violence and rule over others could make some men
free," she might appear to leave herself open to the
accusation that she shares the assumptions of Grant's
"technological society."

For instance, the category of

necessity was central to Arendt's analysis of the difference
in outcome between the French and American Revolutions.

In

the former case, impoverished masses manifested themselves
in the political realm, primarily not for the sake of
political freedom but rather to relieve their misery.

The

poor carried with them as they entered the political sphere
an irresistible force and a violent rage which culminated in
terror; "The result was that necessity invaded the political
realm, the only realm where men can be truly free."

Thus it

would appear that Arendt's political philosophy might
embrace the power of technology to overcome necessity and
establish the conditions under which men can participate
freely in politics.28
In fact, it was not technology alone but the existence
of the vast frontier that enabled America to overcome the
28Arendt, On Revolution. 108-110.
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poverty of the European masses and avoid the excesses of
French revolutionary politics.

Arendt stresses that the

American founders upheld public, political freedom, not
private wealth, as the justifying principle of their
revolution.

They insisted on frugal ways and simple manners

not out of prudishness but because they thought luxury
incompatible with freedom.

"For abundance and endless

consumption are the ideals of the poor; they are the mirage
in the desert of misery.

In this sense, affluence and

wretchedness are only two sides of the same coin; the bonds
cf necw:3sity need not be of iron, they can be made of silk.”
Indeed, the American notion of republican virtue would come
under pressure with the closing of the frontier and the
arrival of millions of European immigrants seeking material
prosperity.

The development of American mass society raises

the possibility that affluence and consumption may supplant
public freedom, as people come to conceive freedom as the
right to be left alone in the pursuit of private wealth.
Arendt remarked hopefully that "There exist today as many
signs to justify hope as there are to instill fear.
As it turns out, Arendt is far from an uncritical
enthusiast of technology.

Technology presents a temptation

to withdraw from public freedom into private happiness, at
the same time that it may help to secure the necessary
conditions for the exercise of that freedom.
29lbid., 134-37.
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The American dream, as the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries under the impact of mass immigration came to
understand it, was neither the dream of the American
Revolution— the foundation of freedom— nor the dream of
the French Revolution— the liberation of man; it was,
unhappily, the dream of a "promised land" where milk and
honey flow. And the fact that the development of modern
technology was so soon able to realize this dream beyond
anyone's wildest expectation quite naturally had the
effect of confirming for the dreamers that they really
had come to live in the best of all possible worlds.
However, despite her reservations about its temptations, we
should not attribute to Arendt the view that a renunciation
of technology would be appropriate.

She probably would hold

that the virtues of Aristotelian moderation and of practical
wisdom or phronesis would provide a sufficient framework for
the supervision of technology.

Such wisdom and moderation

would probably require that some technologies be judged to
be so intrinsically dangerous that they should not be
exploited.

Arendt would not go so far as such critics of

the "technological society" as Grant and Jacques Ellul, for
whom technology appears as a diabolical force whose
utilization to any extent at all involves a violation of
sacred restraint.

Ellul himself was not willing to accept

the full implications of such an attitude, as he reveals in
his remark that "the book of Revelations says that the glory
of nations will enter the New Jerusalem.
nations also includes technology.

The glory of

Hence, our attitude is

not antitechnological; rather, it is a critical acceptance
of technology."

It would be Arendt's view that as long as

we retain a sense of the priority of public freedom over
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private affluence, our perspective will be broad enough to
sustain a sufficiently critical attitude toward technology.
It was for his reversal of this priority that she criticized
Marx, who believed that developments in the sphere of
"relations of production" would eventually supersede the
political realm.

As she remarked before a 1972 conference

in her honor, "I do not share Marx's great enthusiasm about
capitalism."^0
Teleological Politics and the Bios Theoretikos
Even if the above considerations are taken as decisive
against the view that the modern regime must inevitably take
the form of an irresistible "universal and homogeneous
state" in the service of an ever-expanding "technological
society," those who would uphold the centrality and
integrity of the political are faced with yet another
challenge founded upon philosophical premises opposite those
of the libertarian-individualist "neo-Hobbesians," which
nevertheless may give aid and comfort to the "anti-statist"
position.

The political realm is "caught coming and going"

between one school which holds that man's strivings have no
telos and another school which holds that such a telos lies
entirely outside the sphere of politics.

The latter view.

^Ojbid., 136; Jacques Ellul, Perspectives on Our Age:
Jacgues Ellul Speaks on His Life and Work, ed. William H.
Vandenburg, trans. Joachim Neugroschel (New York; Seabury Press,
1981), 108; Arendt, "On Hannah Arendt," in Hill, ed., Hannah
Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World. 334.
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that the justification of the political lies solely in its
enabling the solitary philosopher to live the bios
theoretikos or contemplative life, was criticized
vociferously by Arendt.
Short of an exhaustive discussion of such a position,
which has been attributed to both Strauss and Voegelin, a
few preliminary remarks may be offered.

In the Politics we

find the remark of Aristotle that "the end of the state is
not mere life" but rather "a good quality of life."

He

contrasts the genuine state with a mere alliance for common
defense or commercial intercourse, in which "neither of the
parties concerns itself to ensure a proper quality of
character among the members of the other."

Based on the

interpretation offered by Strauss and Voegelin (or at least
by some of their followers), it would appear that whenever
we encounter reference in Aristotle to "the end of the
state," "a good quality of life," "a proper quality of
character," or, in general, human happiness or eudaimonia.
we are to understand that what is meant is onlv the solitary
contemplation of the philosopher or the mystic.

An

alternative interpretation of eudaimonia is that it
signifies the development of a talent or excellence that
varies from person to person, the action of each in
accordance with his own spirit or daimon. be that the

^^Arendt, The Human Condition. 220-330; see also
chapter 6, 238-40 above.
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excellence of a philosopher, a statesman, or an artisan.
(According to Arendt, eudaimonia "has the connotation of
blessedness, but without any religious overtones, and it
means literally something like the well-being of the daimon
who accompanies each man throughout life, who is his
distinct identity, but appears and is visible only to
others.")

That Aristotle affirms the "imperial" status of

the solitary mystic is not immediately obvious to most
readers.

As Strauss admitted, a reading of Aristotle's

discussion of happiness in the Rhetoric indicates that "our
ordinary notion of happiness is not different from the
ordinary notion analyzed by Aristotle." Such happiness
consists of no more than a "reasonable contentedness,"
consisting of good friends and children and a reasonable
degree of health and wealth.^2
In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics we do find a passage
that appears to uphold the "imperial" claims of the
contemplative over the active life by virtue of its being
more "self-sufficient."

The controversy revolves around

whether the authority of this passage can be established
over and above those remarks which appear to confirm the
"common-sense" notion of happiness.

The "standard"

interpretation points to an apparent difference of attitude
between the Aristotle of the Nicomachean Ethics and the
^^Aristotle Politics 3.9.1280a-1280b; Arendt, The Human
Condition, 193; Strauss, "Crisis," in Graham and Carey, eds.,
Post-Behavioral Era. 234.
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author of the Politics.

As Barker remarks, "While we leave

the Ethics with the feeling that in the speculative life of
each man lies the height and depth and breadth of his being,
we begin the Politics with the sense, that, the individual
being essentially a citizen, his essential life is that of
civic actir;n."

It should be remeizoered that by the height

of Aristotle's career we are removed by about a century from
the peak of the "Golden Age" of Periclean Athens, which was
followed by a period that both Plato and Aristotle regarded
as an era of decline and corruption, such that the passage
to which Voegelin and Strauss attribute so much authority
may represent the single most pessimistic, defeatist passage
in the Aristotelian corpus concerning man's political
potential.

In any case. Barker's view is that the active

and the contemplative life are not mutually exclusive:
"Active thought on the deepest of moral questions is
necessary to the political life, and the statesman is a
philosopher as well as a politician."

Therefore, "Man may

either find his happiness in a political life . . . or, if
his capacities are not for such a life, he may look for
happiness to a philosophical life of active thought.
Despite his awareness of both Voegelin's and Strauss's
perspectives, Spragens concurs with Barker insofar as he
depicts Aristotelian politics as derived from the
^^Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Ostwald
(Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, Library of Liberal Arts,
1962), 10.7.1177all-1178a8; Barker, Plato and Aristotle. 250, 290.
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observation that "the immanent strivings of human nature
depend upon a political setting for their fulfillment."

He

is so bold as to claim that for Aristotle "the strivings of
political action were not considered to be adequately
explicable without such a postulated perfection of human
life."

Here Spragens recalls the image of Aristotle the

empiricist, the zoologist to be precise, despite Hobbes's
disparagement of his metaphysical speculations.

Both

Aristotle's zoology and his politics are derived from
empirical observation, with the difference that he could
explain the immanent strivings of the animals without
reference to political organization, whereas this was not
possible with respect to human strivings.
Spragens's mention of a "postulated perfection" raises
the issue of the perfectability of man, the impossibility of
which is a central tenet of some political theories.

Talk

of human "perfectability" carries with it an ambiguity about
the extent of the perfection being contemplated.
Aristotle's universe is full of potentialities being
actualized; the actualization is a more perfect state of
being than the potential.

However, no such actualization

brings about a perfect world, strictly speaking;
furthermore, instances of failure of actualization abound.
This account of actualization is no less applicable to human
striving.

For instance, if I develop my musical talents,

3'^Spragens, Motion. 99, and Dilemma. 45.
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then once I become an accomplished musician I am a more
perfect being than before, because I have actualized what
was merely potential.

I have "perfected" myself, but I have

not thereby brought about a simply perfect world.

Such

efforts at "perfection," properly understood, should be no
more out of bounds in the political realm than in the
musical.

Trading on the observation that "all progress is

not positive," some political theories go too far in denying
that anv positive political progress is possible in the
sense of the development, indeed the perfection, of our
political potential, stopping short of an unattainable
absolutely perfect world.

Unsuspecting political activists,

no doubt unclear in their own minds about the extent to
which human perfectability, have unwittingly left themselves
open to being classified as proto-totalitarians with their
loose talk of the "perfectability of man."
If we may include "magnanimity" within the catalogue of
Aristotelian virtues (as listed in Nicomachean Ethics, book
4), we might question whether the attitude of Strauss's
philosopher is properly magnanimous.

Is it worthy of the

philosopher to regard all other excellences as rivals of
philosophy?

Such a stance smacks of immoderation, while

Gourevitch tells us that "moderation is quite literally
central to the classical political philosophy that Strauss
wants to restore."

That the polity ought to be judged

solely according to its ability to sustain the philosophers'
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solitary reflections may be an absolutism that may have to
be set aside, at least tentatively, lest it prove a
destructive assumption for the guidance of our actions in
the political realm, in which we most assuredly will not
enjoy solitude.

If it is feared that to affirm the

political excellences will threaten those solitary virtues
which are most excellent of all, we might offer by way of
reconciliation the remark of Grant that "it is of the nature
of things that we come to know and to love what is good by
first meeting it in that which is our own— this particular
body, this family, these friends, this woman, this part of
the world, this set of traditions, this country, this
civilization."

His understanding of the excellences is not

that they are rivals of each other, but that they are
arranged in a hierarchical "great chain of virtues," such
that we must engage ourselves in those excellences that
occupy the lower ranks of the chain before we can ascend to
the higher ones.^^
Human Nature and Institutional Reform
For both Strauss and Voegelin, the primacy of the bios
theoretikos implies the unchangeability of human nature, a
tenet which forms the Archimedean point of their politics.
For Strauss, the ubiquity of natural inequality suggests
that the many can never become philosophers; the imperative
3^Gourevitch, "Philosophy and Politics, II," Review of
Metaphvsics 22(1968): 320; Grant, Technolocrv and Empire. 73.
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of the "universal and homogeneous state" to provide a
condition of equal advancement, material and otherwise, for
all amounts to an implicit denial of this common-sensibly
obvious natural inequality, such that the attainment of the
"world-state" would be concomitant with a change in human
nature. For Voegelin, the experience of Christianity meshed
perfectly with the implications of the primacy of the
contemplative life.

Man is but a creature, created with an

unchanging nature; otherwise he would be subject to an
infinite malleability.

Man realizes his creatureliness by

virtue of his capacity contemplatively to attain
transcendent experience, which is the highest capacity
natural to him.
Such a perspective inclines both Strauss and Voegelin,
as well as Spragens, to oppose adamantly Macpherson's
suggestion that power lust or libido dominandi differs for
different men and can be affected by institutional
arrangements.

"Hobbes's model of human vainglory and lust

for power . . . has more perennial relevance than
MacPherson's analysis tends to imply," Spragens remarks.
"For example, contemporary ethological investigations into
the sources of aggression in animal and human behavior would
indicate that the libido dominandi is neither confined to.
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nor predominantly the product of, any particular form of
social organization.
Macpherson, for his part, purported to have
demonstrated that is was the view of Hobbes, no
sentimentalist about the pacific tendencies of human nature,
that the lust for domination was not innate to all men.
Admittedly, the issue turns on ambiguous passages in the
Hobbesian corpus.

For instance, we find in chapter 11 of

Leviathan the statement that "a perpetual and restless
desire of power after power" is "a general inclination of
all mankind."

Immediately afterward, however, we find that

"the cause of this, is not . . . that he cannot be content
with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the
power and means to live well . . . without the acquisition
of more."

According to Macpherson's interpretation, Hobbes

holds that while all men require at least "a moderate
power," and some men seek ever more power, it is only when
free rein is given to predation that all men are compelled
to protect themselves by seeking an excess of power over
others.

Macpherson holds that market society is just such a

"predatory" society, in which one's man's power is
constantly being invaded by another's.^7
3®Spragens, Motion. 35; see also Strauss, review of
Macpherson, in Strauss, Platonic Political Philosophy. 230
(see chapter 4, 132-33 above).
^^Hobbes, English Works 3:85-86; see also Macpherson,
Possessive Individualism. 38-45, and chapter 4, 133-34 above.
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Voegelin would object to Macpherson's interpretation
because for him it points the way all too quickly to a
program of institutional reform of the "predatory" society.
Such "reformism" suggests that man is an utterly malleable
product of his environment, lacking freedom, which is a
reductionist degradation of his true nature.

Voegelin

argues that Aristotle's criticism of Plato's communistic,
scheme centered on "lack of consistent reliance on the
educative process and in his short circuit into
institutional remedies."

According to Webb's reading,

Voegelin argues that "progressive" thought misses "the
irresolvable mystery of human freedom and the concomitant
limitations of institutions."^®
Voegelin overdraws the distinction between the
"educative process" and "institutional remedies," as can be
seen from Salkever's discussion of Aristotle's views on the
stability of democracies.

According to Salkever's version

of Aristotle, the good democracy, or for that matter the
good regime generally, is one which inculcates "a certain
opinion about the good life" among the citizens.

The regime

secures this opinion by education of a sort, but not by
didacticism; "The easiest way of securing this opinion is
not by direct instruction," but by recrulations.

As an

example of the kind of "instruction" engaged in by the good

38Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle, vol. 3 of Order and History
(Baton Rouge, La.: 1957), 323; Webb, Eric Voegelin. 247.
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regime, Salkever cites Aristotle's "Jeffersonian" defense of
agrarianism as the most stable form of democracy:
It is evident that this form of democracy [the form
based on a farming populace] is the best; and the reason
is also evident— that the populace on which it was based
possesses a definite quality. In the creation of such a
populace some of the laws which were generally current
in earlier ages may all be of service— laws, for
example, forbidding absolutely the acquisition of
property in land beyond a certain amount, or, at any
rate, forbidding it within a fixed distance from the
city centre or the city boundaries.
Salkever's point is that institutions educate, albeit
indirectly.

If he is correct, it may be that the

justifications usually given explicitly for many of our
institutions are not the genuine ones: "Welfare spending is
not a mode of economic efficiency; universal suffrage not a
way of electing the best people, jury trials not a means for
reaching the best verdicts."

Criminal sanctions are among

the best examples of educative institutions, at least
according to the deterrence theory of punishment, in which
punishment is not directed primarily a the criminal but as
an example to the public at large.
Voegelin equates "educative measures" with man's
spiritual side, and he sees institutional reforms as
directed strictly against material ills; thus, a program
devoted completely to institutional reforms suggests that
^^Aristotle Politics 6.4.1319a; Stephen G. Salkever, "The
Crisis of Liberal Democracy: Liberality and Democratic
Citizenship," in Kenneth L. Deutsch and Walter Soffer, eds., The
Crisis of Liberal Democracy: A Straussian Perspective [Albany, N.
Y.: State University of New York Press, 1987), 254-63, esp. 26263.
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man is not a spiritual but a material being.

However, if

Spragens is correct in suggesting that man is neither
"autonomous" nor "heteronomous" in a Kantian sense (that is,
neither completely free nor completely determined), then the
relationship between the spiritual and the material will be
a reciprocal one, and the legislator in his function as an
educator will not be able to disavow all concern with
institutional reforms.

Barker's discussion of Aristotle's

criticism of Plato's communism recalls that of Voegelin; "No
material cure will heal a spiritual evil; only spiritual
means will produce a spiritual result.

To heal disunion and

division of spirit, one must employ a common education,
which will put all men on the same spiritual level, and
initiate them into the same spiritual community."

In

bringing about this spiritual result, however, the
legislator will not be without a role.
Private property is not simply pronounced right by
Aristotle: it is pronounced right when, and in so far
as, it subserves the moral end. It is not to be simply
retained; it is to be retained when it has been
"improved and perfected by proper customs and proper
legislation regulating its use." And thus in practice
it will come to pass that property, being used as such
an instrument, and as a means to charity and
munificence, will become public as well as private, and
common as well as individual. . . . Private possession
will bring its economic and moral advantages: common
use, not merely dictated by law, but flowing from a
proper spirit, will issue in that unanimity which Plato
so greatly desired.
Aristotle criticized Plato's communism, but he did not hold
that private property was to be left completely unregulated;
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there is, he believed, a natural limit beyond which the
accumulation of wealth should not proceed.^0
Despite their disparagement of the "micro-order,"
thinkers such as Hayek and Buchanan do acknowledge in their
discussion cf what may he called the "scalar problems of the
modern economy" that Aristotelian natural limits on the size
of our communities and the dynamism of our economy may have
been breached.

These problems are concomitants of the

growth of our communities to such a scale that they exceed
the natural boundaries of the individual's moral actions.
Hayek mentions that "modern developments, especially the
development of the large city, have destroyed much of the
feeling of responsibility for local concerns which in the
past had led to much beneficial and spontaneous common
action."

Buchanan observes that person now find themselves

inhabiting an "extended community of arbitrary and basically
amoral size."

He asks, "What can a person be predicted to

do when the external institutions force upon him a role in a
community that extends beyond his moral-ethical limits?"

He

speculates about the causes of this development:
The generalized public-goods dilemma of politics can
be kept within tolerance limits only if there is some
proximate correspondence between the external
institutional and the internal moral constraints on
behavior. This century may be described by developments
that drive these two sets of constraints apart. An
increase in population alone reduces the constraining
influence of moral rules. Moreover population increase
^^Barker, Plato and Aristotle. 394-95. For Spragens's
remarks on freedom and determinism, see Irony. 356-61, esp. 360.
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has been accompanied by increasing mobility over space,
by the replacement of local by national markets, by the
urbanization of society, by the shift of power from
state-local to national government, and by the increased
politicization of society generally.
As a solution to these scalar problems, Buchanan proposes a
revival of federalism, if not of secession: "Where is the
Quebec of the United States? . . . Who will join me in
offering to make a small contribution to Texas Nationalist
Party?"

However, if Aristotelian political science is

correct, an entity the size of Quebec or Texas still does
not meet the requirement of being, in Strauss's words, "not
too large for man"; Aristotle, as Hayek remarked, "confined
human order to the reach of the herald's cry."

We are left

to consider whether a revived federalism would be adequate
to offset the effects of Buchanan's "increasing mobility
over space," "replacement of local by national markets," and
"urbanization of society."

Are not all these developments

the outgrowths of the workings of Hayek's "extended order"?
Would not an Aristotelian limitation upon economic dynamism
and accumulation be a more appropriate remedy?^^
Where, then, is Voegelin left with respect to the
preference he stipulates for "educative measures" over
"institutional reform"?

What will it profit us to undertake

"educative measures" once the scale of our institutions has
^%ayek. Constitution. 83-84; Buchanan, "Markets, States,
and the Extent of Morals," in Economics. 272-74 (reprinted from
American Economic Review 68[1978]: 364-68); Strauss, "Crisis," in
Graham and Carey, eds., Post-Behavioral Era. 236; wayek. Conceit.
11 .
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exceeded the moral capacities of human nature?

Voegelin,

along with Hayek and Buchanan, has not heeded the strictures
on the size of the state laid down by Aristotle in Politics
7.4:
Experience shows that it is difficult, if not indeed
impossible, for a very populous state to secure a
general habit of obedience to law. . . . States, like
all other things (animals, plants, and inanimate
instruments), have a definite measure of size. . . .
These considerations indicate clearly the optimum
standard of population. It is, in a word, 'the greatest
surveyable number required for achieving a life of selfsufficiency '.
These Aristotelian strictures suggest that our contemporary
urban commercial civilization is, in some important
respects, unfit for human beings in that its scale is
disproportionate to the capacities of human nature.

If we

cannot escape urban civilization entirely, we have no
alternative but to attempt to manage its most deleterious
effects by means of "institutional reforms" that are
marginally coercive in that they require the collection of
taxes and other restrictions on the absolute right to free
economic exchange.

That the state must expand to a scale

corresponding to the civilization it is to govern is no
objection.

We are attempting to adjust ourselves to an

expensive way of living, and our tax bill is just one of the
costs that this way of life exacts. To say, for instance,
that it would impede "individual responsibility" to enact
"institutional reforms" in the form of measures of economic
protection on behalf of steel, automobile, or textile
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workers in communities affected unfavorably by foreign trade
would be to ask the individual worker to take responsibility
for worldwide economic trends which even the most
sophisticated Wall Street analyst can predict only with
limited precision; such trends manifest themselves over a
range far in excess of Buchanan's "moral-ethical limits.""*2
The Aristotelian objection to the Sophistic limitation
of the state's functions has been mentioned above.
Aristotle's most decisive statement of this objection occurs
in Politics 3.9, where he stipulates that the state is not a
mere commercial or security alliance; "But the end of the
state is not mere life; it is, rather, a good quality of
life."

When Voegelin distinguishes between permissible

"educative measures" and illicit "institutional reform,"
does he not slip into the same distinction between permitted
"persuasion" and impermissible "coercion" drawn by vulgar,
"Sophistic" libertarianism?

While he aligns himself

explicitly with Aristotle and especially with Plato, he has
at least given aid and comfort to a more vulgar doctrine by
letting libertarianism slip in "through the back door."
Strauss, for his part, is compelled to concede that "if
restraint is as natural to man as is freedom, and restraint
must in many cases be forcible restraint in order to be
effective, one cannot say that the city is conventional or
against nature because it is coercive society."

Strauss,

^^Aristotle Politics 7.4.1326a-b.
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incidentally, would appear here to be the best critic of his
own strictures against the supposedly "universal and
homogeneous state.
The most compelling textual evidence Voegelin can
provide for an Aristotelian warrant for his position is to
be found in the criticism of Plato's communism in Politics
2.5, where Aristotle suggests that the evils to be remedied
by Plato's schemes are due not to the absence of communism
but to "the wickedness of human nature."

The conclusions

drawn by Voegelin from this passage are not, however,
incorrigible.

Barker ecnoes Voegelin's position when he

mentions the injunction of the Gospels to "mend your hearts,
and not your governments" in connection with this
discussion, but he also recalls the Aristotelian insight
that "the State, as a compound, varies as its constitution
varies.

For that is it scheme: that is the way in which the

citizens, who form the parts of the State, are arranged in
relation to each other."

The relevance of this latter

consideration to the present problem is that the prospect of
a great accumulation of wealth can have a seductive appeal.
If this seductiveness is left unchecked, the citizens may
come to look upon each other only as either potential
partners in a lucrative "deal" or potential "suckers" to be
taken advantage of to the maximum extent possible.

In that

43Aristotle Politics 3.9.1280a-1281a; Strauss, Natural
Right and History, p. 132. See also chapter 3, 65-66 above.
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case, the practice of what Polanyi (echoing Aristotle)
called "hucksterism” would drive out fellow-feeling and
public-spiritedness.

If the regime does not undertake

"institutional reforms" to restrain this "hucksterism,"
subsequently it may find that the citizenry has been ruined
and that government requires far harsher measures that may
have been necessary at one time, because the polity is now
"constituted" by "hucksters" instead of public-minded
citizens.
The Common Good and the Contemporarv State
In stark contrast to his usual Hobbesian disparagement
of the active political life, Buchanan acknowledges the
human capacity to articulate a public-spirited conception of
the common good when at one point he makes reference to the
ennobling tendencies of democracy.

"Voting choice does

provide individuals with a greater sense of participation in
social decision making, and, in this way, it may bring forth
the 'best' in man and tend to make individuals take somewhat
more account of the 'public interest.'"

He must have in

mind here considerations of the same sort that prompted the
remark of Oakeshott about how "a proposal which may begin in
a want . . . must lose this character and acquire another (a
political character) in being understood, advanced and
considered as a proposal for the amendment of the respublica
^^Aristotle Politics 2.5.1263b; Barker, Plato and Aristotle.
395, 302; Polanyi, "Aristotle Discovers the Economy," 101.
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of civil association.''

Oakeshott here invokes that feature

of political discussion in which we achieve objectivity in
an intersubiective process.

A want may prompt us to put

forward a political proposal, but in so doing we must make
an argument in general terms in which we attempt to persuade
others that our proposal is in the general interest.

In so

doing we are forced to take into account perspectives other
than our own, so that our proposal takes on a character
opposite to that of a sheer childlike demand for wantsatisfaction.

We may begin with a simple individual want,

but the requirements of political discussion compel us to
adopt a broader perspective.^^
The implications of the discussion of the educative
function of institutions presented above are recalled.
Particularly apt is Strauss's evocation of the discussion of
citizenship and constitutions in the early chapters of the
Aristotle's Politics.

The theme of this discussion may be

summarized by Strauss's remark that for Aristotle "the
regime gives to the city its form."

The presentation

emphasizes the reciprocal relationship between political
institutions and the character of the citizens, and in so
doing it captures the true meaning of the observation that
political remedies, to get to the root of things, must be
^^Buchanan, "Individual Choice in Voting and the Market," in
Economics. 193 (reprinted from Journal of Political Economy 62
[1954]: 334-43; see also "Politics, Policy, and Pigovian
Margins," in Economics. 89-90 [reprinted from Economie. n. s. 29
{1962}: 17-28]); Oakeshott, On Human Conduct. 170.
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spiritual, not material.

For instance, "If we take a simple

view of democracy, it looks up to equality, and this gives
it its character."

What, then, is the character of a state

which is conceived as nothing but a framework for economic
exchange, and what will be the political character of the
people born, raised, and educated to be inhabitants of such
a state?

Buchanan and Tullock invoke the authority of the

economist Sir Dennis Robertson on behalf of the tenet that
the state ought to "economize on love"; the other-regarding
virtues, such as love, are so precious that we ought to be
sparing in or dependence on them.

However, if institutions

teach, what is taught by an arrangement in which we depend
on voluntary private exchange to the maximum extent, instead
of on the public virtues?

What is taught is; "We depend on

the other-regarding virtues for little or nothing in this
regime; you will almost never be called upon to manifest
them."

We should not be surprised when the people

acculturated to such a regime bring the same selfinterested, calculating tendencies of the economic side of
their lives into whatever political culture they might have.
Such considerations may explain the remarkable "empirical
fit" which Buchanan and Tullock claim for their approach; if
people inhabit a regime in which rewards are reserved almost
exclusively for the self-regarding virtues, we should expect
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that these will be the only virtues that will manifest
themselves in public as well as in private life.^®
Oakeshott, acknowledging an affinity between the
thought of Hobbes and his own highly restricted account of
the political, makes no provision for the cultivation of the
character of the citizens as part of the engagement of
politics.

Oakeshott holds that his version of Hobbesian

sovereignty need not partake of authoritarianism; it
"implies no frenzy for regulation or passion for
interference" in any sphere including that of political
discussion.

However, as Voegelin pointed out, the Hobbesian

regime permits no freedom of debate, at least not in
principle; freedom of debate would be permitted only at the
pleasure of the sovereign.

In a regime conforming to the

constraints stipulated by Oakeshott, in which so little of
substance is accorded to the political engagement, it might
be that political discussion would become superfluous.^^
Gray notes the preference shared by Oakeshott and Hayek
for a "nomocratic" regime, with its disavowal of "common
good" or "public interest," over a "teleocratic" regime.
Indeed, Hayek wants to purge the word "social" from the
political vocabulary, suggesting as it does in its use in
46gtrauss, "Crisis," in Graham and Carey, eds., PostBehavioral Era. 236-39; Buchanan and Tullock, Calculus. 28, 14345, 299-300.
4^Oakeshott, Introduction to Leviathan. xliii; Voegelin, New
Science of Politics. 154-55.
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such phrases as "social justice" a teleological standard for
the evaluation of the economy; he blames Plato and Aristotle
for providing a pretext for the admissibility of such a
"weasel word."

However, the early Oakeshott objected only

to an "overwrought" conception of public purpose.
Apparently, it was only after several decades of
"ideological hardening" that he formulated the strictly
drawn distinction between universitas and the preferred
societas.

He attempts in On Human Conduct to reconcile his

views with those of Aristotle, but his remarks are
fragmentary and unconvincing.

He contends that Aristotle's

political relationship has "no extrinsic substantive
purpose," that it is more "diluted or 'watery'" than either
friendship or the "'household' relationship," and that the
"end" of the political relationship is "not for him a
substantial purpose but a formal condition."^®
Coates remarks that Oakeshott's civil association is "a
kind of fidelity more 'watery,' urbane and moderate than
those of a tribe, race, nation or religion, or the
'political friendship' of the polis (itself formed from
tribes or villages)."

Corroborating Coates's account,

Arendt argues that the very Latin terminology used by
Oakeshott to specify his "watery" relationship— terms such

4®Gray, Hayek on Liberty. 2d ed. (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1986), 67; Hayek, Conceit. 106-119; Oakeshott,
"The B. B. C.," in chapter 5, 202-03 above; Oakeshott, On
Human Conduct. 110-111 and 118, n. 1.
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as societas and lex— actually convey a more intimate
connection when properly understood.

For instance, we read

that the word societas originally "indicated an alliance
between people for a specific purpose," suggesting a
connection of the kind Oakeshott specified by the term
universitas rather than societas.

Elsewhere we find that

"the original meaning of the word lex is 'intimate
connection* or relationship, namely something which connects
two things or two partners whom external circumstances have
brought together," as when two former enemy peoples are
reconciled to each other within a single regime upon the
conclusion of a war.

In such a circumstance, the warring

parties "now become partners, socii or allies, by virtue of
the new relationship established in the fight itself and
confirmed through the instrument of lex, the Roman law."^^
Spragens and Strauss both argue that appeal to the
public interest, incorporating the more intimate connection
discussed by Arendt, is an irreducible element of the
political, at least if any element of the non-reductionistic
classical understanding is retained.

Recalliny Plato's

mention in the Republic of the existence of an "honor among
thieves," Spragens argues that the felt necessity of even
the most authoritarian, repressive rulers to resort to an
appeal to the common good is evidence of the inescapability
^^Wendell John Coates, Jr., "Michael Oakeshott as Liberal
Theorist," Canadian Journal of Political Science 18(1985): 778;
Arendt, The Human Condition. 23, and On Revolution, 187-89, 211.
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of such a concept.

Strauss remarks that "the consistent

denial of the common good is as impossible as every other
consistent manifestation of the break with common sense.
The contemporary liberal state does not require the
absolute subjection of the individual to the common good,
but it does place some limits on the pursuit of selfinterest .

The liberal state might appeal to Aristotle's

discussion of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics for a
rationale for the balance it attempts to achieve between
self-interest and the common good.

The true egoist has the

same regard for his friends that he does for himself.

From

this it follows that genuine self-interest implies a due
regard for others.

What this "due regard" entails will

depend on circumstances.

Under certain conditions, for

instance, an extensive state and an accompanying tax
obligation that some may find burdensome may be required.
If the tax load is so burdensome that it becomes the
occasion for political division, this suggests that the
political community and the accompanying bureaucraticcoercive apparatus have grown to a scale greater than is
optimal for the human good.

Nevertheless, as long as we shy

away from a back-to-the-land policy of depopulation of
cities, after the fashion of the "agrarian policy" adopted
by the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia, we may have no alternative

SOgpragens, Irony, 383-84; Strauss, "An Epilogue," in
Strauss, Six Essays, ed. Gildin, 123.
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but to continue to maintain the "big government" apparatus.
To refuse to do so would be the mark of a base and ignoble
egoism.

The contemporary liberal state allows a fairly

robust pursuit of economic self-interest, but it also
insists that due regard for others be paid in the form of
taxes and the fulfillment of other political obligations.^^
D'Souza suggests that from the perspective of Strauss
there is no cause for any criticism of unregulated
capitalism: "Strauss's students say he did not spend time
attacking capitalism because he understood there was no
better alternative."

Spragens, however, recognizes the

half-truth upon which such a posture rests: "Western
capitalism has, in fact, averted a Marxian cataclysm only by
implicitly repudiating the unfettered Hobbesian theory
through new channels of distributive justice such as the
progressive income tax."

What, then, are the purposes that

liberalism hopes to serve by exacting the fulfillment of
such obligations as the income tax?

What ends are served?

Actually, the liberal state does not adopt as extensive
a set of ends as it might.

As Barker notes, "One of the

saddest things in our modern life is the man who has no
place, and who has yet full capacity and every desire to
fill a place."

The nations of the Communist bloc purport to

^^Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 9.4, 9.8.
5^0'Souza, "The Legacy of Leo Strauss," 38; Spragens,
Motion, 111.
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provide a place for everyone; the liberal state has not
attempted this, in part out of considerations of sheer
feasibility, reinforced by the difficulties experienced
within the Communist bloc itself.

Still less does the

liberal state attempt to secure for everyone the "meaningful
work" suggested by Marxian thought as a requisite of a truly
human existence.

The aims of the liberal state are more

modest, the size and growth of its state apparatus not
withstanding.

All the liberal state attempts to do is to

alleviate some of the highest-order violations of what it
understands as the necessary circumstances of the human
good.

For instance, the liberal state regards some kinds of

work as not fit for a human being, as in the case of the
person who might find that the only work he could secure was
that usually assigned to a "beast of burden."

Common usage

describes such work as "menial," which essentially means
"demeaning."

The liberal state tolerates a condition in

which many people do work which partakes of servility to one
degree or another, but it attempts to supplement their
incomes by means of either welfare benefits or minimum-wage
regulations, so that they can at least afford some
amenities.

Furthermore, the liberal state understands that

the good for man includes a modicum of community stability,
of which stability of residence and of occupation are
components.

Therefore, if the "extended order" is to be

justified in terms of the material prosperity and well-being
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that it brings us, the liberal state reserves the right to
regulate that order when along with (or instead of) that
prosperity it brings the "creative destruction” mentioned by
Gray but originally identified by Joseph Schumpeter.

On

this basis the liberal state justifies such measures as
import duties, tariffs, quotas, price supports, labor laws,
"social security" programs which include retirement,
disability, and unemployment payments, and "industrial
policy.
Contemporary liberalism insists upon a mitigation of
the "blindness of legal justice" remarked upon by Strauss, a
feature of law that is at the center of the debate between
"rule of law" and "rule by the wise" in classical political
philosophy.

As Gildin remarks, even the Aristotelian

requirement for unequal treatment of unequals may permit an
egalitarian principle as a "rule of thumb" under the
conditions of a dynamic market economy.

The legislator of

liberal inclinations supports measures of economic
protection, broadly defined, out of considerations similar
to those that led to the incorporation of principles of
equity into the common law.

Oakeshott claims the law of

equity can be subsumed within his "considerations of lex."
but how can this be justified apart from teleological
appeals to mitigate the severity of the law in the name of
53Barker, Plato and Aristotle. 372-73. Gray, in
Liberalism. 71, refers to Schumpeter, Capitalism. Socialism, and
Democracv (London: Unwin University Books, 1943), 81-87.
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the good for man?

One can easily imagine a libertarian-

individualist "moral radical" who would urge not only that
the legislature refuse to undertake any measures of
regulation but also that the common law be purged of any
principles of equity.

Such an interpretation of the rule of

law rules out any incorporation of Aristotelian phronesis or
practical judgment of particulars; what the contemporary
liberal regards as legitimate exercises of phronesis, the
radical economic liberal disparages as mere "expediency.
"I do not identify necessity and goodness," remarks
Grant in the course of an objection to the program of
contemporary liberalism as making too much of a virtue of
necessity.

He thinks that the contemporary liberal program

incorporates an attitude of ingratitude toward nature on
account of her being insufficiently beneficent.

On the

other hand, it is hard to argue with Spragens's invocation
of a "reality principle" as the test of political proposals.
If we can equate "necessity" with "reality," we can conclude
that the contingencies of our contemporary situation,
admittedly less than optimal from an Aristotelian
perspective, provide sufficient justification for the
measures we have undertaken, carping criticisms aside.
Grant, citing Strauss, seeks to restore an appreciation of

^^Strauss, On Tvrannv. 74-76; Hilail Gildin, "Leo Strauss
and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy," in Deutsch and Soffer,
eds., The Crisis of Liberal Democracv. 98-99; Oakeshott, On Human
Conduct. 138-39.
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the "beneficence of nature."

He seems to hold the

contemporary liberal political program, rather than the
dynamic market economy, culpable for an ungrateful attitude
toward nature.

Yet while Strauss describes our current

condition as an "economy of abundance" as opposed to the
ancient "economy of scarcity," we should recognize the
ironic twist that is revealed when we reflect that
Aristotle's "economy of scarcity" with its strict limits on
accumulation was itself based on the assumption of the
beneficence of nature, while our "economy of abundance" with
its proliferation of products and gadgets is premised on the
assumption of scarce resources with which to satisfy
unlimited wants.

In any case, we should recall that,

according to Strauss, the ancients' acknowledgment of the
beneficence of nature was consonant with a demand for "the
strict moral-political supervision of inventions"; it is
hard to imagine how we could be true to the ancient spirit
while refusing to regulate that most innovative of all
inventions, the self-regulating market

economy.^5

"In the following chapter, Karl Marx will be
criticized," remarked Arendt as she set out to draw the
threefold distinction among labor, work, and action in The
Human Condition.

She criticized Marx for his failure to

S^Grant, Lament for a Nation. 88; Spragens, Ironv. 12-13;
Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli. 298-99, cited in Grant,
"Tyranny and Wisdom," in Technologv and Empire. 101-102
(reprinted from Social Research 31[1961]; 45-72); Strauss,
"Crisis," in Graham and Carey, eds., Post-Behavioral Era. 231.
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acknowledge the centrality of the political, which she would
subsume under the category of "action.”

At the same time,

she did not wish to be included among the corps of
"professional anti-Marxists."

We may surmise that her

position was that the reasons cited by Marx for the
justification of a revolutionary supersession of the
political are, instead, good reasons for the moral-political
supervision of the economy on behalf of the common good.^®
"Vanguard" Politics and Political Breakdown
Arendt's criticism of a "revolutionary supersession of
the political" recalls the matter of the "problem of the
vanguard," raised and then dropped by Macpherson in a
somewhat casual manner.

His remark that "the debased people

are, by definition, incapable of reforming themselves en
masse" will be recalled.

He mentions the problem of a

"vanguard party," but then stipulates that "in the
circumstances we are talking about, there seems to be no
less dangerous way."

It will be argued here that the

"vanguard mentality" endorsed here by Macpherson provides
the best pretext for considering the politics of
contemporary liberal and leftist parties to be
"Hobbesian.

S^Arendt, The Human Condition. 79.
S^Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy, in chapter
4, 157 above.
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Voegelin spoke of the Occidental polity as having
achieved "an articulation of society down to the individual
as a representable unit."

Arendt, commenting on the

political achievement of the American Revolution, commented
on "the enormous power potential that arises" from "a
country which was articulated from top to bottom."

She

criticized the Americans for not providing for the entire
country in the Constitution the system of political
articulation of the New England "town meeting."

She

believed that the conditions of twentieth-century "mass
society" required such a system in order to provide the
ordinary citizen with an opportunity to participate in
politics without making a career of it, although she
provided no detailed blueprint for a reform which would
bring such a system into existence.

She professed a

sentimental attachment for the "council system" propounded
by European workers' parties during the nineteenth century,
which functioned in the Soviet Union for a short time after
the Bolshevik Revolution.

She believed that an intimation

of such a system had appeared in the form of the committees
which formed spontaneously during the 1956 Hungarian
Revolution before they were put down by the Soviets ("When
Soviet-Russian tanks crushed the revolution in Hungary, they
actually destroyed the only free and acting soviets in
existence anywhere in the world.")

Her advocacy of such a

council system stemmed from her conviction that politics
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properly understood requires us to conduct a political
discussion to which everyone in the polity is a party—
although under the circumstances of the contemporary nation
state this can only be achieved "in principle.”^®
Such a political discussion involving, in principle,
everyone in the polity is what America has most assuredly
lacked, at least since the nineteen-sixties.

The political

breakdown can be traced back to the elevation of racial
issues such as civil rights and school integration in the
nineteen-fifties.

The American liberal and radical

communities determined, after almost a century of neglect,
that the condition of American blacks constituted a
political emergency.

The measures that followed amounted to

a supersession of the normal processes of politics.

Reforms

were initiated not by legislatures but by decisions of the
Supreme Court.

For whites (white Southerners at first, but

this would apply eventually to whites in all sections of the
country), what was taken for granted all their lives now had
lost respectability almost overnight.

They found spokesmen

in the national media shaking fingers at them for opposing
changes felt to be deeply personally threatening; their
point of view found no expression in these media.

Suddenly,

it was as though a large fraction of the population had been
banished from the national political discussion.

Arendt

5®Voegelin, New Science of Politics, 40-41; Arendt, On
Revolution. 175-76, 234-35, and Origins. 492-502, esp. 498.
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contended that those questions that a polity declines to
discuss publicly provide a wedge by means of which
totalitarian propaganda could enter public consciousness and
become plausible; "From these sore spots the lies of
totalitarian propaganda derive the element of truthfulness
and real experience they need to bridge the gulf between
reality and fiction."

Americans are lucky that things have

not gotten worse than they have in this country, given the
gap between (for example) the moralizing lessons about race
being propagated in the mass media and the conversations on
this matter that might take place across a typical American
coffee table, in a barber shop, or at a gas station.
Civil rights for blacks, and, later, the Vietnam war,
may have been legitimate political emergencies.

As the

ninaceen-sixties progressed, however, the American left
generalized the approach of the civil-rights and antiwar
movements to almost every matter on the national political
agenda.

The "movement politics" approach eschewed the

normal channels of political persuasion in favor of a
confrontational politics of "consciousness-raising."

This

59Those who doubt that race has been the originating factor
in the political upheavals that have affected America since the
nineteen-sixties should consult Kevin Phillips, The Emerging
American Maioritv (New Rochelle, N. Y.: Arlington House, 1969).
See also Arendt, Origins. 353; for Arendt's explicit views on
racial issues, see "Reflections on Little Rock," Dissent 6
(Winter 1959): 45-56; she replied to criticisms in Dissent
6 (Spring 1959): 179-81. Arendt's biographer (Young-Bruehl, Hannah
Arendt. 315-18) notes that Arendt somewhat modified her views,
which were taken as conservative, in a private correspondence
with Ralph Ellison in response to a published interview with Ellison.
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latter phrase suggests the component of this style of
politics that many have found morally condescending: the
conviction of the activist that only he and those of his
compatriots have a sufficiently "raised consciousness" to
understand what is at stake.

The subsequent political

activity more nearly resembles an attempt to secure a sort
of conversion than it does conventional political
persuasion.

This "let's-go-have-a-sit-in" style of politics

has now been embraced by enthusiasts of a broad range of
ideologies: radical feminism, environmentalism, pacifism,
civil libertarianism, "gay" rights, and now even animal
rights and anti-vivisectionism.
No phenomenon illustrates the reality of an American
political breakdown so dramatically as the divergence of
world views between "left-activists" and a conservative,
mostly white middle class, whose reservations about
liberalism are manifested most dramatically in the form of
the "religious right"; the spirit of the warring sectarians
observed by Hobbes during the English Civil War is recalled.
The political scientists Carmines and Stimson distinguish
between issue voting on "hard," technical issues and issues
that are "easy" to take a position on because they are so
antagonistic; liberals as well as the left have chosen to
pick a fight with the middle class over the latter.

To

defend their positions on the "easy" issues, liberals have
had to resort to a strategy that is in a deep sense
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apolitical, relying on the Constitution and the federal
courts to maintain that which cannot be sustained within the
popular branches of government.

This strategy gives an

observer such as Strauss a pretext for saying that the
willing consent necessary to distinguish constitutional
government from tyranny is missing.

Especially with respect

to the matters of abortion and of several closely related,
highly sensitive matters involving education, liberals and
the left have put themselves in the position of maintaining
that a traditional religious perspective is inadmissable in
public debate, giving Strauss and his followers a pretext
for claiming that liberals are "forced to suppress every
activity which might lead people into doubt of the essential
soundness" of the liberal state, that they must "forbid
every teaching, every suggestion" that might conflict with
the program of that state.

The liberal state, legitimated

only by the constitutional courts and not the popular
branches, interposes itself between the state and local
governments and their constituents, as well as between
parents and their children.

In so doing it ignores Barker's

evocation of the state as "embracing, not negating, other
organizations," as well as Mure's advice that "You must not
try wholly to sweep away the lower levels."®®
®®Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, "The Two
Faces of Issue Voting," American Political Science Review
74(1980); 78-91; Strauss, On Tvrannv and "Restatement on
Xenophon's Hiero." in Chapter 3, 106-07 above; Barker, Plato
and Aristotle. 228; G. R. G. Mure, "The Organic State,"
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Spragens, reflecting the influence of Voegelin,
diagnoses the "vanguard mentality" as an instance of the
tendency of liberal rationalism to conceive political
knowledge as a technical science accessible only to experts,
and thus to divide mankind into "knowers" and "nonknowers,"
as manifested by the tendency of "sophisticates" or
"cosmopolitans" to disparage "unsophisticated," "parochial"
opinion.

Against this tendency, Spragens insists that the

politically 'mistaken* must be persuaded, not manipulated.
There may be political and moral experts, but their
expertise is only tentative; they must take account of the
point of view of the other, treating others has peers whose
political consent must be secured.

Of course, what has

happened is not so much that the 'mistaken' have been
manipulated as that they simply have been bypassed.

As a

result, the judgment has been rendered in some quarters that
liberals and the left are snobbish and intellectually
arrogant, not to mention constitutionally incapable of
securing acceptance of the measures of economic
"protection," broadly conceived, that it deems to be so
irreducibly necessary.

The sympathies of liberals and the

left do not extend widely enough for either to be capable of
securing the consent necessary to govern.

What is called

for is a religious, racial, and sociocultural "settlement,"
Philosophv 24(1949); 216 (discussed by Voegelin in "The
Oxford Political Philosophers," Philosophical Quarterly
3[1953]: 113-114).
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not essentially different from the settlement sought during
the English Civil War.

We shall let Kojéve have the last

word on this matter, with his observation that it is
tyrannical when one faction imposes its authority "without
•coming to terms' with the others, without seeking any
•compromises' with them, and without taking into account
their ideas and desires.
The suggestion here, then, is that setting aside
"vanguard" politics may enable us to win consent for the
measures of "protection," broadly understood, that are
upheld by contemporary liberalism.

If it is Voegelin's

argument that a spiritual conversion could obviate the need
for any institutional reform, then we must object; but if
his argument is that political consent for liberal reforms
cannot be achieved apart from a process of persuasion which
requires a "change of heart" that partakes of the spiritual,
then we see no reason to dissent.

With the accomplishment

of such a "change of heart," our reforms will, in Barker's
words, be "not merely dictated by law, but flowing from a
proper spirit."

To attain such a "change of heart," we need

to reconvene a comprehensive political discussion trom
which, in principle, no one is to be excluded.

Such a

comprehensive discussion should yield at least an intimation
of a genuine polity; since ours is a mass nation-state of

^^Spragens, Ironv. 105-109, 361-65; Kojéve, "Tyranny and
Wisdom," in Strauss, On Tvrannv. 153.
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hundreds of millions of people, an intimation is probably
the best we will be able to do.

We cannot escape living in

a polity; a polity on our scale will probably partake of
some of the "untidiness" that Hayek, Buchanan, and Gray find
so objectionable.

Such a state may indeed be a "necessary

evil," although that would be due strictly to considerations
of scale, if the Aristotelian approach is the correct one.
Nonetheless, we have no choice but to live in such a state,
no matter how untidy.
Once such a comprehensive political discussion is
reconvened, we should reconsider those policies that have
made the national government the antagonist of Mure's "lower
levels."

In so doing, we could bring about a qualified

revival of "federalism" and could mitigate some of the
deleterious effects of "large-scale" politics.

The matters

at issue here should be addressed with proposals capable of
winning popular assent, not just "swept under the rug."

At

the same time, we should set aside our attitude that any
exercise of political authority, especially in the economic
sphere, is proto-totalitarian.

As we have seen from our

consideration of the individualist-libertarian "neoHobbesians," such an attitude can itself have authoritarian
implications.

Against the tendency of a thinker such as

Gray, whose "moral radicalism" would prohibit both economic
intervention and legal moralism, we hold that both such
policies have costs that, utilizing Aristotelian phronesis.
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must be weighed against their benefits; unfortunately, many
contemporary liberals and leftists have embraced just such
an inappropriate "moral radicalism," at least with respect
to legal moralism.

They risk falling into the trap

described by Crick, in which "we fear so much the perversion
of the political tradition that was totalitarianism, that we
do not dare try for the republic.

®2cray, Hayek on Libertv. 64, 129-34; Bernard Crick, "On
Rereading The Origins of Totalitarianism." in Hill, ed., The
Recovery of the Public World. 44.
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